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The object of this dissertation is to gain an understanding of the speed of entry into high-tech
industries by "latecomers," private and national firms from late-industrializing countries. While
entry is traditionally measured with R&D performance, we have approached it from the
perspective of skill formation. Accordingly, we have investigated how some latecomers have
quickly learned new skills and connected their existing technical knowledge with a new stock of
knowledge, defining the speedy (latecomer) entrant as the first latecomer (for an initial entry) and
the first-to-market (for subsequent entries), respectively. Specifically, we have conceptualized
that a fast entry requires a continuous search for new markets and adaptation to a new
environment. In this regard, the speed of entry into the high-tech industries, based on the
experience in the mid-tech industries, indicates of dynamic capability and, accordingly, becomes
a competitive asset in the context of late-industrializing countries.
Theories in economics, management, or geography, which our hypotheses for speed of
entry are drawn from, have explained factors or mechanism that enable a firm to perform better.
We have first examined how literature envisages the effects of business groups, a form of firms
prevalent particularly in late-industrializing countries, in association with speed of entry.
However, relevant theories tend to compete and the overall theoretical predictions are not clear.
Second, we have further reviewed literature in technology management and expected integration
to occur both externally and internally when entry is executed. Third, given that the relevant
theories highlight geographic proximity for generating externalities, we have suggested different
measurements of geographic proximity for international learning, a distance from the
headquarters of the partner firm and an international joint venture.
Based on the literature review, we have postulated that business groups, integration
capability, and geographic proximity are significantly associated with the speed of entry by
latecomers and have constructed three hypotheses: Hi. Speed of entry by latecomers is related to
business groups; H2. Speed of entry by latecomers is related to integration capability; and H3.
Speed of entry by latecomers is moderated by the relationship between their integration
capability and geographic proximity.
In order to test these hypotheses, we have adopted two methodologies, which are case
study and regression analysis. Next, we have selected the thin film transistor liquid crystal diode
(TFT-LCD) and wireless handsets industries. The TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries tend
to have complementary features: TFT-LCD has a relatively short history compared to other
electronics industries and is capital-intensive. In contrast, the wireless handsets are consumer
goods and connected with the telecommunication service industry. Reviewing the histories of
both industries, we have identified latecomer entrants and have subsequently collected their data
by accessing available archives and interviewing managers and engineers.
From the case studies, we have found in the fast latecomers several interesting points
regarding entry dynamics: first, the owners of these latecomers continuously tried to upgrade their
industrial technologies into more sophisticated ones by closely benchmarking the Japanese firms.
Second, the fast latecomers mobilized managerial know-how from their firms and properly re-
deployed it to the necessary posts. Third, while managerial knowledge was possible to acquire
within a firm, technical knowledge had to be externally supplied; but acquisition of the updated
technical knowledge was extremely difficult. Fourth, due to the difficulties, latecomers accessed
whatever sources they could and used whatever channels were available. Therefore, no single
path to acquiring the necessary knowledge was dominant.
Unique aspects in skill formation and knowledge acquisition by latecomers have also
been observed: while acquiring technical knowledge from outside sources, both the first
latecomer and the first-to-market successfully relocated their skills from prior industries to the
new ones quickly, for example, from semiconductor manufacturing to TFT-LCD or from
beeper/car phone/cordless phone manufacturing to wireless handsets. Finally, in the TFT-LCD
industry, the first latecomer and the first-to-market took advantage of business cycles and
aggressively increased capital investment during downturns. In the wireless handset industry,
these latecomers, associated with the government research institute, developed an alternative
communication technology and quickly mass-produced it. However, not all counter-cycle
investment strategies by latecomers in the TFT-LCD industry succeeded. Similarly, not all
governmental efforts to incubate technologies were successful.
Based on findings from case studies, we have also empirically tested our hypotheses.
A brief summary of our regression analysis is that our first hypothesis is partially supported. The
factors related to business groups are not necessarily significantly related to becoming the first
latecomer or to making subsequent entries (the first-to-market performance) fast. In contrast, our
second hypothesis is supported. The result indicates that the first latecomer performance and the
first-to-market performance require different types of integration capability. Specifically,
becoming the first latecomer is determined by efficiency in external learning, while the speed of
subsequent product entries is driven primarily by internal efficiency. We interpret that the relative
weight of external learning may decrease over time, once a latecomer has entered. Finally, our
third hypothesis is partially supported. Geographic proximity to the headquarters of the partner
firm increases speed of entry, perhaps by facilitating communication and diffusing best practices,
but international joint venture between a latecomer and a leading incumbent firm does not
necessarily enhance integration with sources and does not expedite speed of entry.
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Chapter 1.
INTRODUCTION
"In 1983 when we first announced our plan to enter the semiconductor industry,
everybody laughed at us. We progressed with learning of production skills,
construction of production lines, and product R&D for different technological
levels. All of these proceeded simultaneously. Ten months after the announcement,
Samsung became the third earliest firm to successfully develop 64K DRAM. Nine
years later, Samsung finally became the first in the world to successfully develop
64M DRAM."
-- Byung-Chul Lee, Founder of Samsung Group1
1.1. WHY DOES SPEED OF ENTRY MATTER IN LATE-INDUSTRIALIZATION
Speed is a crucial aspect of industrial development. It addresses how fast a firm learns, integrates
new learning with its existing knowledge stock, and undertakes further creation beyond the new
knowledge stock (Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell et al., 2007). Speed is related to efficiency in
learning and adaptation, and ultimately determines the sustainability and growth of a firm (Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).
Speed is very broadly understood and used by scholars: it represents the time taken to
reach completion of product development (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Sobrero and Roberts, 2001),
of prototype manufacturing (Gort and Klepper, 1982), or of production engineering (Amsden and
Chu, 2003). Alternatively, it also means first-to-market in product racing (Khanna, 1995; Iansiti,
1992). For example, once a new market has formed, there is one frontier firm and other firms can
'Lee, B. (1986). Ho-Am Ja Jun (An autobiography of Byung-Chul Lee)
subsequently become first-to-market in the product trajectory (Chandler, 1977). Or, more broadly,
speed can be interpreted as speed of entry: how quickly entrants build up resources and mobilize
the capacity required for an entry (Mathews and Cho, 2000).
This research studies how the national firms in late-industrialization have made fast
entries in high-tech industries. We first define the national firms in late-industrialization as
latecomers (Amsden, 1984; Amsden, 2001; Gerschenkron, 1962) and investigate how latecomers,
particularly the "first" latecomer, quickly acquire the managerial and technical knowledge
essential to enter newer industries. Generally, latecomers are publicly owned firms, established
and managed by owner families. They are not a part of multinational enterprises originating from
the Western countries (Chandler, Hikino, and Amatori, 1997).
Scholars have provided diverse interpretations about speed of entry. Neoclassical
economists, for example, have argued that later entrants are more eager to learn so as to catch up
with the incumbent firms (Arrow, 1979; Khanna, 1995), while other economists have said that
new product introduction slows down as a product technology matures (Abernathy and Utterback,
1978). Another stream of researchers has asserted that entry itself is a matter of choice, given
first-mover's advantages and second-mover's advantages, considered from various angles
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998).
The most interesting feature about speed of entry by latecomers is that it simply does not
fit within the frameworks used so far in mainstream economics, or even within the mainstream
field of strategy. The problem is that the behaviors and strategies of latecomers do not follow the
frameworks of "regular" paths that economics predicts. Such deviation is distinctive primarily in
two main aspects: (a) latecomer entries are mass-production oriented, and (b) latecomer entries
are based on technological learning.
Latecomers have been delayed in getting R&D knowledge, compared to the leading firms
in advanced economies, but have been faster in pushing forward to mass production than their
advanced rivals (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). In the thin film transistor liquid crystal display (TFT-
LCD) industry (see Table 1.1), latecomers have been later than the leading firms in advanced
economies in making a success of R&D knowledge, but their mass production has proceeded
simultaneously with the world frontier firms. Similarly, in the wireless handset industry, it took
11 years for latecomers to catch up with the Gen 1 wireless handsets (see Table 1.2), but the time
lag became reduced to three years when latecomers began to produce Gen 2 products. By the Gen
3 era, there was no delay in mass production (or in development) between latecomers and the
firms in advanced economies. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that latecomers are very fast
entrants.
Table 1.1. Speed of entry: TFT-LCD development and mass production
Genl Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4 Gen 5 Gen 6 Gen 7
Development World 1986 1990 1994 1996 1996
Entry by latecomer none 1992 1995 1998
Lag (year) n.a. 2 1 2
Mass production World 1990 1993 1996 none none 2003
Entry by latecomer none 1995 1996 1999 2001 2003 2005
Lag (year) n.a. 2 0 n.a. n.a. 0 n.a.
Source: Company homepages, Electronics Display Research Association of Korea (EDIRAK)
Table 1.2. Speed of entry: Wireless handsets development and mass production
Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 3
GSM CDMA TDMA WCDMA CDMA2000
Development World 1973 1987 2002
Entry by latecomer none 1991 19951 none 20021 19991
Lag (year) n.a. 4 n.a. 0
Mass production World 1983 1992 1994 2003
Entry by latecomer 19941 19941 19961 n.a. 2003' 20001
Lag (year) 11 2 n.a. 0
Source: Company homepages.
Note: 1Korean firms
In spite of the significance of the capabilities of latecomers to keep pace with and to
compete against the firms in advanced economies, the existing theories have taken for granted the
efforts of latecomers to quickly acquire knowledge and master it for entry because technology has
been assumed to be free (Amsden, 2001). Clearly, speed of entry has paid attractive rewards for
latecomers that became the first latecomer and the first-to-market (Berger and Lester, 2005; Kim,
1997a, 1997b; Mathews and Cho, 2000). Yet speed of entry remains almost completely
untouched in the management literature and even in the literature in technology economics, where
"market entry" provides the dominant paradigm (Shin, 1996).
In this regard, the major contribution of this research is that it attempts to provide
answers to a puzzling question of what has enabled some latecomers to enter so fast in the
emerging (albeit with some product maturity) high-tech industries. The nature of decision-making
within firms is of a different kind from individual choice in markets (Holmstrom and Tirole,
1989), and is sometimes influenced by or interacts with environments (Pfeffer and Salancik,
2003; Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990). This study, therefore, examines the entry dynamics of a
group of latecomers, who captured new business opportunities and re-shaped themselves into the
new environments more quickly than others. A group of scholars calls this type of adaptability
"dynamic capability" (Winter, 2003; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). They have argued that
winners in the global marketplace have been firms demonstrating timely responsiveness and rapid
project execution, along with the management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy
internal and external knowledge (Teece and Pisano, 1998; Fujimoto, 1995; Fujimoto, 1999;
Henderson, 1994).
Another body of literature suggests that these firms should be regarded as entrepreneurs
in the context of late-industrialization (Mathews and Cho, 2000; Nelson, 1987; Lall, 1988): in
order to overcome disadvantages from being late, which was caused by backwardness, latecomers
had been actively searching for new markets and, once they were identified, entered quickly.
Sometimes latecomers blocked new entries and even behaved like a predator to other firms
(Granovetter, 1995; Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004), but generally were very good at promptly
serving the markets they targeted (Guillen, 2000; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). This study
focuses on understanding dynamic competence and entrepreneurship by a leading group of
latecomers, from the perspective of speed of entry.
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION
This dissertation is a study of latecomers' industrial upgrading into the TFT-LCD and wireless
handset industries, and their efforts to acquire knowledge and advance it. As mentioned in the
previous section, our research objective is to discover significant factors that have facilitated
entry by latecomers, and to discuss how our findings fit (or do not fit) the existing theories.
Our research question is very simple, expressed in one sentence: Why were some
latecomers so fast in entering the high-tech industries (even becoming the first-to-market later)?
Answering the question, however, is very complicated. There are many factors involved in speed
of entry by latecomers, and even relevant theories tend to conflict. What is more problematic is
that empirical findings have also shown mixed results. Therefore, we have built our hypotheses
on the basis of a comprehensive review of relevant literature about each ingredient for "speed" of
"entry" by "latecomers."
First, the existing theories have consistently shown that growth of latecomers is related to
their organizational structure as business groups (Amsden, 1984; Chandler, Hikino, and Amatori,
1997; Granovetter, 1995; Khanna, 1997), but have disagreed on the directions of the relationship
(Khanna and Yafey, 2007; Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004). One stream of scholars have argued
that because no latecomer possessed state-of-the-art skills and knowledge, diversification was the
major channel of technological upgrading (Amsden and Chu, 2003), supported by the group
structure advantageous for acquiring managerial know-how and resources that are not tradable in
the market (Chang, 2003; Kim, 1997b; Leff, 1987; Mathews, 2002). Accordingly, a firm makes a
faster entry if it previously operated in an industry which used production processes or machines
similar to those of the industry being entered. Given that entry into newer industries requires a
large amount of investment, strong leadership is particularly crucial in advancing projects
efficiently (Duhaime and Schwenk, 1985; Hambrick and Masson, 1984). Therefore, this
perspective expects business groups, supposedly having more experiences and know-how for
entry execution, to enter faster than non-group firms.
On the other hand, there is another line of scholars who have approached business groups
in the emerging markets from the market perspective. These scholars have argued that business
groups have been a controversial economic institution (Goto, 1982; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995)
and have suggested that the premium from forming business groups tend to turn into discount
over time (Khanna and Yafey, 2007). The reasons for group disadvantages are development of
external capital markets (equivalently, erosion of internal capital market) (Perotti and Gelfer,
2001; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005), abusive exercise of control by the owner family (Fogel, 2006;
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullaninathan, 2002), or rent-seeking activities in liaison with government
(Khanna and Palepu, 2005; Fisman, 2001). From a non-market perspective, bureaucratic costs
(Harrigan, 1985; Hill and Hoskisson, 1987) and organization inertia for information processing
(D'aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994; Hedlund, 1994), both resulting from operating large-size
organizations, exemplify downsides of group structure.
The relevant theories about business groups, despite their consensus on the relationship
itself between group structure and performance, are competing over the sign of group effects on
the performance and thus do not provide clear theoretical predictions. We therefore further
investigate the link between group structure and speed of entry by proposing our first hypothesis,
(H1): Speed of entry by latecomers is related to business group structure.
Next, we further investigate the source of their speed within and across organizations. In
order to become the first latecomer, a latecomer must master production skills and assimilate
technology of the leading firms as quickly as possible. In this regard, the first latecomer status is
achieved through a course of technological learning and the intra-organizational processing of the
acquired knowledge for the use of new markets. Even after jumping onto a new industrial
trajectory, the firm should continuously search new technological trends and upgrade its products;
otherwise, the first-to-market performance cannot be achieved.
Scholars have identified this type of response to changing environments as integration
capability (lansiti and Clark, 1994; Kogut and Zander, 1992) and have regarded it central to
dynamic competitiveness (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).
Integration capability is comprehensively involved in organizational activities: identifying new
opportunities (Iansiti, 1992; Leonard-Barton, 1992), quickly absorbing external knowledge
(Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996), swiftly connecting the
acquired knowledge with the existing knowledge and forming a new type of knowledge (Kogut
and Zander, 1992; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Peteraf, 1993), and promptly re-allocating the
existing organizational know-how and expertise (Teece and Pisano, 1998; Prahalad and Hamel,
1990).
While the preceding works contributed to conceptualization of integration capability, we
have further noted that integration has two different loci, depending on its functionality:
integration takes place at the border of a firm when external knowledge interacts with internal
knowledge (external integration), and within the firm when internal knowledge is re-allocated and
applied for new learning (internal integration). Theories have predicted that external integration
capability governs when latecomers try to speedily climb up the technology ladder through
interfirm learning (Capannelli, 1998; Mathews and Cho, 2000), while internal integration
capability concerns an entire and within-firm process where an acquired technology is quickly
being processed and assimilated (Ghosal and Moran, 1996; March 1991).
Accordingly, from an extensive review for literature in the field of organizational
learning and knowledge management, we expect that, if a latecomer has a high level of
integration capability, it excellently handles several external learning projects, effectively
implements multi-tasks that combine the acquired and existing knowledge, and, at the same time,
promptly moves toward new applications. Therefore, our second hypothesis is developed as: (H2)
Speed of entry by latecomers is related to integration capability.
In relation to integration capability, we also pay attention to the role of geographic
proximity as a facilitator for knowledge acquisition. In order to execute fast entry, a firm should
acquire and assimilate necessary knowledge, and begin to imitate what is learned (or, ideally,
create new knowledge) within a minimal period (Kim, 1980; Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman,
1985). Combined with technology management, economics of geography has maintained that
geographic proximity to knowledge sources generates positive externalities for recipients, which
has provided a strong motive for building interfirm learning alliances (Krugman, 1992; Storper,
1997; Audretsch, 2000). When knowledge in the form of codified information is processed in a
course of acquisition, assimilation, and imitation (including problem-solving), the distance
between a knowledge transferer and a recipient becomes a crucial factor because knowledge
transfer requires communication between two parties (Von Hippel, 1987; Von Hippel, 1994;
Zander and Kogut, 1995; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Given the importance of geographic proximity, we test on two types of geographic
distances, physical distance between a learner firm and the headquarters of a source firm as well
as physical distance between a learner firm and a collaborative source firm, (e.g., a joint venture
whose physical distance is supposed to be zero). While both concepts represent geographic
proximity, they stem from different theories. More specifically, joint venture has more
complicated issues involved in knowledge integration, for example, control problems or goal
incongruence.
The essence of our geographic proximity hypothesis is that, the closer a recipient firm is
located to its source, the higher the likelihood of effective learning between a source and a
recipient becomes. Therefore, we propose our final hypothesis, (H3): Speed of entry by
latecomers is moderated by geographic proximity. We test our third hypothesis using two types
of geographic proximity, one is the physical distance between a learner firm and the headquarters
of a source firm and the other is the physical distance between a learner firm and a collaborative
source firm (joint venture).
A brief summary of our findings is that HI and H3 are partially supported and H2 is
supported. Prior experience using related skills, managerial leadership based on family ownership,
external integration, and geographic proximity are positively related to being the first latecomer.
We also compare findings for the first latecomer with results of the first-to-market: the first-to-
market performance (subsequent product entries), is also positively related to prior experience
using related skills but, in contrast to the first latecomer performance, to internal integration. We
interpret that becoming the first latecomer is determined by efficiency in external learning, while
the speed of subsequent product entries is driven primarily by internal efficiency. The relative
weight of external learning has decreased over time, once a latecomer has entered.
1.3. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
This thesis puts forward a theoretical explanation of what has enabled some latecomers to quickly
enter some (maturing but still growing) high-tech industries. We provide an extensive review of
literature discussed in the academic fields of economics, management, and technology policy.
Chapter 2 discusses background theories, outlines our conceptual model, and introduces
the research design. We first examine literature that discusses speed of innovation, approached
from economics (industrial organization, catching-up, late-industrialization, and business groups),
management (product life-cycle, dynamic capabilities, organizational learning, and resource-
dependency), and the economics of geography. Beginning with industrial organization economics,
we first draw a big theoretical picture of the question of why speed of entry is important in late-
industrialization, and subsequently narrow down our approach. The literature review begins with
theories about "entry" and moves to theories about "speed" and its implications for "late-
industrialization." Subsequently, we examine theories about factors that possibly affect speed of
entry by latecomers, based on several perspectives (organizational learning, dynamic capabilities,
business groups, and economic geography).
Following the literature review, we introduce our conceptual model and research setting.
Our data was collected from multiple sources, including archives, surveys, and case studies. In
order to test our hypotheses, we adopt two approaches, case studies and regression. Using the
case studies, we identify several channels through which fast-entering latecomers acquired
knowledge and eventually became first latecomers and/or first-to-market. With regression
analyses, we examine whether our hypotheses are statistically generalizable.
Chapter 3 introduces the histories and technological characteristics of the TFT-LCD and
wireless handset (cellular phone) industries. We identify entries of latecomers and the industrial
dynamics that led latecomers to enter. We have found that latecomers in the TFT-LCD industry
used business cycles to swiftly jump on to the technological trajectory, and that latecomers in the
wireless handset industry deviated from the dominant trajectory for quick entry and ramped up
along a new path (CDMA).
Chapter 4 further investigates how the first latecomers acquired pre-entry knowledge and
fashioned their entries into the TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries, respectively. This
chapter elaborates on the three hypothesis testing using the case-study method. Drawing from the
experiences of the first latecomers in the TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries, we propose
that there have been several factors which enabled the first latecomer in each industry to facilitate
its entry more quickly than other latecomers. We argue that the first latecomer has benefited from
business group structure. Within a group structure, one subsidiary freely accessed knowledge
possessed by other subsidiaries in related industries, which provided skills and, further, some
level of R&D knowledge for the new business.
Second, we have also found that the owners of latecomers kept an eye on their rivals in
advanced economies with a view to recognizing new business opportunities and, more
importantly, drove their firms to quickly benchmark the rivals and mobilize resources for entry.
They favored unrelated diversifications, which often landed latecomers in difficulties;
nevertheless, the strong leadership of latecomers, empowered by family ownership, was able to
advance planning and implementation of large-scale investments at a rattling pace. In spite of the
negative effects from excessive diversification, diversification (and the subsequent scaling-up)
was the fastest route for the first latecomer to acquire managerial know-how and even to access
superior knowledge possessed by the foreign firms.
Third, we claim that firm-specific integration capability has been involved in determining
the speed of entry by latecomers. We divide integration into internal integration and external
integration, and examine how the first latecomer has managed relationships with sources of
product knowledge and of production skills. Findings suggest that internal integration was
affected by diversification; diversification promoted economies of (organizational) knowledge
integration but also increased bureaucratic costs, which delayed information-processing speed.
Becoming the first latecomer essentially required external learning because no latecomer
possessed cutting-edge technology. Some latecomers easily transferred product knowledge
incubated by the government, while others excessively competed over sourcing out the
governmental technology; some governments failed in coordinating firms involved in the
competition, while others minimized such conflicts; some latecomers sought to learn informally
from the advanced countries, while others preferred an equity-based collaborative form of
learning. Where no single form was dominant, the levels of endogenous efforts varied among
latecomers; and the levels of external integration, i.e., how fast latecomers acquired necessary
skills and knowledge from the major learning sources, also differed.
Finally, in relation to external learning, we propose that geographical proximity to the
sources of production knowledge elevates external learning, and thus raises the probability of
becoming the first latecomer. In order to examine this hypothesis, we present diverse sources of
data regarding latecomer access to the knowledge possessed by the leading firms, including trade
of capital goods, licensing histories, equipment vendor lists, and collaboration events.
In Chapter 5, we statistically test our hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested with
multiple methods, including content analysis using archival data, case studies based on interviews,
and statistical regression. Sample firms are selected from a population of latecomers in the TFT-
LCD and wireless handset industries.
Chapter 6 concludes our study. We revisit "speed of entry" in the context of late-
industrialization and argue that speed of entry should be considered a new competitive asset for
latecomers. We next present an abridged version of the entry dynamics illustrated by the first
latecomers in the TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries. Finally, we compare our answers to
the research question with predictions of the existing theories. A discussion of whether the
existing theories fit the real world ensues.
Chapter 2.
THEORIES, HYPOTHESES, AND RESEARCH
DESIGN
"Some of the factors that had served as prerequisites in the advanced
country either were not present at all, or at best were present to a very
small extent, in the more backward countries. The great spurt of




What determines speedy entry-execution as well as fast ramp-up in latecomers? In order to
answer, we first conceptualize two types of entry. One is beginning a new industrial trajectory
and the other is new product introduction on a given trajectory. We call a latecomer that enters an
industry faster than any of its peer latecomers thefirst latecomer, and a latecomer that succeeds in
product innovation (within a given technological framework) faster than any of its peer
latecomers the first-to-market. Our analysis throughout this study focuses on the first latecomer;
however, many factors apply to both the first latecomer and the first-to-market, for both cases are
essentially concerned with investments in new technology and skill formation. Therefore, we will
also discuss and examine whether the determinants for thefirst latecomer are continuously
involved in thefirst-to-market performance.
2 Gerschenkron, A. (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.
The idea of speed of entry has been approached from the perspectives of economics and
management. In this study, speed of entry is conceptualized in a way derived from several
perspectives, including economics (industrial organization theory, product life-cycle theory, and
business groups), management (dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, and organizational
learning theory), political economy (late-industrialization), and economics of geography (global
production network and interfirm learning). Based on these multifaceted theoretical foundations,
we examine latecomers' entry-execution decision, capacity building, and acquisition of
technological and managerial knowledge.
In this chapter, we review theories about significant factors that affect speed of entry by
latecomers and propose three hypotheses: (a) Speed of entry by latecomers is related to
integration capability; (b) Speed of entry by latecomers is related to business group structure; and,
(c) Speed of entry by latecomers with regard to integration capability is moderated by the
geographic location. For hypotheses (a) and (c), relevant theories tend to compete and thus
expected directions of the relationship between speed of entry and the hypothetical variable are
not clear; for hypothesis (b), we further develop existing theories. Finally, we use case studies and
regression data analysis for hypothesis testing.
2.2. THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES
2.2.1. Business Groups and Speed of Entry
A successful and quick entry strategy depends on two general factors, resources and
entrepreneurship: for example, an entry requires efficient communication among involved people
and units (R&D, marketing, planning, and so on) (Tabrizi and Eisenhardt, 1993), access to
technical knowledge (David, 1997), and available managerial know-how (Downs and Mohr,
1976). In this regard, fast entry is concerned with efficiency of mobilizing and acquiring
necessary resources, as well as of re-deploying organizational resources as quickly as possible.
On the other hand, the entry decision requires entrepreneurial leadership: capabilities of
identifying the "right" market at the "right" moment (in the product life-cycle) (Mitchell, 1989),
building pre-entry and planning for growth (Amsden, 2001), and making proactive investments
(Amsden, 1984).
We further review how latecomers have built their manufacturing experience: first, it is
important to note that industrialization of latecomers involves technological learning and
application of borrowed technologies that have already been commercialized by firms from other
countries.3 Because new industrial entries have been the results of learning and assimilation, entry
of latecomers undoubtedly brings up an issue of technology acquisition and imitation of the
products made by the incumbent firms (Amsden, 1984; Kim, 1997a). Although it is complicated
to determine the reasons why some latecomers are good at learning, scholars have agreed that
technological learning by latecomers has been accelerated by industry selection (Lall, 1988;
Dahlman and Fonseca, 1987; Amsden, 1984). They have argued that latecomers have favored the
capital-intensive industries where lower costs driven by mass production attract customers,
techniques of large-organization management are acquired, and system-related technical know-
how is learned.
Regarding industry selection, an interesting observation is that latecomers have never
pioneered a market. In contrast to the leading firms in the high-tech industries, often path-
breaking innovators, latecomers wait until profitability is confirmed (which also means that a
product begins to mature) (Shapiro, 1991). 4 Usually profits are already beginning to fall by the
time that latecomers enter, as indicated by the fact that these latecomer entrants learned
production skills from OEM experiences with the leading firms (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998;
Tran, 1988). These findings imply that latecomers' entry (the first latecomer performance) should
be approached from the perspective of skill formation rather than R&D success.
The second factor in determining entry decisions is related to getting human resources, a
group of people who are capable of implementing the upgrading projects with the managerial
expertise needed in high-tech industries, sometimes also related to entrepreneurship. Top
managers, in fact, form only a small part of the organization but they are crucial because a failure
3 An opposite perspective postulates that an incumbent firm leads and a follower speeds up their innovation
to catch up, like racing behavior (Tirole, 1988). Industrial organization theory proposes strategic interaction
between incumbents as a determinant of entry speed. For example, game theory, which models two firms
and two stages, shows that a leader increases its effort for innovation while a follower lowers its effort level
(Grossman and Shapiro, 1987). Likewise, "replacement effects" proposes that, based on the belief that a
firm maximizes the discounted value of its existing profit flows, an incumbent monopolist in a drastically
changing industry innovates less (in terms of investment in R&D) than an entrant, and thus expects to be
replaced by the entrant (Arrow, 1979).
Furthermore, mainstream economics argues that a follower's entry is, in fact, influenced by a
strategic decision of a leader. In other words, this group of economists does not assert that a follower
catches up based on capability and learning, but argues that the leader intentionally slows down entry of the
subsequent products. We acknowledge that this mainstream economics perspective provides an excellent
understanding of interaction among the competing firms, in particular with regard to the entry timing of
rivals. However, acquisition of more advanced skills is hard to view in game-theoretic terms. Hence, we
approach our research from the perspective of technological learning and skill formation.
4 While inherent backwardness in technical knowledge and skills constrains latecomers from entering
industries of upfront technologies, the leading firms make decisions after deliberate consideration of pros
and cons between earlier and later entries (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Lieberman and Montgomery,
1998). The main point here is that entry into a new technology business is a matter of strategic choice for
the leading firms (firms in advanced economies) but a matter of capability for latecomers.
in their supervisory and coordination functions has severe consequences for how the rest of the
organization behaves (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989). Thus, the human resource factor also raises
an ownership (or management) issue.
In late industrialization, the prevailing business groups in developing countries are
family-owned or family-managed (La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Leff, 1978;
Suehiro, 1997; Hiroyoshi, 1989; Hoshino, 1990). From the sociological standpoint, the family
control facilitates economic transactions (Granovetter, 2005) but, at the same time, causes
institutional underdevelopment (Fogel, 2006; Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000). From the
economics perspective, the relationship between family considerations and performance of
business groups is commonly found in developing countries: the group structure and performance
in the Thai business groups, for example, is related to their family history and evolution (Bertrand,
Johnson, Samphantharak, and Schoar, 2004). Beyond Thailand, there is also considerable
evidence on the link between families and the performance of business groups (Clifford, 1994;
Chang, 2003). While firm size was expanding, the group families reinforced their control by
using pyramid ownership structures (Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Truantis, 2000; Chang, 2003).
Given this substantial impact of family considerations, some scholars have noted that
upgrading industrial capabilities always requires heavy investments in skills and have
subsequently argued that such decisions would have not been made if not for family ownership
(Barbero, 1997; Agarwala, 1986). They have claimed that, in late-industrializing countries,
leading business groups - although not every business group - had very entrepreneurial founder
families: starting from low-level skills, these groups have speedily climbed up the technology
ladder over a short period (Amsden, 1984; Amsden and Chu, 2003). However, another stream of
scholars have contended that, while acknowledging the role of family ownership as a response to
different economic conditions, such a structure often destroys shareholder values and ends up
with severe financial loss or even collapse of a firm (Chung and Mahmood, 2006; Khanna and
Yafeh, 2007). This group of scholars have also pointed out that there have been failures caused by
mismanagement by group owners, as many as (or perhaps more than) successful latecomers
emerging from family ownership (Jo, 2003; Granovetter, 2005). Accordingly, the relationship
between group ownership and performance is complex and, arguably, may be non-linear.
Controversy has also continued over the organizational expansion by latecomers:
latecomers diversified aggressively during the industrialization period and one stream of literature
regards it positively. This stream of researchers argues that latecomers have been very active in
finding new business opportunities and getting in (Garrido, 1997; Suehiro, 1997; Amsden, 2003).
Diversification also brings economies of knowledge integration (D'aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994;
Taniura, 1989), which is especially valuable given that technical and managerial knowledge is
very hard to acquire in their markets. A corollary is that business groups, in the context of late-
industrialization, know better "how to enter" than non-group firms. Business groups may also be
efficient if they make up for missing institutions related to the process of entrepreneurship,
particularly new ventures initiated from the group brand name and reputation (Khanna and Yafeh,
2007).
Another problem is that, as firms grow in size, their organizations substantially increase
costs, particularly bureaucratic costs (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Williamson, 1981; Williamson,
1975; Mahoney, 1992). Sources of these bureaucratic costs are generally of three kinds: costs of
control and coordination, of adaptation, and of information-processing. As firms diversify,
managerial inefficiencies may develop because diversification creates complex problems of
control and coordination among highly interdependent production activities (Holmstrom and
Tirole, 1989; D'aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994). Consequently, costs of control and coordination
are incurred.
When an environment is changing and uncertain, the bureaucracy costs also make firms
insensitive to sense the change and they become further maladapted (Jones and Hill, 1988; Ouchi,
1980). The costs of adaptation are based on observations that, as an organization becomes larger,
the organization cannot adapt to volatile demands, business cycles, seasonality, and other
fluctuations (Henisz, 2000; Harrigan, 1985). High unpredictability requires more administrative
effort to cope with capacity problems in several stages of the value-added chain, whenever there
is a downturn in demand, and to solve shortage problems during periods of peak demand (Folta,
1998; D'aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994).
Bureaucratic costs are also involved in delaying the entry process: environmental
uncertainty increases the information-processing needs of organizations (Thompson, 1967). High
uncertainty creates a need to monitor the environment, to collect information throughout an
organization, and to synthesize it; but it is harder for larger organizations to process information
quickly (Galbraith, 1973). Slower information-processing makes a firm sluggish at scanning
environments that it plans to enter, as well as at communicating with business units. Hence, larger
organizations increase information costs and, consequently, the decision maker must trade off the
quality of information and decision-making against costs (time or other) of improving them
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989).
Minimization of the bureaucratic costs is central to performance of firms (including speed
of entry) and is supported by a considerable number of empirical studies. Scholars have shown
that the group structure in developing countries undermines performance and, further, threatens
their long-term survival (Khanna and Palepu, 2000b; Chang, 2003; Khanna, 2000). They have
argued that the diversification "premium" decreases over time and eventually turns to a
"discount" (Claessen, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Jones and Khanna, 2006). Claessen, Fan,
and Lang (2006) have showed that a diversification discount is distinctive in relatively advanced
developing countries, while its premium is more common in poorer developing countries. The
existing literature accordingly suggests that, in spite of economies of knowledge integration, if
bureaucratic costs exceed benefits from knowledge acquisition and skill formation, diversification
becomes detrimental and even fatal to a firm. Clearly, no latecomer can be an exception. Theories
also imply that diversification in relatively advanced developing countries is not uni-linearly
related to speed of entry. Khanna and Yafeh (2007), in their recent and comprehensive review of
business groups, have also assessed that diversification in late-industrializing countries
sometimes creates "paragons" and, at other times, "parasites" in performance.
The third factor significantly involved in entry decisions is related to acquisition of
production skills and product knowledge. The most noticeable feature in latecomer-style
production is, based on the latecomers' mid-tech experience, mass-production- oriented
manufacturing. In contrast to mass production as a predominant production system, there have
been various routes to acquiring production skills, for example, international subcontracting
(Rasiah, 1994), spillover from or local partnership with foreign direct investment (Lall and Urata,
2003; Cheung and Lin, 2004), or buying from a capital goods vendor (Wong, 1998).
While the prior works indicate that no single and external path to production knowledge
has been dominant, scholars have generally agreed that the business group provides excellent
"internal" markets for talented employees (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Chang, 2003; Amsden and
Hikino, 1994). Resource leverage through an internal structure has been frequently used for
acquisition of production skills (Mathews and Cho, 2000; Chang, 2003), although the way
latecomers have leveraged internal resources has varied. However, latecomers have raised their
proficiency of resource leverage by selecting new businesses based on their previous businesses
(Sato, 1997; Mathews and Snow, 1998). For example, the sequential order in which the
Taiwanese firms acquired their manufacturing skills was TVs, calculators, notebooks, and
wireless handsets or TFT-LCD industries (Amsden and Chu, 2003). Therefore, prior experience
in industries that overlap in characteristics with an entered industry - put in another way, related
product diversification - is an indicator of project experiences and of a set of available internal
resources in the context of latecomers. Using their internal structure, they have not only learned
techniques of production engineering, but have also gained mastery of integrating the skills they
acquire (Mathews and Cho, 2000; Shin, 1997; Amsden and Chu, 2003). s In this regard, having
prior experience in industries that use skills similar to those of a target industry raises the speed of
entry by latecomers (Teece, 1986)."
Finally, given that all latecomers relied on foreign technology, it was very crucial for
latecomers to obtain subcontracting from the leading foreign firms (Kimura and Ando, 2006;
Amsden and Chu, 2003). The Southeast Asian experiences, for example, suggest that
subcontracting with the leading foreign firms has promoted production skills of the local firms
(Rasiah, 1994). Although working with the leading foreign firms did not in itself transfer R&D
knowledge, enhancement of production skills through subcontracting has led the local firms to
undertake R&D (Wong, 1998). Therefore, we also need to examine technological learning for
new entry in the context of latecomers' relationships with the leading foreign firms. When
deciding on subcontractors, the leading foreign firms selected their suppliers on the basis of
production size, which signaled their capacity and reduced monitoring costs, since no latecomer
possessed frontier technology (Amsden and Chu, 2003). Although, in theory, horizontal
integration itself is not directly associated with quick entry, latecomers whose profit rate was very
low have benefited from their large size and production volume in access to foreign know-how
and have built knowledge-based assets, particularly brand names.
In brief, the factors importantly involved in latecomers' entries are identified as
managerial know-how, leadership, technological resources (engineers and scientists), production
skills, intra-organizational information-processing, active adaptation, and knowledge-based assets.
Literature on strategic management has also regarded these factors as critical for making
subsequent product entries faster: they are major components for capabilities that bring
sustainable competitiveness (Teece and Pisano, 1998; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Theories have
consistently suggested that business group structure and speed of entry are related, but their
interpretations of what is an overall outcome from having all these factors operating in business
groups, are controversial. Accordingly, we build our first hypothesis as follows, and investigate
further how speed of entry by latecomers is linked to business group structure:
H 1. Speed of entry by latecomers is related to business group structure.
s In the mid-tech industries, unrelated diversification often brought production engineering skills. For
example, when Hyundai began shipbuilding, Hyundai Construction undertook factory construction and
Hyundai Heavy Industry manufactured machinery. However, in the high-tech industries, unrelated
diversification lost its power as a source of technological know-how.
6 It is also noteworthy that other scholars have claimed that technologies of products and processes often
are discontinuous (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In that situation, prior experiences do not facilitate
speed of entry, and even may bottleneck organizational process (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994).
2.2.2. Integration Capability and Speed of Entry
In contrast to the complex relationship between business group structure and speed of entry,
business history has consistently highlighted that competitiveness is best illustrated by activities
showing that a firm learns quickly and becomes adapted to its changing environment (Nonaka
and Takeuchi, 1997; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Clark and Fujimoto, 1992). For better
understanding, we present below national variations in technological competitiveness,
constructed from the experience of semiconductor manufacturing, which shows technical
similarity to the TFT-LCD industry. The information in the table implies that innovation in
latecomers is basically different from that in advanced countries. The focus of latecomers'
innovation in this industry, for example, is to access critical technological knowledge and quickly
diffuse the knowledge, while innovation in the US or Japan is centered on product development
or quality control.
Table 2.1 implies that speed of entry by latecomers in our industries might depend on a
mechanism distinctive from the American or Japanese styles: it may not be product-oriented
R&D, nor systemized quality control built upon cooperative and trusting relationship with
suppliers. In this regard, speed of entry by latecomers is supposed to be enhanced by quick
translation of the acquired knowledge into mass production and firm-specific applications.
Because of the need to constantly catch up with the frontier technologies, this expectation applies
to both the first entry and the subsequent entries.
Table 2.1. Basis of competitive posture
Production innovation Process innovation Diffusion management
Competitive Product Process Access to technologies
focus
Competitive Intellectual property rights; Cost; quality Resource leverage
tools first-mover advantages
Competitive Firms Firms Firms; government; research
vehicles institutes; consortia
Dynamic Product enhancement; Process enhancement; Combinative capabilities;
capabilities R&D quality / time improvement organizational learning
Sources of First-mover advantage Quality/ time enhancement Fast followership
competitiveness
Institutional Atomic competition Limited competition Accelerated diffusion;
framework linkages with foreign firms
Lead countries US Japan Korea, Taiwan, Singapore
Source: Mathews and Cho (2000).
The diffusion-oriented management indicated by Table 2.1 suggests that latecomers rely
on more diverse sources and channels for knowledge acquisition. For example, when the
Taiwanese firms began to produce laptops, they obtained production skills from working with
foreign firms, developed advanced product designs from collaboration with research institutes as
well as from independent R&D, and upgraded supply technologies by forming consortia with
domestic suppliers (Chang and Tsai, 2000). These cases subsequently raise a question that is
central to our research question: How did latecomers manage learning from multiple sources and
at multiple levels and, as a result, quickly assimilate and move beyond assimilation? Evidently,
the question addresses organizational capability.
Regarding organizational learning, early scholars have stressed the importance of
organizational adaptability for timely responsiveness in an uncertain and changing environment
(Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984). Following their studies, recent researchers have
also identified a type of organizational capacity to acquire, store, and process knowledge for
effective learning (Grant, 1996b; Hedlund, 1994; Dosi, Malerba, and Teece, 2003). The early and
recent theories together suggest that successful entry execution substantially requires a particular
type of organizational capability, and that that capability should be understood in the context of
adaptability and learning. Kogut and Zander (1997) first named the concept, calling it
"combinative capabilities." 7 Combinative capabilities means an intersection of the capability of
the firm to exploit both its knowledge and the unexplored potential of the technology, the latter
being particularly termed by Scherer (1965) "technological opportunity."
Latecomers' entry execution in this study, however, does not only require resource
combination, but also needs some capabilities that can quickly change or re-configure firm-
specific assets for newer industries. Because their entry aims at industrial upgrading, entry
execution by latecomers is in principle horizontal diversification, but requires systematically
newer and more advanced skills and assets.8 Therefore, as knowledge-based theory, evolutionary
economics, and organizational learning theory predict, we expect that firms which attempt to
upgrade their industrial portfolio will make extra efforts to promote specific types of activities
and orchestrate them - "searching" for new opportunities (Nelson and Winter, 1984; Hedlund,
1994), combining what is known with new learning (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Zahra and Nielsen,
2003), and rapidly "adapting" to new environments (Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003).
7 Kogut and Zander (1992) have argued that even entrepreneurial activity cannot lead to the immediate
replication of unique organization skills through simply entering a market and piecing the parts together
overnight, since replication takes time, and the replication of best practice may be elusive.
8 History of Hyundai Group is a good example. It moved from the construction industry, to automobile
industry, and to shipbuilding industry. For more details, see Amsden (1984).
Specifically, we define this capability as integration capability; the concept was originally
proposed by Iansiti and Clark (1994) and denotes a capability to quickly venture into new
business opportunities, blend existing knowledge and new learning, and apply them to the new
environment.
We have further explored integration capability and have identified that there are two
types of integration capabilities, depending on the locus of their functions: external and internal
integration capability. Notably, the essence of external integration for latecomers is interfirm
learning (lansiti, 1992; Iansiti and Clark, 1994), since the first task for latecomers who want to
climb up the technology ladder should be imitation (getting technology and then assimilating it).
In order to imitate, firms have acquired various kinds of knowledge: product knowledge existing
in a codified form (design, licensing, publication, or patent) (Dosi, 1988; Katz and Shapiro, 1987),
production knowledge which is partially tacit (manuals have only limited information)
(Shrivastava, 1983), or learning-by-doing (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1997). The role of external
integration capability for interfirm learning has been confirmed by a large volume of studies
(Capannelli, 1998; Chen, Chen, and Ku, 2004; Gee and Luo, 1998). These studies have reported
that latecomers have been connected with a wide range of learning sources, including equipment
vendors, suppliers, government, independent technical consultants, and competitors (Kim, 1997a;
Mathews, 2003; Wong, 1998; Amsden and Chu, 2003).
Although no single source for external integration has been dominant, the way that
latecomers are externally integrated has been largely influenced by their links to government: the
experience of the leading East Asian countries, for example, has shown significant spillovers
from the governmental R&D labs to private firms in late-industrializing countries (Goh, 1996; Lu,
2000; Shin, 1996). It is also well-known that the Electronics Technology Research Institute
(ETRI) in Korea promoted technology consortiums for the wireless handset (Mock, 2005),
semiconductor (Mathews and Cho, 2000), and TFT-LCD industries (Mathews, 2003) and
successfully incubated the technologies. The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in
Taiwan was also extensively involved in diffusing technologies to the private firms through spin-
off or consortiums?. Under some circumstances, connection to government has, in contrast,
yielded damaging effects. Intervention by the Chinese government, for instance, caused biased
resource allocation and eventually ended up with unequal regional growth (Huang, 1996; Huang,
9 Burger and Lester (2003), however, argue that, due to political conflicts, spin-off projects from ITRI have
not been implemented. In addition, they also point out that the role of the Taiwan government was not
outstanding, or perhaps even inefficient, based on the fact that Unipac's mass production was driven by the
technology transfer from Japan.
2005; Ring, Bigley, D'Aunno, and Khanna, 2005). Overall, the effect of governmental connection
in late-industrializing countries is still debatable.
Internal integration capability, another dimension in integration capability, is concerned
with re-configuration of strategic assets, intra-organizational flows of information, and re-
allocation of skills and managerial know-how. Internal integration capability is involved in the
entire process in which they access the sources of technological knowledge and absorb the
knowledge as quickly as possible (Westphal et al., 1985; Kim, 1997b). The successful
performance of latecomers' first and subsequent entries, accordingly, also depends on the degree
of internal integration capability that processes knowledge through acquisition, absorption, and
assimilation.
Internal integration is well illustrated by March (1991). He has viewed organizations as
storing knowledge in their procedures, norms, rules, and forms. Organizations then accumulate
such knowledge over time, learning from their members. This process involves encoding
inferences from history into routines that guide behavior, as well as circulation of new
information efficiently within the organization. Internal integration capability, accordingly, is a
unique characteristic for a firm in the manner that the capability governs certain types of
economic activities, and such "uniqueness" comes from continuous and recursive interactions
between organizational learning and creation of new knowledge out of previous learning (Ghosal
and Moran, 1996). Consequently, scholars have linked internal integration with dynamic
capability, by which firms are more likely to survive under changing environments or even
evolve over time (Nonaka, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Galbraith,
1973; Grant, 1996a). Hence, speed of entry depends on how quickly a learner organization
assimilates newly acquired knowledge with existing skills and assets.
Several studies have demonstrated that latecomers' internal integration is centered on
mass production (Mathews and Cho, 2000; Tran, 1988; Yusuf, 2004). Mass production also
requires upscaling (Amsden and Chu, 2003) and, accordingly, it is a reasonable presumption that
their entry performances are related to proficiency in operating production equipment as well as
to progress for (new) facilities construction required for scaling up. Some latecomers, after
acquiring production skills, quickly mastered the skill of design integration, based on their
learning from sources of production technique (Ismail, 1998; Kim, 1997a).1 A few among these
latecomers have further developed innovation capability, the knowledge for design creation. The
10 In the case of the electronics industry in Taiwan, the source has been the Japanese parts and components
suppliers (Amsden and Chu, 2003; Berger and Lester, 2003). In the case of the semiconductor industry in
Korea, the production technique was transferred from the Japanese equipment vendors (Shin, 1996;
Mathews and Cho, 2000).
innovation of this group of latecomers is usually home-based and tends to involve group-wide
R&D (Kwak and Kang, 2008).
Due to its intrinsic nature as "internal," internal integration capability is related to design
of organizational structure (Fiol and Lyle, 1985; Imai, 1991). Theoretically, efficiency of a
typical M-form organization depends on shaping an organization into a matrix style, or, more
specifically, how well an organization promotes horizontal communication and decision-making
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989). Although M-form organizations have as many cons as pros, there
are two distinct advantages that latecomers in the high-tech industries have gained from M-form
organizations.
First, the interlocking structure has enabled latecomers to quickly acquire at group level
the managerial capabilities required for the high-tech industry (Chang and Hong, 2000). This
capability is specifically called "project execution capability" (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). In
particular, the Korean business groups have headquarters, which are responsible for doing central
planning and coordination with affiliates. Employees are relocated within the boundaries of a
business group and thus have a good understanding of the work of other affiliates and even other
employees (Johnson, 1982; Leff, 1978). The close relationship between headquarters and
affiliates has significantly increased internal integration capability: for example, when a new
business emerges in Korea, headquarters quickly mobilizes a task force team, drawing its
members from managers in the overall group's affiliates (Chang, 2003). By re-allocating
excellent "know-how" possessed by the managers in the Chaebols, the firm becomes maximally
adaptable and prepared for further learning.
Second, members of M-form organizations tend to share intrafirm resources across
subsidiaries (Amsden, 1997). Taking an example from Korea again, Chaebols established group-
level R&D centers and organized along broadly defined business lines such as automobiles and
electronics to meet these affiliates' common needs in order to facilitate group-wide technical
support for affiliates (Chang, 2003; Shin, 1996). Putting it briefly, latecomers have their affiliates
share technological knowledge, brand, and management know-how and, thereby, enhance internal
integration capability. Being all for one as well as one for all, latecomers have successfully
achieved fast followership.
H2. Speed of entry by latecomers is related to integration capability.
H2 (a). Speed of entry by latecomers is related to external integration capability.
H2 (b). Speed of entry by latecomers is related to internal integration capability.
H2 argues that the central consideration in latecomers' fast followership is their response
to a changing environment and the configuration of their external relationships with knowledge
sources; at the same time, testing H2 requires examination of internal structure and knowledge
flows within a firm. It also needs a detailed review of intra-organizational spillover of the best
practices, once acquired from external sources.
2.2.3. Interfirm Learning, Geographic Proximity, and Speed of Entry
Because latecomers have never pioneered an industry, their entries (both first and subsequent
entries), in a strict sense, were not based on innovation but rather imitation. This fact implies that
learning from external sources (originating from advanced economies) is a crucial determinant for
speed of entry, which is in line with product life-cycle theory." Therefore, as an extension of our
second hypothesis, we next consider how learning from external sources leads latecomers to
maximizing integration effects.
First of all, interfirm learning is influenced by geographic factors (Kono, Palmer,
Friedland, et al., 1998). Economics of geography has first noted that, if a firm is located closer to
its learning partner, learning is more actively facilitated (Krugman, 1992; Scott, 1992) because of
the advantages originating from lower transportation costs, higher externalities, and better access
to demand (Krugman, 1992; Scott, 1999). A corollary of this argument is that speed of entry will
be higher if a latecomer entrant that acquires technical knowledge is located in the neighborhood
of its learning source. 12
Theories in management studies have similarly associated geographic proximity with
speedy knowledge integration. The knowledge-based view, for example, has reported that the
discovery of the best practices, followed by a more focused inquiry into how those results are
obtained (Balm, 1992; Szulanski, 1996), often takes months of information collection and
evaluation (Teece, 1996) and has also suggested that identification and transfer of best practices
is fastest when geographic distance from a benchmark is minimal (Szulanski, 1996; Feinberg and
Gupta, 1994). Evolutionary economics, which emphasizes limited search routines, cumulative
" According to product life-cycle theory, firms set up production facilities abroad for products that had
already been standardized and matured in the home markets (Vernon, 1966). Foreign direct investment
(Hymer, 1970; Hirsch, 1976), particularly by multinational enterprises (Dunning, 1993; Caves, 1996),
transfers knowledge and other firm-specific assets. Because a production technology, when getting into the
hands of latecomers, becomes virtually "second-hand," faster access to production technology possessed by
the leading firms in advanced economies significantly raises speed of entry by latecomers.
12 Yet there is also an opposite perspective that geographic proximity does not matter. This view asserts that,
thanks to development of information technology, firms do not really have to stay close (Ernst and Kim,
2002). An increasing body of literature has also supported this perspective, reporting that technological
learning occurs through electronic manufacturing systems within firms located geographically far apart
(Chen, 2002).
learning, and learning-by-doing, has proposed location and proximity as critical variables (Porter
and Solvell, 1999; Zander, 1994), since repeated interaction and lasting arrangements for the
exchange of knowledge between firms, or technical learning, is very common in the innovation
process (Lundvall, 1988; Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, and Sparks, 1998). Organization
theorists have also claimed that, in spite of increasingly sophisticated means of communication,
the need for personal, face-to-face contacts in the exchange of information has hardly disappeared
(Von Hippel, 1994; Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Audretsch and Stephan, 1996). Further, personal
contacts have been identified as important sources of technological information and
improvements in time-to-market (Leonard-Barton, 1982; Shrivastava, 1983; Fiol and Lyle, 1985).
Therefore, our understanding is that, although recent developments in information technology can
mitigate problems in knowledge diffusion posed by geographic isolation, geographical proximity
is still important for implementing the time-to-market strategy successfully.
Geographic proximity is especially important in industries that have particular kinds of
technological regime - with non-standardized products, complicated goods, services involving a
lot of customized and negotiated content, or products and services where technology changes
frequently (Shatz and Venerables, 2000; Balasubramanyam and Balasubramanyam, 2000). The
interdependencies between knowledge integration and geographic proximity are substantively
complex, often intangible, and only occasionally involve the explicit and formal exchange of
ideas or knowledge (Florida, 2003). This is because some kinds of knowledge or ideas are
sufficiently complex or fast-changing that they resist codification, which in turn makes it difficult
for them to be communicated in an anonymous, depersonalized way and hence to transcend the
barriers of distance (Audretsch, 2000; Von Hippel, 1987; Storper, 2000).
Given the theoretical of geographic proximity, we test whether it moderates relationships
between speed of entry and integration capability, by measuring geographic proximity in two
different ways and: distance from the headquarters of the partner firm (following the geographic
definition) and distance from a collaborative contractual partner firm (in the sense of transaction-
cost economics). The two types of distances are not the same: an international joint venture, for
example, has zero distance from the contractual partner but has substantial geographic distance
from the partner's headquarters. Then, what are their implications? What are the critical points in
each type of geographic distance with regard to speed of entry?
First, regarding the role of headquarters in international interfirm learning, Hymer (1976)
argued that multinational enterprises' innovation occurred only in the home countries and that
their key inputs for scientific and engineering activities were not likely to move from the home
countries. While knowledge embedded in machinery can flow to other countries, know-how and
problem-solving skills are difficult to transfer. These types of knowledge are, in fact, the core
object for international interfirm learning and are largely embedded in humans. The knowledge
embedded in humans does not flow freely and is, therefore, heavily affected by geographic
proximity. Simply put, as a learner firm is located closer to the headquarters of a source firm, the
learner is more likely to access the human-related knowledge possessed by the source. Therefore,
a latecomer's geographic proximity to the headquarters of its source firm will reinforce
knowledge acquisition from interfirm learning, and thus enhance its speed of entry.
Shorter distance from the headquarters of a learning source has provided substantial
benefits for efficient knowledge transfer, which has been sufficiently documented by scholars:
when the Korean firms, for example, entered the semiconductor industry, they reduced lead time
by contacting Japan, a neighboring country. The Japanese equipment manufacturers shuttled
between the two countries for building fabs and teaching production skills (Shin, 1996; Kim
1997b). That type of geographic proximity not only helped the first entry, but also helped the
Korean firms proceed quickly to subsequent entries, as indicated by the facts that proximity to
capital good suppliers has enabled the Korean firms to continue to implement fast production
engineering (e.g., Hyundai automobiles) or to complete problem-solving tasks quickly (e.g., Po-
hang Steelmaking) (Amsden, 1984). The Japanese electronics firms also built cohesive
production networks between Taiwan and Japan, which speedily transferred production skills to
the Taiwanese subcontractors and eventually led them to higher value-added production (Porter,
2000; Feldman, 2000; Yusuf, 2004).
Another type of geographic proximity is distance from a collaborator firm, one of the
most comprehensively discussed topics in management studies. Management researchers have
shown that contractual alliances have provided latecomers with channels to systematically learn
codified knowledge as well as absorb technical and managerial know-how (Mowery, Oxley, and
Silverman, 1998; Nohria and Eccles, 1992). The standard reasons for firms to stay together lie in
"hard" transactional efficiencies (ease of inter-firm buying and selling), but recent research has
broadened the sources of such co-residence relations to include various kinds of "soft"
externalities, such as local knowledge spillovers between firms (Feldman, 1993; Audretsch and
Vivarelli, 1994) and dependence on human relations, rules, and customs which enable firms to
coordinate under conditions of uncertainty or complexity (Saxenian, 1994).
Interfirm learning and geographic proximity further suggest several ramifications: first,
because imitation should be quicker in industries where important capabilities, whether embodied
in machines or in individuals, are more accessible (Zander and Kogut, 1995), speed of entry will
be higher when collaborators stay closer. Second, because the interfirm learning becomes more
efficient when partners have similar levels of knowledge stock and more overlapping knowledge,
the learning effect is more enhanced if collaboration proceeds with a long-term partner (Mowery,
Oxley, and Silverman, 1996).
Third, because the pressure of competition is the pressure of limited time to decide and
process acquired information, firms in interfirm learning try to adopt and routinize the partner's
organizational practices and specific/technical knowledge as quickly as possible. During this
process, communication serves as a fundamental property for speedy utilization of knowledge
(Grant, 1996b). Thus, geographic proximity supports the expectation that, simply put, the closer
two firms become, the more likely they are to collaborate well (and do good benchmarking).
Interfirm learning, on the other hand, also considers more complicated situations. There
are so many considerations that affect efficiency for interfirm learning, such as prior interactions
and other production ties, as well as considerations of strategic inter-dependence related to
interactions in resources or final product markets (Gulati, 1995; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman,
1998). One problem that possibly relates to latecomer interfirm learning is control.13 Control,
defined as a purposeful and goal-oriented activity (Green and Welsh, 1988), tends to occur and
influence the knowledge acquisition of the partner. Specifically, in the presence of goal
uncertainty (Simon, 1994), control becomes common in rapidly changing environments.
If effective, control helps to enhance the partners' exchange of ideas, redirect employee
motivation and goals, and redefine organizational direction in line with new information (Makhja
and Ganesh, 1997). If ineffective, control creates obstacles to organizational learning through
suppression, passiveness, inertia, and delay of feedback on organizational action (Levitt and
March, 1988; Weiss, 1980), and also through organizational departmentalization, message
systems, and routine rules that separate organizational units capable of learning from one another
(Huber, 1991). Because learning is not a monolithic concept, a learner firm, if control is
ineffective, cannot automatically generate learning by following generally prescribed behaviors.
Control (or coordination) problems vary: they make capabilities of involved firms asymmetric
(Grant, 1991), lower mutual dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003), make goals incongruent,
and bottleneck re-negotiation among involved firms (Yan and Gray, 1992; Luo and Park, 2004).
Usually, such problems arise from gaps in the involved firms' capabilities and different attitudes
related to resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hamel, 1991).
13 Control is observed in another way. When partners differ in terms of their learning-related characteristics(intent, receptivity, or initial conditions), they learn at different speed (Hamel, 1991). In the setting of
interfirm learning, the firm who is of lower capability becomes dependent on the other firm of higher
capability. This stream of theory argues that a more dependent firm will be controlled by the less dependent
other (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997). In that situation, control is not mutual but
uni-lateral.
Besides, opportunism is always involved in an interfirm relationship. The reciprocity or
reciprocal commitment in an exchange accordingly manifests in the form of an informal
obligation as opposed to a concern for individual gratification (Kogut, 1988; Ahuja, 2000). Yet
contractual governance of exchanges involving complex and/or tacit knowledge is especially
problematic as contracts are very difficult to specify, monitor, and enforce in these circumstances
(Inkpen, 2001; Oxley and Sampson, 2004). From the speed perspective, an equity joint venture
can partially mitigate the hazards of opportunism (Pisano, 1989; Muthusamy and White, 2005);
nevertheless, it cannot be a perfect solution unless the goals of the firms involved are perfectly
aligned (Perrow, 1970; Hickson et al., 1971).
Overall, these theories envisage that, if firms fail to make their goals congruent during
interfirm learning, a party of lower capability will be greatly disadvantaged and, as a result,
information processing will be slower. Alternatively, if firms can keep their objectives consistent,
they will access complementary resources possessed by the other parties. Therefore, interfirm
learning can raise speed of entry by latecomers, but the opposite effect is also possible. Therefore,
we explore the directions of two geographic moderators by testing our third hypothesis.
H3. Speed of entry by latecomers is moderated by the relationship between their integration
capability and geographic proximity.
H3(a). Speed of entry by latecomers is moderated by the relationship between their
integration capability and distance from the headquarters of a knowledge source.
H3(b). Speed of entry by latecomers is moderated by the relationship between their
integration capability and existence of a joint venture.
H3 means that a firm's integration capability is promoted more if it is geographically located
closer to its knowledge source. For hypothesis testing, we divide our examination into two parts:
in Chapter 4, we examine the process of knowledge acquisition, assimilation, and imitation. In
Chapter 5, we test our hypothesis with regression models.
2.3. RESEARCH DESIGN
2.3.1. Research Setting
The research setting for this study is the entries of firms in developing countries into both the
TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries from 1990 to 2006. We include the entire list of
manufacturing firms in the TFT-LCD industry, that produce above a certain level of production
capacity. Our TFT-LCD firms are geographically distributed in Korea, Taiwan, and China. For
wireless handsets, we examine country production ranking (see Table 3.12) and select three
developing countries (Korea, Taiwan, and China). Next, we include the entire list of the wireless
handset manufacturers in these countries but limit our samples to the branded firms.
This setting offers several advantages. First, the research setting should be "recent"
because recent technologies in fast-changing industries best reflect the rise and fall of incumbent
firms over a relatively short period, and therefore are an essential condition for our research
setting. Recent (digital) technologies also help researchers save time and effort required to collect
data as compared with the older (analog) technologies that have lasted over a long lifespan.
However, we will also consider the pre-digital (analogue) experiences of our firms, taking
account of their technological paths. Both industries are fraught with high uncertainty and risks.
For TFT-LCD, although the industry shows a growing pattern, one product entry requires
millions in R&D expenditure or costs for production site construction. There are other
optoelectronics technologies competing with TFT-LCD. In contrast, the growth of the wireless
handsets industry has been stagnating, and the incumbent firms must choose a strategy between
product differentiation and lowering costs in order to survive. Also, sourcing decisions are very
important, as more firms become directly or indirectly involved in manufacturing wireless
handsets.
Second, we are choosing industries where product innovation is easy to identify. For
TFT-LCD, since the early days of the industry, the key feature through which to differentiate
products was size (Hoetker, 2005). Each product has advanced in discrete steps, for example, a
jump from first-generation (6-inch) to second-generation (8-inch). This provides a series of
identifiable innovations for which I can easily identify the firms that innovate into higher
generations of product. For wireless handsets, we use the same approach: so far the wireless
communication has evolved into the Gen 3 technology. Each generation uses distinctive chipsets,
product designs, and auxiliary functions. Accordingly, technological specifications of a wireless
handset significantly differ across paradigms (generations), while they change gradually within a
paradigm (a generation) over time. For example, the notable feature of the Gen 3 wireless
handsets is internet access, which was absent in the Gen 2 products. However, within the
paradigm of Gen 2, many upgraded versions of the wireless handset were introduced, for example,
mp3 phone, camera phone, or personal digital assistant (PDA) phone.14
Third, although both industries are recent technologies, they have already begun to
mature, as indicated by evidence that offshore manufacturing had started before the first
latecomer entered. This means that the average profit margin for later entrants will be smaller.
Hence, firms should enter as early as possible if they are considering entry. In addition, because
product innovations are discrete, entry should be executed as quickly as possible. Simply put, for
example, no consumer now wants to buy a bulky walkie-talkie for a communication device.
Fourth, both TFT-LCD and wireless handsets are manufacturing-oriented industries.
Therefore, fast accumulation of manufacturing skills is essential for quick entry into these
industries. This fact provides an interesting research setting, for the production skills appear
crucial compared to other industries, for instance, the biotechnology industry, where entry is
determined by discovery and development (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Mastery of TFT-LCD
and wireless handsets requires that not only manufacturers (upstream firms) but also firms in the
supply chain remain competitive. Technical challenges that need to be overcome vary in number
and complexity across product design, components, and equipment. Accordingly, management of
buyer-to-supplier relationships and manufacturer-to-equipment vendor relationships is required
for successful product innovation. On the other hand, in spite of the importance of production
skills in TFT-LCD and wireless handsets, production never outweighs the engineering efforts to
develop innovative displays and cellular phones, as well as to integrate them into a new
electronics model using TFT-LCD panels or new parts and components for cellular phones.
Fifth, the TFT-LCD and wireless handset technologies are complementary. While TFT-
LCD is a non-consumer good and capital-intensive, as well as demanding excellence in
production skill for successful product entry, wireless handsets are consumer goods, less capital-
intensive than TFT-LCD, and a product design-dominant industry. In order to minimize
extraneous variations from industrial characteristics in our analysis, we intentionally select two
contrasting industries.
2.3.2. Measurements: Speed of Entry as a Performance Variable
For measurement of entry performance, we select the beginning of mass production. There is a
large body of research which has treated R&D performance as an entry (Katz and Allen, 1985;
14 For further information, see section 3.4.1., which explains the history of the wireless handset industry.
Khanna, 1995; Iansiti and Clark, 1994). '5 Valid measurement though it is, we seek an alternative
measurement that fits late-industrializing countries. Entries by latecomers, for example, have not
been R&D (or patent)-based (Suthersanen, Dutfield and Chow, 2007). 16 Similarly, Kim (1997a)
has also argued that latecomers entered the mid-tech industries based on imitation. 17 The existing
studies imply that, if we measure speed of entry with R&D-related indicators, the speed is highly
likely to be underestimated. Because latecomers had acquired production skills and then began to
conduct product R&D (Rasiah, 1994), they did not go through a linear process for entry execution
(Lu, 2000; Kim, 1997b; Kim, 1980; Mathews and Cho, 2000).
Entry is of two types: an initial entry to a new industry and the subsequent introduction of
new products after the initial entry. The literature review that we presented in the previous section
suggests that both an initial entry and the subsequent entries are related to (a) business group
structure, (b) integration capability (both external and internal integration capability), and (c)
geographic proximity (both distance from the headquarters of a partner firm and joint venture
formation). Because any entry essentially requires re-allocation of competitive resources, we
expect that the three hypotheses are applicable to both cases. Differences between an initial entry
and the subsequent entries, however, exist. An initial entry needs a larger scale of resource re-
allocation and is usually regarded as more risky, due to information and financial constraints.
Also, acquisition of new skills is more strongly required for an initial entry. Noting these
characteristics, we will investigate cases and examine findings from the case studies
quantitatively.
Because we have two industries with multiple firms from different countries, we are
going to triangularize our approach by using both case studies and statistical analysis. Detailed
illustrations to operationalize statistical analysis are presented in the subsequent chapters
(Chapters 3, 4, and 5).
15 This stream of research has originated from the advanced economies and the R&D-related measurements
have been acknowledged as common variables and thus widely used by scholars in innovation studies.
Based on the assumption that the firms (in advanced economies) tend to follow a linear process of
production engineering, these firms are expected to begin production as soon as they develop R&D
knowledge. Product development is thus commonly used to gauge the activities of the firms in advanced
economies. In addition to R&D performance, prototype development is frequently used as an entry
indicator (Thomske, 1998; Thompke, Von Hippel, and Franke, 1998; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Cusumano
and Takeishi, 1991).
16 For more information, see the Singapore, South Korea, China, Taiwan, ASEAN, and Latin America
cases in Suthersanen, Dutfield, and Chow (2007).
17 Latecomers go through three stages: duplicated imitation, creative imitation, and innovation. At the stage
of duplicated imitation, latecomers copy product designs and/or processes from the early movers. Imitation
is attempted at the level of modular or, at best, system improvement. When latecomers reach the stage of
creative imitation, they are capable of devising new products by drawing on the best practices. Finally, the
innovation stage refers to when latecomers can originate applications or even advance interface
technologies. Latecomers' entry occurs at the stage of duplicated imitation (Kim, 1997).
Chapter 3.
INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS:
THE THIN FILM TRANSISTOR-LIQUID CRYSTAL
DISPLAY AND WIRELESS HANDSET INDUSTRIES
"Korean companies had no market share in phones or infrastructure - it
was all Nokia and other foreign companies. If they had gone TDMA,
they'd still be shut out because they would have been behind the
development of all the other competitors developing TDMA products.
But if they went with CDMA, they could be early suppliers and
establish themselves as the leading manufacturers in their market."
-- Steve Altman, Executive VP and President, Qualcomm Technology Licensingi1
3.1. OVERVIEW
This chapter introduces our industries and firms and examines entry of firms in late-
industrialization. In Chapter 3, we examine the background of how these latecomers have
acquired critical knowledge for entry into the TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries. As we
discussed in Chapter 2, two perspectives have been competing over firms' racing behavior in new
product development and production.'" The underlying theories can be briefly recapped as two
contrasting theories that view the central factors for innovation as strategic actions by the leading
firms versus endogenous learning by latecomers.
18 Mock, D. (2007). Qualcomm Equation.
'9 See section 2.2. for further information.
First, mainstream economics posits that leading firms consider rivals' actions when
formulating their decisions for innovation. The fundamental motivation for the strategic
interaction is that leading firms intend to reap profits from their current products as long as
possible (Arrow, 1979; Tirole, 1988). Accordingly, the leading firms intentionally reduce their
speed of innovation, expecting to be replaced by new entrants.
Another view of racing behavior argues that, when the incumbent's flow profits are large
enough, the same replacement effect causes the incumbent to be replaced only temporarily
(Khanna and Iansiti, 1997). In this view, the incumbent subsequently regains a dominant position
with a superior version of the new technology, but its attempt to accelerate discovery implies that
the subsequent innovation is inferior, based on the fact that first-to-market (including fast entry)
can be achieved by more investment but the outcome from the speed is the same as with the
previous outcome. 20
On the other hand, catching-up theories based on neo-Schumpeterian economics claim
that, because latecomers lack skills, product knowledge, finance, and equipment, latecomers'
entry is less influenced by the strategic choice of the leading firms and largely driven by
latecomers' accumulated learning and capability upgrading (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This
group of scholars suggests that developing countries have shown an innovation pattern different
from developed countries and thus latecomers' speed of entry should be understood in the context
of their histories and endogenous elements (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Chen and Sewell, 1996;
Gershenkron, 1962).
This perspective argues that latecomers' move to high-tech industry has been acquired by
the sustainable competitive resources gained through linkage, resource leverage, and learning
(Mathews and Cho, 2000). The endogenous factors include close collaboration with government
(Amsden, 2001; Kim, 1997), investment by large firms in building competitive resources
(Mathews, 2002; Lu, 2000), small firms and their flexibility and networking (Berger and Lester,
2005), or a high rate of tertiary education (Kim, 1997; Hopper, 2003).
As Table 3.1 suggests, latecomers were late in the success of product development but
were quick in mass production. The table suggests that (a) latecomers in the TFT-LCD industry
have been lagging behind the frontier firms (mainly, the Japanese firms) in having product
knowledge, and; (b) in spite of their delayed access to the knowledge of how a product is
manufacturable, latecomers applied late knowledge into mass production more quickly than the
frontier firms. Therefore, we first investigate technological characteristics of the TFT-LCD and
20 The value of output from shortened time-to-market is not a function of the amount invested. See Khanna
and Iansiti (1997) for further details.
wireless handset industries, backdrops of latecomer entries, and market performance by
latecomers. In the subsequent chapter, we will examine in more detail the entry dynamics of the
first latecomer.
Table 3.1. Speed of entry: TFT-LCD development and mass production
Genl Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4 Gen 5 Gen 6 Gen 7
Development World 1986 1990 1994 1996 1996
Entry by latecomer none 1992 1995 1998
Lag (year) 2 1 2
Mass production World 1990 1993 1996 -- -- 2003
Entry by latecomer none 1995 1996 1999 2001 2003 2005
Lag (year) -- 2 0 -- -- 0 --
Source: Company homepages, Electronics Display Research Association of Korea (EDIRAK); same as
Table 1.1.
The main body of Chapter 3 examines the backgrounds of industrial evolution at product
level: flat panel display (TFT-LCD) and wireless handset phone. Based on the product life cycle
theory, we review histories of industrial development in the two industries and identify entrants
from developing countries. The study of product technology also includes the evolution of
technology, entry onto the product technology trajectory, and the subsequent product upgrading
in the given product trajectory (first-to-market) that enabled latecomers to begin selling their own
brands. This chapter chooses case studies as a primary approach.
3.2. THE TFT-LCD INDUSTRY
3.2.1. Evolution in TFT-LCD Technology: Discontinuous Product Innovation
Cathode-Ray Tube (CRT) Era
The invention of the cathode-ray tube by Karl Ferdinand Braun in 1897 marked the dawn of a
new display age. A cathode-ray tube, or CRT, is a specialized vacuum tube in which images are
produced when an electron beam strikes a phosphorescent surface. Television sets, computers,
automated teller machines, video game machines, video cameras, monitors, oscilloscopes, and
radar displays all contain cathode-ray tubes. Phosphor screens using multiple beams of electrons
have allowed CRTs to display millions of colors (Thompson, 2005).
With a high demand from the electronics industries, CRTs were dominant in the display
market by the late 1990s and, like most electronic components, their manufacturing was
characterized by intense competition among companies as well as countries. CRTs were treated
as commodities with tiny profit margins for their makers, and efficient producers sought low
costs and high quality (Electronic News, 2002).
Brand marketers therefore were increasingly turning to contract manufacturers to
manufacture either subsystems or complete electronic products. The brand marketers were not
generally involved in the physical manufacturing of products produced under their names. In the
1990s, brand marketers such as Toshiba, Philips, Sony, or NEC still reigned over the CRT
industry, but they themselves did not manufacture. They outsourced to contract manufacturers
and suppliers through a global production network. The OEMs in lower-wage countries tended to
specialize in manufacturing only, and brand marketers were responsible for R&D, marketing, and
distribution (Encyclopedia of Global Industries, 2003).
The big brands continued to upgrade CRT technology by investing in R&D. However,
the CRT technology was maturing and profits were declining. Production targeted low costs. In
1997, Philips Research Laboratories in Eindhoven successfully developed 10mm-deep CRT
technology whose color rendition was even better than thin film transistor liquid crystal diode
(TFT-LCD) technology at that time. In spite of the successful outcome, Philips was not planning
to take the technology into production, not on technical grounds, but because it could not find a
partner firm which was able and willing to make a large-scale fixed investment in the waning
business (Bush, 1997). Profit margins on CRT technology continued to fall sharply, and LCD
emerged to rival CRT (see Table 3.2). The market was structured in two tiers: high-end
manufacturers (Japanese and Korean firms) vs. non-high-end manufacturers (Southeast Asian and
Chinese makers, including OEMs).
Competing against LCDs, the CRT technology had already reached state-of-the-art in the
late 1990s: although LCDs were small, light, and low power-consuming, CRTs were cheaper and
had better displays than LCDs (Electronics Weekly, 1997). Nevertheless, large-size display
became popular and, what is worse, CRTs were less profitable in large-size products than LCD.
Accordingly, some Japanese big brands left the CRT business and others moved production lines
from Japan to overseas. Both the firms which left and the remainder began to concentrate on the
LCD products.





Source: Frost and Sullivan, online source.
Hence, the Korean firms took over the CRT market (see Table 3.3). Samsung, LG-Philips,
and Orion have been the major CRT producers. The firms from developing countries have
remained in the industry because CRTs are still selling in lower-wage countries due to the higher
prices of LCD products. Yet products made by the winning CRT manufacturers do not match the
manufacturers' country-of-origin.
Taking the example of Korea, most of the production lines are located in lower-wage
countries (primarily China) while the R&D labs remain in Korea (see Figure 3.1). As a result, the
number of the Korean CRT parts and components suppliers decreased sharply; they followed the
exodus of assemblers, merged into bigger producers, or diversified into other businesses, leaving
only 20 percent as much production volume locally produced, compared in 2000 (SERI, 2005).
Table 3.3. Market share of CRT, 2001
Rank Firm Country Market share
1 LG-Philips Korea/Netherlands 23.7%
2 Samsung (Samsung SDI) Korea 21.4%
3 CPT Taiwan 10.0%
4 Sony Japan 6.8%
5 Thomson France 6.4%
Source: LG Electronics Technology Institute, 2002.
Figure 3.1. CRT production in 2003: By manufacturer's origin (left) and country of origin (right)
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TFT-LCD Era
The potential use of liquid crystal displays (LCDs) was initially demonstrated by RCA in 1968
but failed to be produced due to a high level of voltage and electricity being required. The LCD
products were not commercialized until Sharp introduced portable electronic calculators in the
late 1970s using LCD. Technical progress achieved in the late 1970s in the semiconductor
industry led LCDs to become used as display panels in electronics.
The earliest form was twisted nematic (TN) and supertwisted nematic (STN). From the
late 1970s, the Japanese government connected electronics manufacturers and suppliers in a
consortium to develop LCDs into a more complicated form, thin film transistor (TFT), as well as
to promote commercial use. As a result, Sanyo, Toshiba, and Canon introduced pilot products for
amorphous silicon (a-Si) TFT-LCD in 1982.
TFT-LCD technology was first mounted in watches by Seiko, next in calculators by
Sharp, and then in word processors in the 80s. The introduction of TFT-LCD displays in the early
90s accompanied full color displays. In 1987, Sharp succeeded in pilot production of TFT-LCD,
for TV and then became the first to mass-produce in 1990. Other Japanese firms soon joined
mass production of TFT-LCDs. From 1982, when pilot TFT-LCD products were developed, the
Japanese dominance in the LCD industry continued until Samsung began mass production in
1995 as the first latecomer. Among various display products, TFT-LCD has driven the growth of
the display market (see Figure 3.2).
In accordance with technical progress in TFT-LCD, the CRT technology also evolved.
CRT and TFT-LCD compete against each other but their industrial natures do not share common
factors. TFT-LCD requires a great deal of financial input and process (or production) technology.
Most of all, in terms of production technology, manufacturing TFT-LCD is very similar to
semiconductor production. More specifically, both businesses rely on the foundry process and,
like the semiconductor industry, what matters to the TFT-LCD manufacturing process is timely
investment in facility construction and finances to continue the sequential investments in facility
renovation and expansion.
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This suggests two important implications: first, while display manufacturers have moved
from CRT to TFT-LCD, the technological trajectory is discontinuous. Because manufacturing
TFT-LCD requires entirely different production skills, the firms willing to shift to TFT-LCD need
to find new sources for production. In the Japanese firms' case, it was the semiconductor
manufacturing technology. Second, because production requires large-scale investment in
constructions, it is difficult for incumbent firms in TFT-LCD to act as described by the economic
theory. The gist of the industrial organization theory is that a leader intentionally slows down and
then innovates again right before a follower catches up. Yet, because capital investment and
equipment are key constituents in TFT-LCD innovation, production timing based on swift and
flexible action is not practicable.
We examine technological leadership in the early stage (stage before emergence of
latecomers) and present a table below. We have found that the action of leaders in TFT-LCD did
not necessarily follow the "wait-and-see" strategy predicted by mainstream economics. First, as
suggested by Table 3.4, the Japanese firms were leading innovators, but no firm was dominant
until the emergence of latecomers. Second, while the economic theory predicts that followers
tend to bring more innovation, both the Japanese firms and the Korean firms were actively
competing over TFT-LCD innovation. The data suggests that mainstream economics is limited as
a theoretical framework for late-industrial research.






















Development of high-temperature poly-Si TFT-LCD color TV
Development of 14-inch (Gen 3.5) a-Si TFT-LCD
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 1)
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 1)
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 1)
Construction for TFT-LCD (Gen 2) production
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 2)
Development of 21-inch (Gen 5) TFT-LCD
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 2)
Production of TFT-LCD (Gen 2)
Development of 22-inch (Gen 6) TFT-LCD
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 2)
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 2.5)
Development of 29-inch TFT-LCD (Gen 6) production
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 3)
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 2)
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 3)
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 3)
Development of 40-inch TFT-LCD
Investment in Gen 3.5
Investment in Gen 3.5
Investment in Gen 3.5
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 3.5)
Mass production of TFT-LCD (Gen 3.5)
Source: Nikkei Electronics Market Access Report (1999) and author.
3.2.2. Entry of Latecomers
Technological Maturity and the Japanese Economy
In spite of their delayed starts, latecomers have found ways to engineer their entry into the TFT-
LCD industry and have rapidly claimed leadership. Scholars have argued that there are factors
which induced entry of latecomers to the TFT-LCD industry, which is market-pull and business
cycle (Mathews and Cho, 2000; Fuller, Akinwande, and Sodini, 2005; Numagami, 1999). In
general, a "market-pull" factor means that increase of market size drives production, inducing
mass production (Rothwell, 1992). On the other hand, a "business cycle" factor means that
technology itself is a force driving innovation and new entrants take advantage of ups and downs
in the industrial cycle to achieve a quick and easy entry (Linden, Hart, Lenway, and Murtha,
1998).
We first examine the "market-pull" factor. An historical examination of the TFT-LCD
technology suggests (see Table 3.5) that, in spite of the Japanese mass production, the TFT-LCD
products were still high-priced and served only specific demands until Samsung, the first entrant
from developing countries, began to produce Gen 3 products in 1996. Samsung's initial entry was
with mass production for Gen 2 products in 1995, but it was not in the large-scale manner that it
has done with post-Gen 2 products.
The entry of the Korean firms has reshaped the pattern of racing behavior in TFT-LCD
innovation: most distinctively, latecomers dropped product prices sharply, at the same time
building production sites for advanced technologies concurrently with the leading firms in
advanced economies. Plummeting profit margins forced the leading firms (mainly the Japanese
firms) to make a choice between moving to advanced products or leaving the industry. Because a
timely and large capital investment is a crucial condition for successful technological leadership
in the TFT-LCD business, both the Japanese firms and the latecomers were being pushed to
further the advancement of the TFT-LCD technology by making repeated investments. The
Japanese firms responded to the competitive pressure by moving production lines overseas for
TFT-LCD of earlier generations.
At the same time, the Japanese firms were also pooling resources for jumping to next
generations. However, they were thwarted in implementing the product advancement plan
because the Japanese economy had been in depression. The economic slowdown in Japan in the
late 1990s also caused the Japanese TFT-LCD firms to falter in further investments for post-third
generation technologies (Amsden and Chu, 2003). It was a very risky strategy to continue product
racing and eventually the Japanese firms, except Sharp, decided to stop investing further in TFT-
LCD technology for Gen 4 (Asakawa, 2007; Liu and Lee, 1997).
The price drop was propelled by the fact that latecomers produced on a large scale based
on their low-wage advantage and sold at a low price. 21 The price continued to decline and, as a
result, firms from the advanced economies willing to remain in the business were forced to go
overseas (keeping only some parts of their manufacturing lines in Japan) because domestic
production was unprofitable. Japan IBM and Toshiba left the market, Sharp leapfrogged from
Gen 3 to Gen 6, NEC sold its technology to the Chinese entrant SVA, and Hitachi and Matsushita
turned to other display businesses.22
We have observed that two characteristics represent technology maturity in the TFT-LCD
industry; the entry of latecomers has driven price drops in overall products, and forced the
Japanese firms to reconsider their strategy. Thinning of profit margins drove the first movers
from their home countries to lower-wage countries, and eventually almost crowded the first
movers out of the industry (see Table 3.6). Within five years of Samsung's entry, other firms
(mainly from Korea, Taiwan, and China) also came in and began to mass-produce the Gen 3
products (see Table 3.5).
From the outset of the Gen 4 technology, the Japanese firms yielded the leadership in
both innovation and market performance, which implies that latecomers managed to compete
against the early movers (see Table 3.7). Because all of the latecomer firms were price-
competitive, each had to upgrade products in order to remain competitive in the market. During
the decade after the first latecomer's debut, the share of latecomers in the world TFT-LCD market
rose to more than 80 percent of the total market share (see Table 3.8).
21 Product-life cycle theory predicts that use of the new technology eventually spreads to other countries as
the rising real wages in the high-income market make saving labor more profitable and as the real price of
the innovation falls (Davis, 1977). The "going offshore" phenomena have been observed not only in
advanced economies like Japan, but also in developing countries, for example, Taiwan and Korea.
22 Taiwan benefited from the Japanese overseas production. In fact, TN-LCD, a preceding form of TFT-
LCD, had been produced in Taiwan jointly with the Japanese firms. Therefore, overseas production was
considered and had already begun around the time that Samsung entered. Upon Samsung's entry, the
Japanese firms promptly proceeded with overseas production. See Liu and Lee (1997) for further
information.
Table 3.5. Change of unit price in TFT-LCD panel and product entry (USD)
Year 12" (Gen 3) Entry 17" (Gen 4) Entry 19" (Gen 5) Entry 42" (Gen 7) Entry
1996 1000 Sharpt





2000 HannStar 850 LG,t Samsung, AUO, CMO
2001 205 Quanta 500 CPT, HannStar
2002 350 500 LG,t Samsung
2003 270 410
2004 240 330 SVA, Innolux
2005 180 218 AUO, CMO, BOE 1343 Samsung t
2006 130 156 795 LG, AUO, CMO
2007 110 106 135 575
Sources: DisplaySearch, Samsung Economic Research Institute, Frost & Sullivan, various years.
Note: t indicates the first mass producer.
LG denotes LG-Philips; BOE denotes BOE-Hydis; SVA denote SVA-NEC.
Table 3.6. Top companies in flat panel display, ranked by sales, 1985-2005
Company (Country) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005
Sharp (apan) 1 2 4 4 5 4 3
NEC Japan) 2 3 5 5 7
Samsung (Korea) 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Toshiba (apan) 4 5 3(DTI) 9 6
IBM (apan) 5 3(DTI) 7 8
Hitachi (apan) 6 3 3 7
Philips (Netherland) 7
Fujitsu (apan) 8
LG (LG-Philips, Korea) 4 2 2 2 2 2
Sanyo (apan) 6 10
ADI (Taiwan) 8
CMO/IDT (Taiwan) 9 9 6 5
AUO (Taiwan) 4 3 4
CPT (Taiwan) 5 6
HannStar (Taiwan) 8 7
TMDisplay (apan) 9
Quanta (Taiwan) 10 7
Source: DisplaySearch, Frost and Sullivan
Note: NEC and Toshiba exited in 2001 and 2002, respectively; DTI is ajoint venture between Toshiba and
Japan IBM.
Table 3.7. The first development: TFT-LCD technology type
Technology Year Firm Technology Year Firm
Gen 2 1990 Sharp Gen 5 2002 LG-Philips
Gen 3 1994 Sharp Gen 6 2004 Sharp
Gen 4 2000 LG-Philips I Gen 7 2005 Samsung
Source: Websites of Sharp, LG-Philips, and Samsung
First Latecomer Entered: Crystal Cycles and National Entry Dynamics
An essential feature of the TFT-LCD technology is that innovation in each generation is
discontinuous from the previous generation in terms of size and resolution. Not only the smaller
discrete innovation steps, but also each generation has witnessed entry by new entrants from an
East Asian country (Mathew, 2003). For example, the first generation saw Japan establishing the
trajectory and then with Gen 2 the Korean firms, led by Samsung and LG, fashioned their entry.
Samsung was the first latecomer entrant and LG became the first-to-market in later products; with
Gen 3, the Taiwanese entered; with Gen 4, the Singaporeans entered; and with Gen 5, the Chinese
firms are now building their TFT-LCD fabs (see Figure 3.3). This is an extraordinary pattern of
entry as well as knowledge diffusion within Asia, implying "flying geese model" for regional
dynamics (Akamatsu, 1962).
Once entered, latecomers alternated in the leads. In Gen 4, LG took over the position of
first-to-market from Samsung, by beginning mass production in 2000 (Samsung, AUO, and CMO
also started Gen 4 in 2000). LG continued its first-to-market position up to Gen 5 and yielded the
title to Sharp for Gen 6 products. A year later, Samsung, the first latecomer, regained first-to-
market status with Gen 7 technology.
The business cycle in TFT-LCD is also called the "crystal cycle." The TFT-LCD industry
has experienced crystal cycles since the outset of the new technological trajectory, when the
Japanese firms first mass-produced the products in 1988 (Mathews, 2003). Each cycle is
differentiated in terms of panel prices and production volume. Like other business cycles, the
crystal cycles have taken place due to time lag between demand and supply (investment in
facilties). Below we present information for histories of the crystal cycles (compare Figures 3.3
and 3.4) and the country shares in the TFT-LCD industry (see Table 3.9).
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Fundamentally, the first latecomer entered the TFT-LCD and ramped up fast by using the
cycles. Whereas firms in advanced economies (Japanese firms) reduced investment during a
downturn, the first latecomer, in contrast, increased investment and acquired essential knowledge
until the next upturn came. The counter-cyclic investment strategy of the first latecomer became
successfully replicated by the subsequent latecomer entrants. The first cycle took place from 1991
to 1994, and during that time the TFT-LCD business reached its peak in 1991-1992 and went
downward in 1993-1994. It was an era of the Japanese firms, including Sharp, NEC, IBM,
Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, Sony, Seiko-Epson, Matsushita, Hitachi, and Sanyo.
The second cycle was from 1994 to 1996. During the downturn in the first cycle, the
Japanese firms reduced investment in capacity. From 1994, the business turned up but again went
down from 1995 onward. It was in 1995 that Samsung, a Korean firm and first entrant from a
developing country, entered on the TFT-LCD technological trajectory. When the second cycle
went into a declining phase, the Japanese firms again reduced investment in capacity.
Furthermore, a long-lasting Japanese economic recession made the Japanese TFT-LCD
manufacturers cut back R&D as well. In contrast, the Korean firms - first Samsung, second, LG,
and then Hyundai and Daewoo - started to construct fabs and also simultaneously aggressively
invested in fab construction for the next generations. The Korean firms "somehow" (which we
will examine in subsequent chapters) quickly moved to production of Gen 2 products.
The Korean Gen 2 production lasted only a short period, but their Gen 3 production
became ready soon. From the beginning of the upturn in the third cycle, the Korean firms tried
the aggressive ramp-up strategy again, including price cuts based on mass production. As a result,
from the third cycle onward, the Korean firms rapidly increased their shares in the world TFT-
LCD market. The third cycle began in 1996 and ended in 1998 with the Asian financial crisis.
During the upturn, the Korean firms ramped up but the Asian financial crisis forced both the
Japanese and the Korean firms to shrink their further investment in continuous innovation. In
particular, the Japanese firms, in an attempt to stay solvent in the turmoil of the financial crisis,
accelerated their industrial restructuring. The common strategy of their restructuring was to leave
a minimal production capacity in Japan for high value-added TFT-LCD products and, instead, to
procure other products from offshore outsourcing.
In fact, upon the entry of the Korean firms, the Japanese firms had already begun to
relocate production lines by means of licensing, joint venture, or subcontracting, and they had
selected the Taiwanese firms in order to curb the growth of the Korean firms. Yet Taiwan was
selected for two reasons: Taiwan is within quick reach of Japan and the Taiwanese firms
possessed a considerably high level of technological capabilities. During the third downturn,
these Taiwanese firms, including Chung-Hua Picture Tube (CPT), Acer (now AUO), Unipac, Chi
Mei Optoelectronics (CPO), and Hannstar, joined the TFT-LCD business, just as the Korean
firms had done during the earlier downturn.
The fourth cycle started in 1999 and ended in 2001. At first, the price soared but began to
fall toward the end of 1999. The price bottomed out in the September 2001. During this period,
when the downturn lasted longer than in other cycles, the incumbent firms merged or made
acquisitions among themselves to survive. For example, Acer and Unipac merged, forming AU
Optoelectronics, and Toshiba and Matsushita Electric merged. In addition, there were more new
entrants from Taiwan - Quanta, Toppoly, and Innolux, for example - and, in contrast to the
Taiwanese firms which entered in the third cycle, these firms targeted specific segments or niches
(Singapore successfully attracted Japanese investment to build a new plant. The Singaporean
production of panels, although much less massive than its Taiwanese or Korean counterparts,
began in 2002). From the beginning of the fourth cycle, both the Korean and the Taiwanese firms
went overseas. For the Korean firms, destinations for their outward investment were Eastern
Europe and other Asian countries. The Taiwanese firms favored China for their offshore location.
Finally, during the fifth cycle that started in 2002, the Chinese firms decided to enter. The
entry of the Chinese firms did not follow the classical counter-cyclical pattern that the Korean or
the Taiwanese firms adopted, but certainly took advantage of technological leapfrogging by
moving to the new Gen 5 products. Such advantage was possible for the Chinese firms because
some existing firms stopped product racing and left, as further innovation would have required
them to invest excessive amounts. Consequently, the Chinese were able to access TFT-LCD
technology via joint venture or asset acquisition. SVA allied with NEC (Japan) and BOE acquired
Hydis (formerly a subsidiary of Hyundai, a Korean firm).
In summary, the entry of the Korean firms (the first entrants from developing countries)
was possible because of their counter-cyclic investments. The Korean firms had to speed up
project execution for knowledge acquisition that had begun from the pre-entry planning. Because
they had to be ready to complete knowledge acquisition before the next upturn began, all projects
proceeded very quickly; otherwise they could not have entered. The Korean strategy was that the
firms entered during a downturn, while the Japanese firms were reducing investment, and quickly
completed capacity building and mastery of production skills before an upturn in the next crystal
cycle came.
Sources of production skills varied and no single source was dominant, although
connection with the Japanese engineers (especially, equipment vendors) was enormously helpful
for the Korean firms to understand production technique. The entry of the Taiwanese firms in the
third cycle was deliberately assisted by the technological transfer from the Japanese firms. In
contrast to the Korean entry, the "strategic interaction" theory proposed by the industrial
organization economics does apply to the Taiwanese entry. By inducing the Taiwanese firms to
jump onto the TFT-LCD trajectory, the Japanese firms wanted to curb the growth of the Korean
firms and concentrate on high-value-added products.
Figure 3.4. Crystal cycles and events of entry
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Table 3.8. Market share by country: TFT-LCD, 1996 - 2005 (%)
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Japan 100 91 82 73 61 52 39 28 30 23 17 15
Korea 0 9 18 27 36 38 41 39 36 39 40 38
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 3 10 20 33 32 36 41 43
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 4
Source: Hanwha Securities Analysis (2003), Dongwon Securities Analysis (2006), Samsung Economic Research Institute (2001)
3.3. THE WIRELESS HANDSETS INDUSTRY
3.3.1. Evolution in Wireless Handsets Technology
Before moving to examination of technological advancement in the wireless handsets, it is
necessary that we should observe the history of the mobile communication technologies, for it is
related to entry of latecomers. Below in Table 3.9 and Figure 3.5, we present a trajectory for the
mobile communication technology. The mobile communication has evolved to Gen 3, having
several standard technologies. A primary commercial use for mobile communication technology
in Gen 1 was the car phone and, thus, the wireless handset manufacturing began with the "global
system for mobile communication" (GSM), which was developed by a European consortium and
commercialized in 1992. Notably, the U.S. used the time division multiple access (TDMA)
technology and later approved of code division multiple access (CDMA) technology.
Table 3.9. History of the mobile communication technologies
Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4t
Standard technology Analogue GSM,TDMA , WCDMA, 200WiBro, n.a.
Transmission speed Lower than 14.4-64kbps 144kbps-2Mbps igherthan10kbps 100Mbps
Voice, shortMajor service Voice Voice, short Voice, high-speed
Major service Voice message, lower- internet, video talk Multimedia
speed internet
Commercialization 1981 1992 (1996 for 2000 Later than 20101981 2000 Later than 2010time CDMA)
Source: Ministry of Information and Telecommunication, Korea.
tEstimated
Figure 3.5. Technological evolution in the mobile communication technology: A roadmap
Gen 1 ---- Gen 2 ---- Gen 3 ---- Gen 4
Analogue - CDMA (U.S. type) - CDMA 2000 - UMB





Information about development of the mobile communication technology is conducive to
understanding how latecomers, in particular the first entrants from developing countries,
fashioned their entries to the wireless handset industry; nevertheless, the mobile communication
1985 1996
- LTE
technology itself was not directly related to production technology for the wireless handsets, since
developers for communication technology (chip makers), service providers, and handset
manufacturers have been different firms.
The manufacturing technology for handset phones is close to that of the electronic
calculators in physical size and unit value, and close to that of notebook computers in number of
parts and complexity (Amsden and Chu, 2003). Yet the wireless handsets are different because
they have more complicated chips and software in one machine, requiring more complex
assembly skills. They are also distinguished from TFT-LCD due to the characteristics of the cell
phone industry - both technology and brand power are equally crucial. We below present Table
3.10 for understanding speed of entry in the wireless handset industry. Official latecomer entry in
Gen 1 products (analogue wireless handsets) was as delayed as 1994. Latecomers' initial entry
was late due to under-established telecommunication infrastructure and lack of product
technology.
As Samsung, the first latecomer producer for Gen 1, confesses, their mass production for
Gen 1 (analogue) products was based on reverse engineering (for product knowledge) and OEM
experience (for production technology) (Munhua Ilbo, 2006). Therefore, the first entry by
latecomers was not founded by R&D milestone. Further, when the Korean firms produced the
Gen 1 products, top brands already introduced Gen 2 (GSM) products. Consequently, latecomers
failed the Gen 1 production in the market sales. Nevertheless, with acquired production
technology, the latecomers became quickly adapted to GSM technology and capable of producing
the GSM phones.
Table 3.10. Speed of entry: Wireless handset development and mass production
Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 3
GSM CDMA TDMA WCDMA CDMA2000
Development World 1973 1987 2002
Entry by latecomer -- 1991 19951 -- 20021 1999'
Lag (year) n.a. 4 n.a. 0
Mass production World 1983 1992 1994 2003
Entry by latecomer 19941 1994' 1996' -- 20031 2000'
Lag (year) 11 3 n.a. 0
Source: Company homepages; same as Table 1.2.
Note: 'Korean firms
As Table 3.10 suggests, the first mass production of wireless handset phones (Gen 2
technology) took place in the 1990s. Before latecomers entered in 1994, the early mass producers
have maintained leadership throughout their industry's history, and knowledge-based assets
possessed by the firms in advanced countries have fortified their market powers. However, even
after entry, latecomers were unable to catch up with the advanced firms for several reasons. In the
early 1990s (before the CDMA era), some latecomers already produced the wireless handsets via
subcontracting (mainly OEM); however, their production was not large-scale. Some products
served domestic needs but the production of latecomers was primarily export-oriented.
Accordingly, imported wireless handsets dominated in the markets of developing countries.
Domestic market did not support latecomers and, more importantly, production was not profitable
enough due to small-scale and high royalty paid out to foreign core technologies.
Upon the needs of self-development due to high-royalty fees, the Korean firms, in
cooperation with the government and Qualcomm, began to work on alternative technology and
they, in 1996, successfully mass-produced the CDMA phones (details on "how" will be discussed
in the next chapter). The speed of entry by latecomers in the wireless handset industry is
particularly interesting for three reasons: firstly, the Korean firms (and government) did not
imitate the Japanese experience (Japan adopted GSM technology as a national standard), which
implies a considerable project execution capability accumulated in Korea.
Secondly, as Tables 3.9 and 3.10 illustrate, the Korean firms that produced CDMA (Gen
2 tech) phones proceeded with CDMA 2000, a CDMA offspring Gen 3 technology. The Korean
firms became first-to-market for CDMA 2000 and, further, quickly expanded their technological
arena to WCDMA, another Gen 3 technology in GSM origin. Because CDMA was a later Gen 2
technology, GSM was more geographically widely used. With the additional first-to-market
position in WCDMA (advanced GSM) phones, the Korean firms accelerated their ramping up.
Finally, based on handset manufacturing experience, the Korean firms (and, more
importantly, the Korean government) began to develop a new mobile communication technology,
since they regarded royalty paid to chip makers still too expensive. As a result, WiBro became
acknowledge as a standard Gen 3 technology in 2006. The Korean integration into the mobile
communication technology was completed within one decade of its CDMA entry. Upon
standardization of WiBro, the Korean firms can make wireless handset manufacturing more
profitable, without paying for core technologies.
How did latecomers grow in the keen competition against the global brands? By 2000,
the wireless handset producers at the world forefront became structured into three or four tiers.
There were some success stories among latecomer firms, although a jump to an upper tier was
very hard. As Table 3.11 suggests, market leadership was very consistent over time. The big three
- Motorola, Nokia, and Ericsson - mass-produced and dominated the wireless handset market.
Siemens entered slightly later than the big three.
Table 3.11. Top companies in handset phone, ranked by sales,
Company Mass production 1996 2000
Motorola 1991 1 (27%) 2 (17%)
Nokia 1992 2 (19%) 1 (31%)
Ericsson 1991 3 (14%) 3 (11%)
Siemens 1993 4 (3%) 4 (6%)
Samsung 1994 5 (2%) 5 (5%)
LG 1996 6 (2%)
1996-2006 (market share, %).
2003 2006
2 (14%) 2 (21%)
1 (34%) 1 (31%)
6 (5%) 4 (7%)
4 (7%) 6 (4%)
3 (10%) 3 (12%)
5 (5%) 5 (6%)
Source: Gartner Dataquest (2006), reproduced from Istans (2006)
With the advent of Gen 3 technology (the Gen 3 era began in 2000), the wireless handset
industry became more competitive among latecomers and the top five firms became more
dominant. Yet Samsung and LG quickly entered GSM product markets and increased their shares.
However, as the industry became concentrated over time (see Table 3.12), participation and the
share of latecomers in the world production also increased (see Table 3.13), which indicates that
there has been a supplier relationship between latecomers and global brands.
Table 3.12. Concentration ratio for top 5 brands: Handset phone, 1996-2006.
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Top 5's share 65.0% 68.0% 67.0% 66.0% 70.0% 71.0%
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Top 5's share 75.0% 70.4% 74.1% 74.3% 77.9% n.a.
Source: Gartner Dataquest, various years.
Table 3.13. Top countries in handset phone, ranked by production volume, 1995-2005 (mil USD)
1995 2000 2005
1 U.S.A. 49,999 U.S.A. 70,009 U.S.A. 68,123
2 Japan 12,922 Japan 26,206 China 37,000
3 France 6,082 Korea 14,401 Korea 32,940
4 U.K. 4,718 U.K. 13,856 Japan 29,795
5 Germany 3,179 France 12,507 France 12,051
6 Italia 2,478 Germany 8,018 Germany 11,186
7 Korea 1,771 China 7,500 U.K. 8,781
8 Canada 1,305 Sweden 5,644 Finland 6,413
9 Sweden 1,259 Mexico 4,700 Mexico 6,000
10 China 1,250 Finland 4,683 Taiwan 5,919
World total 97,091 190,968 251,352
Source: Reed Electronics Research, recited from KIET (2006)
In the early period (by the mid 1990s), imported foreign products dominated the markets
in developing countries. Yet the Korean firms not only soon took over the domestic market
leadership, but also became the big exporters: while other latecomers relied on lower prices, the
Korean firms quickly changed their competitiveness from price to product novelty (which also
means that the Korean firms are very fast in production engineering). For example, during five
years from its CDMA debut in 1995, Samsung introduced 100 CDMA handset models (Hankook
Kyungje, 2005). Samsung's products became no longer cheaper than the Western brands (see
Table 3.14).
Table 3.14. Change of average unit price in handset phones, 2001-2005 (USD)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Samsung 185.3 197.6 192.7 181.8 170.7
Nokia 151.3 145.3 149.5 140.2 133.1
Source: Gartner Dataquest, various years.
Whereas the mobile technology proceeded to Gen 3, manufacturing skills for the
upgraded technology did not require significant changes. On the other hand, as technology
developed, more latecomers entered and product technology became fueled to mature (see Figure
3.6). Good sales performance then required upgraded components (e.g., a modem chip and other
related components being installed in the handset), marketing-based designs, and prices. As
shown in Table 3.13, the fast growth of latecomers that entered after the Korean entry from 2000
to 2005, specifically China and Taiwan, was based on their price competitiveness and the swift
identification of market segments and niches.
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To cope with product maturity, the market leader firms - notably the big three (Nokia,
Motorola, and Ericsson) - used various strategies for outsourcing. They located their overseas
production posts in latecomers' countries, contracted with licensees, and connected with the local
OEM or ODM suppliers (see Table 3.15). Some of the local OEM or ODM suppliers for the
foreign brands became OBM, and began to compete against their foreign customers in the
regional market. Because profits continued to decrease, whereas the local wages continued to rise,
the market-leading firms from advanced economies kept seeking global outsourcing in much
lower-wage countries.
Table 3.15. OEM-type production: Wireless handsets, 2003-2006
2003 2004 2005 20061
Production volume (thousand unit) 56,731 61,039 68,566 74,395
Production revenue (mil.USD) 4,003 4,928 5,986 6,790
Volume share of worldwide total (%) 11.1 9.7 10.4 10.7
Volume share of Asia/Pacific total (%) 17.7 17.7 18.3 17.7
Worldwide total (thousand unit) 511,880 629,389 659,811 694,350
Asia/Pacific total (thousand unit) 320,616 345,091 375,447 421,480
Source: Gartner Dataquest (2005)
Note: 1Estimates
The competitive pressure also drove latecomers to cut costs and thus latecomers also
began to pursue an outward FDI strategy. The Korean firms went to Eastern Europe, China, and
Southeast Asia and the Taiwanese firms relocated production lines to China and Southeast Asia.
The leading Western firms also experienced restructuring: some left the business, selling their
production divisions or firms to new entrants, as illustrated by the case of Ericsson (Ericsson left
the handset business in 2001 and Sony took over the business in a form of joint venture). Firms
from developing countries were the major acquirers, as BenQ's acquisition of Siemens shows.
Since the wireless handset market became saturated in the later 1990s, the cell phone
brands have been working on the non-technology elements for product innovation: convergence
with other electronics technologies, components upgrading, design improvement, and service for
a variety of contents. As Table 3.16 shows, the wireless handset producers have explored their
markets, blending various electronics products. Table 3.17 shows a view that the mobile phone
market in general is saturated but a niche market is growing fast.
Table 3.16. First-to-market: Chronicle events in the wireless handset industry
Year Firm Activity
1946 Bell Lab Cellular communication service (car phone) provided to Swedish policy
1973 Motorola Development for Genl wireless handset, based on the Bell Lab technology
1981 Motorola First mass production of Gen 1 product
1992 Nokia First mass production of GSM (Gen2) handsets
1994 Nokia First mass production of TDMA (Gen2) handsets
1994 Nokia First production of Nokia Tune phone (ringer-downloadable phone)
1996 Nokia First production of smart phone (handset with a PDA function)
1997 Nokia First production of mobile game phone
1999 Samsung First production of MP3 phone
1999 Nokia First production of WAP phone (internet-available phone)
2000 Samsung First production of camera-installed phone
2000 Samsung First mass production of CDMA 2000 (Gen 3) handsets
2002 Samsung First mass production of WCDMA (Gen3) handsets
2005 Samsung First production of satellite DMB phone (TV phone)
Source: Company homepages; Wikipedia; Italics denotes first-to-market
Table 3.17. Market growth, 2003-2007
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Basic phone 185 162 147 213 213 206
Growth rate -12.4% -0.1% 46% 0.3% -3.2%
Camera phone n.a. n.a. 0.5 3.9 11 26
Growth rate 680% 182% 136%
Cellular PDA 0.4 1.1 1.6 3.4 4.6 5.8
Growth rate 175% 45.4% 112.5% 35.2% 26.2%
Source: Gartner Dataquest (2006) and HSBC (2007)
Note: Measured in million units
Accordingly, marketing skills and knowledge-based assets have gained more weight than
technology. There has not been much significant improvement on the technological dimension,
and therefore sales have depended on the pricing strategies, marketing-based product designs,
and/or the content-related auxiliaries. Products have become segmented into high-end and low-
end. Low-end products, with their cheap prices, have become especially popular in developing
countries, which provided latecomers a good opportunity of entry. Some latecomers in lower-
wage countries, properly using global production network, quickly entered the low-end product
markets. Some latecomers (for example, the Korean firms) shortly applied other electronics
technologies and explored their high-end markets. As Table 3.17 confirms, expansion of the
segmented markets has consequently supported the fast growth of these latecomers.
3.3.2. Entry of Latecomers
The OEM Experience and the Big Push from Government
As in other industry cases, the leading firms from advanced economies had maintained supplier
relationships with latecomers in the early 1990s. Before 1996, when CDMA was successfully
mass-produced by Samsung, participation of latecomers in the wireless handset market had been
very limited. They had no brand, depended on foreign technology in the entire production process,
and had domestic markets dominated by the imported products. Because Korea has been a major
outsourcing location for the Western handset brands,23 the Korean firms in the early 1990s had
opportunities of learning production skills from the Western brands. Yet product knowledge was
very difficult to acquire and, due to insufficient telecommunication infrastructure, entry by
latecomers was delayed till 1994.
There had been attempts to manufacture (analogue and/or GSM) handsets, imitating the
Japanese products, since 1988 when the first prototype of analogue wireless handset was
introduced. Yet such efforts did not lead to a satisfactory output, for producing wireless handsets
was not profitable enough (due to high royalties), and progress - manufacturing wireless handsets
without a good understanding of product knowledge - was too slow. Also, whether the
experience of reverse engineering was deterministic in producing Gen 2 products is not clear but
it is not deniable that the Korean firms acquired some elementary skills from the reverse
engineering.
In particular, the high royalties paid out to the foreign chip makers pushed the Korean
firms to find an alternative technology to GSM or TDMA. Therefore, in 1991, the Korean
government made a licensing agreement with Qualcomm, which was a small venture company
that developed telecommunication chips. The fast entry also brought great market success,
contributed by Qualcomm's upsurge and the technological approval of Qualcomm's CDMA as
one of the standard communication technologies. The CDMA standardization was resulted from a
political consideration of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which wanted to
promote the domestic equipment and service firms against the dominant European firms.
Even after getting approval, Qualcomm could not find equipment manufacturers and for a
time even once manufactured the handsets itself. The leading firms, based on TDMA or GSM,
were not willing to invest in making the CDMA technology manufacturable. It was of course new
and huge set-up costs that are at stake but the leading firms, at the same time, did not see
23 Nokia's biggest overseas production line is located in Ma-san (Korea) and 100 percent of products are
exported. Additionally, Telson and Pantech had been Motorola's core suppliers.
particular needs to invest in new technology developed by a start-up firm. Qualcomm recalls how
hard it was to find top-class manufacturers:
Everyone in Qualcomm knew that an outside manufacturer could not
produce commercial-sized handsets in time. In 1992, networks were being
developed but none of the major manufacturers, such as Motorola and Nokia,
to which Qualcomm had licensed CDMA were showing signs of support for
large-scale manufacturing of CDMA wireless handsets. So Qualcomm
essentially had to bootstrap its own industry. (Mock, The Qualcomm
Equation, 2005)
In 1991, the Korean government contracted with Qualcomm, and Samsung finally mass-produced
the CDMA phones in 1996. Because it was the first commercialization of the CDMA technology,
the mass production by Samsung had two implications: CDMA would replace TDMA and other
technologies, and the Korean firms would also join the ranks of major manufacturers.
Growth in Post-CDMA Age
When the Korean firms were just entering the wireless handset industry with the CDMA device,
they did competitive pricing on their products in order to compete against GSM and TDMA
products. The competitive pricing enabled the Korean firms to increase some shares in the world
wireless handset markets and to make their brand names among consumers. However, over time
the Korean firms did no longer rely on lower product prices but on product differentiation and
upgraded quality.
After the Korean entry, there was no critical technological momentum to make
latecomers upgrade their status in the market during Gen 2 period. Without significant
technological changes, the wireless handset industry became saturated and the firms, including
the leading brands (Nokia, Motorola, and Ericsson), created substitute demand by offering
various types of products (marketing-based). Accordingly, the success of latecomers depended on
price cutting and their ability to segment markets. From 2000 to 2005, some latecomers, most
representatively China and Taiwan, achieved a fast growth based on lower prices and a good
quality of handsets in their niches (see Table 3.4).
While other latecomers also made subsequent entries, the Korean firms quickly acquired
the GSM product knowledge because the CDMA technology was adopted by smaller countries,
compared to the GSM one. When the Gen 3 era began, the Korean firms continued its first-to-
market position in the handset market for the CDMA 2000 technology (Gen 3 evolved from
CDMA) and, shortly later, also became the first-to-market in the WCDMA handsets (Gen 3
developed from GSM). In the meanwhile, Samsung developed and began to mass-produce chips.
As the wireless handset market has been saturated over time, the royalty paid to Qualcomm on
the Korean brands became a considerable burden in the profit margin. Accordingly, the Korean
government organized another project for developing a new mobile communication technology
and, in 2006, got approval of WiBro as a standard Gen 3 technology.24
So far, many latecomers have entered the wireless handset industry. For the Korean firms,
some - Chaebols - are producing their brands and middle-sized firms are using ODM and/or
OBM strategies.25 In the case of the Taiwanese firms, they fashioned their entry by joining global
production network of the Western brands.2 6 Among the Taiwanese handset manufacturers, some
with more knowledge-based assets became quickly independent of their upstream firms. In the
case of the Chinese firms, some made a quick entry by acquiring existing firms. Other firms have
been jointly producing with the Western brands.27
3.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined entries of latecomers into the TFT-LCD and wireless handset
industries. The pattern of their entries, although diverse in the mode of acquiring technical
knowledge and resources, shows that latecomers generally took advantage of business cycles,
which means that their entries were based on aggressive investment in skills and facilities. The
history of latecomer entry also suggests that latecomers waited until profits began to fall.
Consequently, we have approached their entries from the perspective of skill formation rather
than of innovation. Latecomers in our study learned and accumulated manufacturing know-how
quickly, more quickly than they had product knowledge based on R&D performance.
24 The WiBro entry is late in the light of Gen 3 technology but is rather a strategic move as a preparation for
the Gen 4 era.
25 For more information, see Table 3.18 provided at the end of chapter.
26 For details see Table 3.19
27 See Table 3.20 at the end of chapter for a list of firms
Table 3.18. Major Korean wireless handset manufacturers
Firm Est.' Group Entry3  Industries2  ODM OBM Comments
Samsung 1969 Group 1993, G Unrelated Yes Yes First Korean mass producer for the CDMA handsets
LG 1962 Group 1996, G Unrelated Yes Yes Second best-selling cell phone brand in Korea
Pantech & Curitel 2001 Group 2001, A Telecom eq. Yes Partly Pantech acquired Curitel, a mobile division of Hyundai Electronics.
Pantech 1991 Group 1997, G Telecom eq. Yes Yes Venture firm; OEM for LG, then ODM for Motorola, then OBM in China.
SK Teletech 1962 Group 1998, A Unrelated Yes Yes Acquired by Pantech Group in 2006. SK Telecom is a telecom service
provider.
KT Freetel 1996 Group 2001, S Telecom service No Yes Domestic market only; Previously state-owned enterprise; KT is a telecom
and eq. service provider.
Sewon Telecom 1988 Non-group 1997, G Telecom eq. Yes Partly Start with license from Qualcomm; Best sellers for telephone and intercom;
Bankrupted in 2006.
Telson 1992 Non-group 1997, S Electronics, Yes Partly Start with ETRI tech; Nokia's local subsidiary4 ; Bankrupted in 2006.
Telecom eq.
Macson Telecom 1974 Group 1996, S Electronics, Yes Partly Start with ETRI and Pantech tech; Best sellers for car phone in 1990s;
Telecom eq. Bankrupted and acquired by LG.
Appeal Telecom 1994 Non-group 1998, S Telecom eq. No No Top market share for beeper in 1990s; Sold to Motorola due to financial
insolvency; now R&D only
Belwave 1999 Non-group 1999, S Telecom eq. Yes No Bankrupted in 2004 and restructured.
VK 1997 Non-group 2001, G Telecom eq. Yes Partly ODM for SK Teletech, OBM in China; Bankrupted in 2006.
Innostream 2000 Non-group 2001, A Telecom eq. Yes No Restructured (partially acquired by an Israeli firm)
BUCom 2001 Group 2001, G Telecom eq. Yes No ODM/OEM; Bankupted in 2006.
EZM Tech 2000 Non-group 2000, G Telecom eq. Yes No JV with SCOM (Hong Kong brand)
Turbo Tek 1988 Non-group 2001, A Telecom eq. No No OEM for LG
Giga Telecom 1998 Non-group 1998, S Telecom eq. No No Restructured (CDMA division sold to UT Starcom)
Source: Author
Notes. ' Group establishment; 2 Indicates group-level diversification within SIC two digits; 3 Cell phone entry and its mode. G-greenfield investment;
S-spin off; A-acquisition; J-joint venture (new establishment); Relationship ended.
Table 3.19. Major Taiwan wireless handset manufacturers
Firm Est. 1 Group Entry 3  Industries2  ODM OBM Comments
BenQ 1984 Group 1997, S LCD, home appliances, chemicals, and telecom eq. Yes Yes Spin-off from Acer Group, the leading seller of
computers.
Compal 1984 Group 1999, G TV, computers, LCD, and telecom eq. Yes No Long history of laptop production (since 1989);big seller of LCD and CRT monitors.
Arima 1989 Group 1999, G Computers, telecom eq. & parts, and LCD Yes No Global supplier for laptops; recently began LCD
and other optoelectronic business.
Quanta 1988 Group 1999, G Computers and storages, LCD, and telecom eq. Yes No Largest global computer supplier; Diversification
was sequenced from computer to computer
peripherals, to computer storage, to cell phone,
and to LCD.
DBTel 1979 Group 1998, G Fax machines, computers and telecom eq. Yes Yes Branded products selling in China.
Asustek 1990 Non-group n.a. Computers and storages, and telecom eq. Yes Yes Branded products selling in China.
Inventec 1975 Group 2000, G Computers, home appliances and parts, telecom eq. and Yes Yes Branded products selling in China.
book publishing
Foxconn 1990 Group n.a. Computers and storages, TV and other communication No No Global OEM. Products various. Chinese brand
eq., telecom eq. and parts name is Hon-Hai.
Foxlink 1986 Group 1999, G Monitors, scanners, printers and telecom eq. Yes No OEM/ODM specialization. EMS.
CMCS 2001 Non-group 2001, G Telecom eq. and parts and software Yes No Acquired by Foxconn in 2005.
HTC 1997 Non-group 1997, G Computers and telecom eq. Yes No
Via 1987 Group 2002, A Computers, telecom eq. and parts No No Started as design house and now also engaged in
manufacturing.
Source: Author
Notes. 1 Group establishment; 2 Indicates group-level diversification within SIC two digits; 3 Cell
S-spin off; A-acquisition; J-joint venture (new establishment)
phone entry and its mode. G-greenfield investment;
Table 3.20. Major Chinese wireless handset manufacturers (licensed firms)
Firm Est. 1 Group Entry3  Industries 2  ODM OBM Comments
Amoisonic 1997 Group 2001, G TV & telephone, electronic parts, telecom eq., and business ? Yes TV business-oriented
1995 Group 1995, J
1992 Non-group 2003, S
consulting
Telecom eq. and service
Telecom eq. and computer storages
CEC n.a. Group n.a. Telecom eq.
Datang 1998 Group 2003, A Computers and peripherals, telecom eq. and parts, and
communication services

















































Home appliances, telecom eq. and TV & radio
Medical eq., telecom eq., and construction materials
Home electronics, motor vehicles, plastics, electronic parts,
and telecom eq.
Computers and peripherals, telecom eq., and machinery
Home appliances, telecom eq., computers and TV
Radio & TV, computers and telecom eq.
Computers, home appliances, telecom eq., chemicals, plastics,
electronic parts
Computers and parts, telecom eq., hotels,
Telecom eq.
IC design, telecom eq. and service
Telecom eq., computers, and home appliances
Telecom eq., software, and utility lines
No
?
Yes JV with Nokia
Yes Based in Hong Kong; acquired by VK
(Korea) in 2002
Yes Heavy reliance on outsourcing
Yes National telecom network provider
Yes Yes Spin off from the state lab; in spite of its
long history, brand power is weak



























Ericsson JV partner but could not




Home appliances and then telecom
Telecom infrastructure
Note. Question marks indicate that respondents argued R&D capability for product design but product development in practice had been outsourcing-oriented.






AND MOVING BEYOND IMITATION
"R&D was time effective rather than cost effective. It enabled
Quanta to be first-to-market rather than lowest in price."
-- Barry Lam, President of Quanta Group28
"The success of our business depends on timing. Make a
preemptive investment and be as fast as possible for mass
production. We should not miss timely investments."
-- Kun-Hee Lee, President of Samsung Group, Speech at Samsung
semiconductor's 30 th Anniversary
4.1. OVERVIEW
In the previous chapter, we identified entry of latecomers and explored the background of their
quick jump on to the technology trajectory of TFT-LCD and wireless handsets. This chapter
investigates further how latecomers have been fast learners and moved beyond learning from the
advanced firms. In particular, we further examine entrepreneurship and managerial knowledge,
production and process knowledge, vertical and horizontal inter-firm relationship, and the role of
government.
28 Cited from interview data presented in Beyond Late Development: Taiwan 's Upgrading Policies
(Amsden and Chu, 2003).
4.2. ENTRENEURSHIP AND MANAGERIAL KNOWLEDGE
Leadership is a core variable in explaining speed of innovations (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Pre-entry planning and subsequent strategies determine the efficiency
of the progress in new businesses (Allen, Lee, and Tushman, 1980). The leadership variable, both
in management and in technology, is presumably related to the entry strategy because speedy
entry requires significant re-allocation of resources, investment planning, and sometimes
transformation of the organization (Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996). Therefore, as a first step of
identifying mechanisms for efficient entry-execution, we examine what owners of business
groups in late-industrialization have done in order to speed up their entries.
4.2.1. Leadership and Upper Echelon
Because frontier product design (R&D knowledge) was absent, most latecomers paid attention to
the business moves of the leading firms. For the Korean firms, the traditional benchmarking
model is the Japanese firms (Shin, 1996; Amsden, 1984). There are some exceptions, for example,
the Korean wireless handset case, where product knowledge was provided by the government and
a chip maker (Qualcomm). Nevertheless, it was the Korean wireless handset manufacturers who
primarily invested in acquisition of production skills.
In Korea, the TFT-LCD and wireless handset entries were decided after Samsung's
annual brainstorming meeting in Japan in the late 1980s. Every January, Samsung's president and
the senior managers of all subsidiaries get together in Japan and have a meeting for new business
planning. The location has always been Japan, which implies that the top manager teams are
benchmarking the Japanese firms. The Korean firms always have a model to imitate, the Japanese
firms, and it is the same with the Taiwanese firms (Amsden and Chu, 2003). While family
ownership has been criticized, it has also contributed to swiftly making a large-scale investment.
Business groups are owned by a group family, but their control of the group arises from
managerial control rather than their capital share. The strong leadership of an owner enabled the
firm to proceed speedily. In our interview with Samsung's R&D managers at the TFT-LCD
division, one manager said:
We began our TFT-LCD business without a solid technological foundation.
Like our previous experience in semiconductors, Samsung's investment
amount in the TFT-LCD industry ran into astronomical figures. We had some
experience in process innovation acquired from semiconductor manufacturing,
but it did not guarantee another success in the TFT-LCD industry. Given the
risks and financial amount invested, it would have been impossible for
Samsung to enter if is had not been family-controlled. Only an owner can
make such a decision.
In fact, latecomers' speed of entry has been determined by their investment capability.
Table 4.1 illustrates the investment patterns among latecomers and supports the importance of
investment capability for latecomers to jump onto the new technological trajectory. From 1995 to
2000, the TFT-LCD market began to change from the Japanese monopoly to the East Asian
oligopoly.29 While the Japanese firms reduced investments, the Korean firms grew with large-
scale preemptive investments, followed by the Taiwanese firms.30 Compared to the Korean firms,
the Taiwanese firms entered later in both the TFT-LCD and wireless markets. Because of their
later entry, the Taiwanese firms bore less risk but also made a large-scale expenditure for entry.
Accordingly, leadership with excellent project management was critical with the Taiwanese firms,
too.
Table 4.1. Investments in TFT-LC
Firm
Sharp Total production costs
Capital investments
NEC Total production costs
Capital investments
Hitachi Total production costs
Capital investments
Samsung Total production costs
Capital investments
LG-Philips Total production costs
Capital investments
Hyundai Total production costs
Capital investments
Acer1  Total production costs
Capital investments
Unipac' Total production costs
Capital investments
CMO Total production costs
Capital investments
Hannstar Total production costs
Capital investments
Primeview Total production costs
Capital investments
Source: DisplaySearch












Note: ' Two firms later merged into forming AUO; 2 based on U.S. dollar, author re-estimated investment
amounts expressed originally in different foreign currencies.
29 There was a financial crisis in East Asia during 1997-1998.




























































































The entry decisions made by the group owners were supported by the efficient actions of
their senior managers. The senior managerial forces, defined as positions equivalent to or higher
than division managers, were substantial project executers, and they have been very efficient at
implementing projects. The main reason behind their efficiency has been that they have a good
understanding of their firms and the businesses. Without exception, all founders, presidents, and
the senior and upper managers at the Korean and Taiwanese firms in the TFT-LCD and the
wireless handset industries have been local people with excellent field expertise.3 '
Therefore, at the decision-maker level, efficient implementation of the entry plan was a
major force to drive latecomers to enter rapidly. Particularly, the relocation of upper-level
managerial knowledge to the new business division greatly facilitated know-how sharing among
subsidiaries and entry execution. The efficient implementation at the upper-manager level rested
on effective relocation of managerial knowledge to the newly entered industry. Latecomers made
good use of their internal capability. When Samsung entered the TFT-LCD industry, for example,
the general management team was re-organized. Both at Samsung and LG Philips, those who had
a semiconductor career were placed in key posts for the TFT-LCD entry. The Taiwan TFT-LCD
firms also relocated top managers from the electronics or semiconductor subsidiaries. K.Y. Lee, a
CEO of BenQ (handset makers who acquired Siemens), was previously a president of Acer and
AUO. In Table 4.2, we show how the Korean firms acquired managerial knowledge in order to
enter the TFT-LCD and wireless markets.
Relocation of managerial knowledge also included managerial knowledge in R&D and
production. In most cases, latecomers promoted their locally trained techno-managers within their
own organizations and placed them in the chief position responsible for technology, as their
experiences in the calculator and the computer industries (Taiwan), and the home electronics
industry (Korea) show. But there were also some exceptions: there were senior and upper
managers who were recruited overseas and took a lead in R&D at latecomer firms.
These overseas managers were not expatriates. This group of managers have engineering
backgrounds with Ph.D. degrees and careers at the leading firms. For example, Dr. Changkyu
Hwang, a CEO of Samsung Semiconductor, worked at Intel and Dr. Daeje Jin, a hero of
Samsung's wireless handset success, was a manager at IBM. The technology leaders at the
Taiwanese firms are also the local Taiwanese people who have studied and worked overseas. Dr.
Feng-Sheng Su, a Chief Technology Officer at AUO, formerly worked at General Electric.
31 Among the 50 top business groups, only Lotte Group is owned by an expatriate. Local people are also
dominant in Taiwan, except for TSMC.
Table 4.2.Human resource relocation for TFT-LCD entry: The Korean latecomers
Samsung LG-Philips
Current position Previous post Current position Previous post
LCD CEO Semiconductor production and marketing CEO LG semiconductor vice president
LCD fabl Semiconductor photo-mask team Panell, 2&5 factories LG semiconductor Kumi factory
LCD fab2 Semiconductor (DD center) fab1 team Sales department LG semiconductor sales department
LCD tech support team Semiconductor (DD center) support team Patent LG semiconductor patent
LCD management support Semiconductor (DD center) support team Marketing strategy LG semiconductor European subsidiary
team
LCD automation team Semiconductor (DD center) Quality management LG semiconductor quality department
LCD T7 L/C team Semiconductor (DD center) fab2 team SCM LG semiconductor memory planning
LCD T7 TFT team Semiconductor (DD center) Application sales LG semiconductor Taiwan subsidiary
LCD product and technology Semiconductor (DD center) production and technology Production technology LG semiconductor production technology
team team center center
LCD directors with semiconductor career over total number of LCD directors: 9/33=27.3 LCD directors with semiconductor career over total number of LCD
directors: 14/42=33.3
Source: Reproduced from Park and Choung (2006). Original data from Business Reports of Samsung (1999-2005) and LG-Philips (1999-2005).
While the TFT-LCD experience consistently confirms the importance of managerial leadership,
the wireless handset entry provides weaker but still consistent evidence of entrepreneurship: in
the Korean case, the entry was initiated by the government. Therefore, the role of managerial
leadership in determining the entry into the wireless handset business was less critical than the
TFT-LCD case. However, the owners of Samsung, LG, Hyundai, and Pantech shared the need of
developing an alternative technology (CDMA phone), instead of paying an enormous amount of
GSM royalty fees. Taiwan entered into the wireless handset business in the 2000s, even later than
some Chinese firms. Before the Taiwanese firms diversified into the wireless handset market, the
industry had already matured. Although the Taiwanese firms plunged into new technology
business as the Korean firms did, the Taiwanese firms gradually moved from the TV and
calculator manufacturing to handset production.
In summary, latecomers achieved fast ramp-up based on several facts related to
entrepreneurship: the owners of latecomers watched the Japanese firms and quickly decided to
imitate their high-tech business strategies. The industries that they were entering had matured to
some extent but not completely matured, as indicated by the high growth (although profit margins
were falling). The decisions were made by the company owners rather than top professional
managers. Top professional managers were instead responsible for substantial project
management. These managerial forces were generally the local people (with a couple of
exceptions) who knew the firms and possessed expertise. For efficient implementation of entry
projects, latecomers relocated these managerial forces.
On the other hand, in order to acquire technological savvy, latecomers promoted locally-
trained people. They also complemented local human resources by recruiting their overseas
national, who had earned advanced degrees in the U.S. and had managerial experience at the
leading R&D labs. The entrepreneurship factors were observed consistently among latecomers.
Therefore, latecomers became enabled to execute fast entry by efficiently re-allocating
managerial know-how, which is a distinctive form of knowledge integration. With the re-
allocated managerial knowledge, latecomers quickly adapted to the new business environments.
4.2.2 Diversification and Its Role as Knowledge Sharing
This section examines how latecomers have built internal capabilities and how the accumulated
internal capabilities have helped latecomers to accomplish entry within a minimal period. More
specifically, by elaborating on gains from diversification, we examine the effects of business
groups on the possibility of being a first latecomer, as well as explore some qualitative evidence
that suggests how latecomers have integrated their knowledge.
Latecomers have reduced the time and processes taken to shift to new businesses by
using their previous experiences. The benefits from the previous experiences include similarities
in production technique, access to supplier networks, and customer relationships. When moving
to "high-tech" industries, latecomers selected ones in which they could use physical and
intangible resources built in the previous businesses. The entries required a set of new skills and
product knowledge: but the skills required to acquire them were not radically new. The
diversification experience suggests how latecomers, by utilizing internally accumulated skills,
have shortened the steps to reach a stage where they successfully mass-produce new high-tech
products.
In the TFT-LCD industry, all latecomers had previous manufacturing experiences in the
semiconductor or electronics industries. We provide a list of latecomers in TFT-LCD in Table 4.3.
In Korea, Samsung and LG have traditionally been engaged in the electronics industry and both
of them were market leaders in semiconductor manufacturing (especially in the field of memory).
The Chinese firms also moved from the electronics industry and entered.
Taiwan has the largest number of the TFT-LCD manufacturers: Unipac is a subsidiary of
UMC, the largest semiconductor foundry firm. AUO was promoted by Acer Display, which later
merged with Unipac. Notably, Acer Display is a subsidiary of Acer Computer, a global computer
manufacturer. Hannstar is a joint venture between Winbond, a semiconductor firm, and Walsin,
an electrical manufacturing firm. Quanta Display is a joint venture of Quanta Computer, a
notebook manufacturer, and Sharp, a Japanese TFT-LCD producer. Chi-Mei Optoelectronics
(CMO) began as a petrochemical firm. CMO has thereby been strong at producing materials and
parts for TFT-LCD. While many firms rely on external vendors in order to procure materials and
components, CMO is supplied by the group subsidiaries, for example, Chi-Lin Technology for
lighting-related components, Hymax for driver IC, and Chi-Mei Asahi for glass panels.
Through diversification, latecomers accumulated project execution know-how and a
certain depth of manufacturing skills, although diversification was not always successful. The
pre-entry experiences enabled them to build linkages with the local and the overseas customers
and components suppliers. Specifically, experience in the semiconductor industry was a
significant contributor to the latecomers' successful entry. In the TFT-LCD industry, success was
determined by the same factor as in the semiconductor industry: timely building of large-scale
product lines and subsequent investment in upgraded technologies.
Table 4.3. Latecomer firms in TFT-LCD, 2006
Firm (est. year) Country Group Ownership 6 Assets7  Employees Industries Sales 7  Pre-OBM
LG-Philips (1985) Korea G5  JV 8,920 19,363 Electronics, electrical machinery, 6,229 None
Samsung (1969) Korea G N, P 44,431 80,594 Electronics, electrical machinery, software 43,737 None
AUO (1996) 1 Taiwan G N, P 6,964 24,327 Electronics, electrical machinery 4,364 Matsushita OEM4
CMO (1998) 2 Taiwan G N, P 5,806 15,421 Electronics, electrical machinery, computers 2,735 Fujitsu & NEC OEM4
CPT (1971) 3 Taiwan G N, P 5,462 22,945 Electronics, electrical machinery, computers 2,235 Mitsubishi OEM4
HannStar (1998) Taiwan G N, P 3,586 5,274 Electronics, computers, computer peripherals 1,066 Toshiba OEM4
Quanta (1999) Taiwan G N, P 4,949 5,845 Electronics, electrical machinery, software 1,560 Sharp OEM4
SVA-NEC (1987) China G JV, S 55,062 1,220 Electronics, electrical machinery 1,300 None
BOE-Hydis (1993) China G JV, S 590,806 9,848 Semiconductor products, electronics 783,144 None
Source: Merchant, online database
Note: Originally started as Acer Display Technology and merged with Unipac in 2001; 2 Chi-Mei Optoelectronics; 3joint venture between Chungwha Picture Tube(Tatung subsidiary) and Acer Technology; OEM came earlier or/and proceeded in parallel with OBM; 5a subsidiary of a business group; 6 N: national, P: private, S:
state-owned, JV: Joint venture; 7 applied only to subsidiary and measured with USD.
Furthermore, the TFT-LCD industry is very similar to the semiconductor industry in
many ways; most of all, both share the foundry techniques. For example, among TFT-LCD
patents that Samsung and LG-Philips filed in the U.S., semiconductor process technology patent
applications amounted to 18% and 25% of the whole patent application numbers, respectively
(Park and Choung, 2006). When Samsung entered the TFT-LCD business, more than 70 percent
of R&D staff at its semiconductor division were relocated to the TFT-LCD division.32
Accordingly, a typical profile of the first latecomer is a diversifier from the semiconductor
industry, for example, Samsung, LG, and Hydis. By diversification, latecomers could share
supplier links and managerial resources built through semiconductor manufacturing. Group
subsidiaries shared learning and technologies, benefited from cross-licensing, and had an
advantageous position with vendors when negotiating over equipment purchases.
Theoretically, diversification entails heavy bureaucratic costs, an expense incurred from
managing an expanding organization. The bureaucratic costs include: communication distortion
(Mahoney, 1992); additional administrative overhead and production costs (Harrigan, 1985);
cross-purchasing at a higher price than the market value (Quinn, Doorley, and Paquette, 1990);
managerial inefficiency from control and coordination difficulties (Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1994; D'aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994). These bureaucratic costs make organizations very sluggish
and slow in reaction to their changing environment (Piore and Sabel, 1984).
Nevertheless, in our latecomer case, opportunities for exploiting technological and
managerial knowledge interdependencies arise when a combination of multiple subsidiaries
permits the application of sharing efficient production skills, R&D knowledge, and managerial
know-how. Moreover, knowledge created in one stage of a firm's production chain is shared with
other stages of production. More importantly, an entering latecomer rests heavily on group
knowledge-based assets. Therefore, the advantages of diversification outweigh the bureaucratic
costs.
Secondly, the electronics experience was also helpful: the experience not only identified
and provided easy access to the key suppliers in TFT-LCD, but also guaranteed a stable volume
of production. Yet not every latecomer with a semiconductor or electronics background was
successful. Toppoly, for instance, is a subsidiary of Compal Group which has produced CRT
monitors and other electronics. Toppoly diversified to the TFT-LCD industry but it has had
difficulty in increasing efficiency and lowering the defect rate since it entered in 2000.
Diversification has also played a significant role in obtaining subcontracting and local partnership
for foreign direct investment (unless it is a greenfield investment), the common modes for
32 R&D information is based on author's fieldwork (2005).
latecomers' acquisition of production know-how. In the Taiwanese handset industry, getting
ODM contracts from the leading brands (e.g., Nokia, Motorola, Sanyo) required a good
performance in OEM: when selecting OEM firms, the leading brands prioritized firms with good
reputations in the previous business.
Learning from the advanced firms by way of OEM was, of course, critically necessary to
proceed to ODM, but the leading brand firms (upstream firms) did not choose latecomers before
latecomers acquired a certain level of production capability, indicated by firm size or annual
average production volume (Amsden and Chu, 2003). In the Korean handset industry, the Korean
firms (Samsung and LG) had subcontracted handset (GSM) manufacturing before the CDMA
success, but since they began to mass-produce the CDMA phones, they became OBM firms.
Therefore, in the Korean handset history, whether diversification was helpful for progress to
OBM is not so clear. Yet when middle-sized Korean firms later entered the handset
manufacturing business and did subcontracting with the Korean brands (Samsung, LG, and some
middle brands), the upstream Korean brands selected their suppliers on the same basis.
In the wireless handset industry, modes for access to technology varied: Samsung relied
consistently on an in-house strategy and that was also LG's primary strategy (at the same time,
both worked with government). The Taiwan and Chinese firms first entered from diversification
and then supplied to the big brands until they produced their own brands, as presented in Table
4.4. Some later entrants tended to acquire the existing firms for a quick entry. BenQ and TCL
acquired Siemens and Alcatel, respectively. These firms had neither experienced OEM/ODM nor
independently produced brands. These firms entered last, when the early movers were exiting.
In essence, we have found several channels where diversification contributed to raising
speed of innovation in latecomers: their previous business in the related industries (e.g.,
semiconductor and electronics manufacturing) provided many physical and intangible
connections to the new businesses, TFT-LCD and wireless handsets. Because manufacturing
TFT-LCD and semiconductors shared a certain kind of common process technology - the fab
experience - firms with the semiconductor experience possibly outpaced others in TFT-LCD
manufacturing.
Latecomers have built the capability of efficient resource allocation, as they have
gradually been moved into more technologically sophisticated industries via diversification. Their
integration capability was reinforced by the practices of (a) extensive job rotation to familiarize
workers with the context of their work and to increase their flexibility and (b) group-level joint
projects. Particularly, the firms with the electronics experiences used their parts and components
supplier networks.
Table 4.4. Latecomers in the wireless handset industry, 2006.
Firm (est. year) Country Group' Ownership2  Assets3  Employee Group industries Sales3  Pre-OBM
Arima (1989) Taiwan G N, P 80,777,666 10,126 Computers and peripherals, telecom 825,604 Ericsson OEM & LGODM
Quanta (1988) Taiwan G N, P 69,334,088 44,687 Computers and peripherals, telecom, software 1,641,023 Dell & HP ODM
Compal (1999) Taiwan G N, P 3,715,633 3,823 Telecom, computers 436,218 Motorola ODM
BenQ (1984) Taiwan G N, P 36,883,255 32,507 Computer and peripherals, software, telecom 6,935,432 Acq. Siemens 5
Samsung (1969) Korea G N, P 444,311 80,594 Electronics, electrical machinery, software 43,737 None
LG (1959) Korea G N, P 215,400 64,000 Electronics, electrical machinery, chemical, etc. 23,899 None4
Eastcom (1996) China G N, S 5,624,477 2,209 Electronics, telecom, computers 2,344,670 Motorola & KyoceraOEM
Bird (1995) China G N, S 4,355,477 2,493 Telecom, electronics, computers 862,664 Sagem OEM
ZTE (1997) China G N, S 34,287,677 39,266 Telecom, software, electronics 2,948,055 None
Haier (1984) China G N, S 1,085,024 30,645 Telecom, electronics 2,511,722 Sendo OEM
TCL (1992) China G N, S 10,321,433 1,876 Telecom, electronics and computers 1,055,433 Alcatel OEM
Source: Merchant online database
Note: : 'G indicates a subsidiary of a business group; 2 N: national, P: private; S: state-owned; 3 applied only to subsidiary and measured with USD; 4 LG did
OEM (with HP) only in PDA production; 5 acquisition failed.
For the ODM (and OEM) firms, their customer network enabled them to reduce the time to find
technology partners (especially in the case of Taiwan). Third, by relocating engineers and
scientists as well as managers who had some relevant expertise in new business, latecomers were
well-prepared for new business and capable of quickly integrating new learning externally
acquired (which we will discuss in the next sections).
Finally, the Taiwan experience indicates that in both TFT-LCD and wireless handsets,
only diversified firms could obtain production technology through supply chains of the leading
brands. Latecomers' reputation and production size in the previous experience represented the
levels of technological capability (and quality control) and production capacity and therefore
were primary selection criteria used by the leading brands when those firms sought local
production partners or production suppliers. As diversification (particularly unrelated
diversification) entailed a lot of problems, especially in financial management, the result of
diversification did not necessarily lead the ramp-up of latecomers. Also, as firm size grew, some
latecomers could not manage their organization effectively. Consequently, corporate acquisition
and international expansion frequently ended up with a failure. Only the successful latecomers in
the TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries have identified markets with extra rents and
quickly adjusted themselves to the changing environment. Diversification has been a mechanism
for re-allocation of internal resources in order to use the resources in a manner that elevates their
values.
4.3. PRODUCTION AND PROCESS KNOWLEDGE
4.3.1. Upscaling and Learning
This section examines the relationship between production system (mass production) and entry
speed of latecomers. Latecomers have entered the TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries with
mass production. Theoretically, mass production makes firms less specialized, less flexible, and
thus slower in adjusting themselves to the changing environment (Piore and Sabel, 1984).
Paradoxically, the speedy entries of latecomers were not based on craftsmanship and did not
serve specialized needs: their mass-production entry has been inevitable for several reasons. First,
because latecomers do not have brand power, a competitive price has been the strongest weapon
in the world market. Declining profit margins and standardization trends have also been
incentives to exploit economies of scale (Amsden and Chu, 2003).
Second, no latecomer pioneered technology and thus latecomers did not have cutting-
edge product R&D knowledge. This made latecomers first focus on learning production skills and
only over time increase product knowledge. Because latecomers had accumulated a considerable
level of production skills in the mid-tech industries, it was more advantageous for latecomers to
select a mass-production strategy. In addition, by mass production, latecomers could diminish
unit design costs (Amsden and Chu, 2003).
Therefore, upscaling - raising the probability of mass production - per se has been the
object of latecomers' R&D, rather than creative product development. In fact, it took years even
for the leading firms in advanced economies to mass-produce TFT-LCD. What has distinguished
latecomers is that they have been very late in product development, but quicker than the leading
firms in mass production. Table 3.1 (on the page 38) again confirms that R&D success by
latecomers in the TFT-LCD industry has been delayed: but the time lag between the leading firms
(world) and latecomers in mass production becomes reduced or zero over time.
Mass production by latecomers has induced declines in profit margins, as shown in the
previous chapter. An entry of latecomers has lowered product prices, which is decreased again by
the subsequent latecomers. In order to compete against the leading firms as well as other
latecomers, newer latecomer entrants have to produce at lower prices than the existing latecomer
manufacturers.33 Latecomers' mass production has also driven the leading firms to leave their
product market or to go overseas for less costly production, which facilitates knowledge diffusion.
With price competitiveness based on mass production and cheaper wages, latecomers increased
market shares in the world and rapidly ramped up.34
Latecomers successfully found faster routes to mass production and eventually reduced
time-to-market by their entries. The quick entry strategy was realized by learning, of course.
What attracts our attention is that learning of latecomers has been fostered in a manner that
cannot be observed in other countries' experiences. In order to save time, latecomers in the TFT-
LCD industry proceeded with several types of projects together. While a classical process in
production management is linear, starting with R&D, then facilities construction, production, and
finally testing, latecomers separated the entire production process into discrete steps and executed
them individually and concurrently.
33 Based on the author's interviews with the Taiwan TFT-LCD panel manufacturers.
34 The concept of technology maturity is not easy to measure; nevertheless, decreasing profit margins or
declining unit prices typically represent maturity. In theory, the leading firms which pioneered an industry,
unless exiting, tend to consider FDI or international outsourcing when technology begins to mature, for
technological maturity pulls prices down. To remain profitable, first movers go overseas for low production
costs (mostly for lower wages). Therefore, FDI and international outsourcing are the indicators of
decreasing profitability. In particular, because of the rapid changes in technology, the high-tech industries
are characterized by fierce competition and narrowing profit margins even before their technology reaches
the mature stage. At the mature stage, firms have to seek profits by lowering costs through disaggregating
each manufacturing or assembly task overseas (Chen, 2002).
Called "parallel project management" by latecomers themselves, projects were
proceeding concurrently with in-house R&D and technology imports. Latecomers also
constructed production facilities, at the same time developing process technology. Not only in
terms of the value chain, but also in the geographic sense, latecomers implemented projects in
"parallel": they made their overseas labs do the same research that they were conducting
domestically. Most outstandingly, they conducted R&D about different levels of technologies.
Thus, before latecomers began to mass-produce Gen 2 products in 1995, they already had process
technology for Gen 5 products developed.
"Parallel project management" was not first introduced with the TFT-LCD entry: it
originated with Toshiba (the Japanese firm), from which Samsung benchmarked the practice for
the semiconductor catching-up.35 The original use of "parallel project management" in the
semiconductor industry was to internalize different types (product design and process technology)
from multiple sources as quickly as possible. Not only the companies, but also government
adopted this project execution strategy. When ETRI in Korea was driving CDMA
commercialization with the national technologies, ETRI worked on the product R&D and,
concurrently, the Korean firms developed production technologies.
Qualcomm also joined the "parallel project management" competition. Qualcomm and
ETRI elaborated concurrently on similar projects (product R&D), but the progress of Qualcomm
was very slow - at least, ETRI believed so (ETRI, 1996). Hence, ETRI independently went
further the scope of assigned projects, as well as quickly beginning to explore the research realm
of Qualcomm. This experience provided a technologically solid basis when Samsung developed a
mobile communication chip in 1999 and became independent of the Qualcomm chip.
Whereas the leading firms tended to enter with product R&D, latecomers' first task was
building production sites. Product R&D was initiated in the last sequence: Latecomers'
innovation is not product R&D-oriented, but process R&D-oriented. One major dimension for
latecomers' R&D is improvement of manufacturability rather than product development. Mass
production was, accordingly, the object of R&D. Another dimension for latecomers' R&D is
application of the existing technologies to the new ones. For the Korean firms, R&D for TFT-
35 According to Mathew and Cho (2000), "the plan called for Samsung to assemble at breakneck speed the
elements of an advanced VLSI semiconductor operation, by passing or 'leapfrogging' all previous LSI
technological steps, and focusing on the standardized memory chips where Japanese firms had already
made their mark. Frontier product and process technologies were to be sought through licensing, and
internalized within Samsung's own capabilities as quickly as possible through massive recruitment drives
for specialist engineers.....Samsung established two parallel development teams, one to produce a working
version of the Micron design, and the other to assemble the process technology at a new plant being built at
breakneck speed at Kiheung, south of Seoul" (Mathews and Cho, p.123). Samsung's "parallel project
management" was later replicated by Hyundai when Hyundai entered the semiconductor industry.
LCD focused on adoption of the semiconductor manufacturing technologies. Because the
Taiwanese TFT-LCD entrants (except AUO) did not have a fab experience, they were later in
TFT-LCD entry than the Korean firms and had to be supplemented by product technologies
developed by ITRI.36 Nevertheless, the Taiwanese firms applied the electronics technologies
(calculator and notebook) to the wireless handset manufacturing, as demonstrated by Amsden and
Chu (2003).
From the perspective of internal process, mass production driven by multiple and
concurrent projects, and technology application of the existing technologies to the new
technology, are the essence of quick entry in latecomers. The fact that mass production and
technology application have worked seamlessly indicates that latecomers have an outstanding
integration capability. Their integration capability is confirmed by the fact that, although
latecomers were delayed in R&D success timing, their mass production did not have a time lag:
latecomers were more rapid than the leading firms in moving into mass production. In order to
mass-produce, latecomers should scale up. Unipac merged with Acer, forming AUO. AUO later
combined with Quanta. Not only latecomers, but also the leading firms have been concerned with
economies of scale. For instance, Future Vision involves 20 Japanese firms, including Hitachi and
Epson. Toshiba and Matsushita joined together and established TMD.
4.3.2. Role of Imported Capital Goods and Geographical Proximity
After the owners of latecomers selected target industries to enter, they mobilized capital, using
their business group system. Top managerial forces then quickly prepared for entry by mustering
essential people through internal re-organization and external recruiting of their nationals (from
the leading firms). Another crucial element for technology mobilization in the entry process is to
acquire production (or process) technology.
36 In the early 1990s (1992-1994), the best-selling Taiwanese semiconductor firms (with fabs) were TSMC,
UMC, Winbond, Mosel-Vitelic, TI-Acer, Macronix, HMC, and Holtek (cite from Mathews and Cho, 2000).
Among the top sales firms, only Acer (AUO, its subsidiary) entered the TFT-LCD industry. Therefore,
except AUO, no TFT-LCD firm in Taiwan had a fab-experience in the semiconductor industry. The
Taiwanese firms had an advanced capability in design rather than in process. Until the late 1980s, process
technology and fabrication capability were still lacking (Mathews and Cho, 2000), as shown by the case
that Mosel-Vitelic failed to launch DRAM manufacturing. Accordingly, the leading Taiwan semiconductor
manufacturers were reluctant to diversify into the TFT-LCD industry, which made the Taiwan entry
delayed, compared to the Korean entry. Through stages of the Taiwan semiconductor growth, ITRI and
ERSO have developed process technology and diffused it to the Taiwanese firms. ITRI also applied the
process technology and transferred to Prime View International, which was the first TFT-LCD firm in
Taiwan. Without participation of major semiconductor fabrication firms, ITRI became the best
technological source for the TFT-LCD manufacturing. We will discuss in more details in section 4.5.
In the TFT-LCD industry, the production technology at the early stage was acquired from
the equipment, imported from overseas. In the wireless handset industry, the nature of production
technology was automated assembly for individual parts, rather than a fab-like process. We will
first examine each industry and later compare the two industries. In TFT-LCD, the role of
imported capital goods and foreign technology vendors should not be missed as a source of
latecomers' procurement of the production technology at the pre-entry and early stages, for
diversification experience alone was never sufficient to proceed to a new industry.
Imported capital goods have been the major source of production technology, both in
theory and practice. Theoretically, the initial step in the innovation process for latecomers was
that latecomers assimilated imported capital goods (Kim, 1980; Dahlman and Westphal, 1981).
After learning from assimilation was sufficiently accumulated, latecomers finally proceeded to
imitate the leading firms in advanced economies (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). Also, empirically, the
role of the foreign equipment vendors significantly contributed to latecomer entry into mid-tech
industries (Amsden, 1984). In particular, in the industrial development of the East Asian countries,
the contributions of the Japanese equipment vendors to production know-how transfer have been
noteworthy (Mathews and Cho, 2000; Berger and Lester, 2003; Rasiah, 1994).
In Korea, benefits from the Japanese neighborhood went beyond mid-tech industries. For
the TFT-LCD entry, the Korean firms replicated the strategies they used for the semiconductor
entry. The Korean semiconductor entry was an outcome of imitation of Japan because the Korean
firms exactly followed the steps of the Japanese semiconductor manufacturers and procured the
same materials and equipment from the same vendors (Mathews and Cho, 2000).
In Table 4.5, we present a composite of the capital goods imported to Korea, categorized
by national origin. During the first half of the 1990s, the Korean latecomers were in the middle of
leapfrogging in the semiconductor industry and preparing for TFT-LCD entry. Japan continued to
be a predominant equipment supplier during the pre-entry and early post-entry period, although
the Japanese share gradually diminished. During this period, the Korean firms entered the TFT-
LCD, wireless handset, and semiconductor industries.
We have also found that geographical proximity enabled latecomers in East Asia to
quickly access production technology, which induced fast entry. The report released by Samsung
indicates that the Japanese equipment vendors were primary instructors for Samsung for
production technology (SERI, 1999). The Japanese technology became available because, due to
the economic slow-down, the Japanese TFT-LCD panel makers stopped investing (Asakawa,
2007). Similar to the semiconductor experience, it was difficult for them to acquire knowledge
from the Japanese manufacturers. Accordingly, the initial technological learning was licensing
from a U.S. equipment vendor, Optical Imaging Systems (see Table 4.6). Samsung did not think
that the learning was efficient, thus beginning to actively seek informal learning from the
Japanese TFT-LCD moonlighting engineers.
Table 4.5. Imports of capital goods by country of origin: Korea as a destination, 1991-1996 (%)
Year U.S. Japan Europe World
1991 26.35 44.70 17.91 100
1992 26.23 40.82 18.04 100
1993 25.47 42.22 16.89 100
1994 26.58 41.67 17.90 100
1995 27.86 39.09 17.53 100
1996 28.62 34.67 19.32 100
Source: UNCTAD, various years.
Notes. A. Capital goods are defined and categorized as 7.1 (power generating machines), 7.2 (special
industrial machinery), 7.3 (metal working machines), 7.4 (general industrial machinery), 7.5 (office
machines, ADP Mach), 7.7 (telecommunications sound equipment, etc.), and 7.7 (electrical machinery,
apparatus, parts).
B. Europe includes EU 25 countries less the former USSR confederation countries.
Table 4.6. Latecomers and major equipment vendors: TFT-LCD
Firm Year Vendor partner Capital goods
Samsung 1993 Optical Imaging Systems (US) Gen 2 fab construction in Ki-Heung: from Gen 3,
Samsung shifted to the Japanese vendors
1994 Various firms (P) Technical consultancy and problem solving
1995 Fujitsu's vendor (P) Equipment for wide-viewing angle
LG 1996 Alps Central Laboratories (JP) Equipment for driver ICs; Major vendor for LG
1996 Photon Dynamics (US) Testing equipment
Hyundai 1996 Toshiba's vendor (JP) Gen 3 fab construction in I-chon
Source: Company interviews; Complemented with Mathews (2003)
Note: US - U.S.A; JP - Japan
At pre-entry stage, the Korean firms had consistently turned to the Japanese equipment
vendors for help but their approaches had been turned down due to the market power of their
current Japanese manufacturer clients.37 Then a chance came. Because R&D expenses to develop
toolsets and equipment were overwhelmingly snowballing, the Japanese equipment vendors
37 Due to the semiconductor experience, the Korean firms have built close relationships with the Japanese
equipment vendors. Because the semiconductor and TFT-LCD industries tend to share similar (fab-like)
process technology, the TFT-LCD equipment vendors and the semiconductor vendors were closely
networked. The Korean network with the Japanese semiconductor equipment vendors is particularly
important in understanding the Korean entry into the semiconductor industry as a first latecomer, for the
Japanese semiconductor equipment vendors were the most significant source of the semiconductor
manufacturing technology (Shin, 1996).
wanted to have as many buyers as possible in order to amortize those costs (Asakawa, 2007). In
addition, the Japanese manufacturers reduced capital investment due to downturn and economic
slow-down. Consequently, the Japanese equipment vendors turned into an active attitude for
attracting customers. As a result, both Samsung and LG successfully formed customer-seller
relationships with of the Japanese vendors from 1995. The Japanese lessons were provided in the
mode of turnkey projects.
With assistance from the Japanese equipment vendors, Samsung and LG waited until the
first downturn in the TFT-LCD price took place in 1993-1994 (Matthews, 2005). Taking
advantage of redundant human resources increasingly available in Japan due to the downturn,
they hired the Japanese scientists and engineers. It was the second-generation era in the TFT-
LCD life-cycle, and Samsung produced the second-generation products experimentally (in terms
of the production size). Meanwhile, the "Seoul Express" of weekend moonlighting Japanese
engineers accelerated enough for the Korean latecomers to launch mass production at the next
downturn in 1995 (Asakawa, 2007). With the two successive attacks, the Korean latecomers
successfully ramped up quickly (Wang, 2006).
In order to curb the Korean growth and retain profitability given falling margins, the
Japanese panel makers moved their production to Taiwan. They chose Taiwan because Taiwan
was close to Japan and the Taiwanese firms were equipped with a high level of production
capabilities. When the Japanese TFT-LCD manufacturers came to Taiwan to build production
partnership with the Taiwanese latecomers, they accompanied the Japanese equipment vendors.
Therefore, production partnerships already included learning from the equipment, as suggested by
Table 4.6. The Japanese equipment vendors in Taiwan replicated the same sequence with the
Taiwanese latecomers. As in the Korean experience, there was informal learning as well as
formal networking, something between Taiwan and Japan like the "Seoul Express" (Wang, 2006).
Because enhancing production skills is a matter of learning-by-doing, frequent face-to-face
communications between a transferer and a recipient possible given for their geographically
nearness, raised efficiency of learning.
The history of Korean wireless phone manufacturing traces back to 1983. Samsung
pulled 40 engineers from R&D teams of the fax machine and cordless phone divisions and
reverse-engineered various Japanese car phones to acquire production technology (Munhwa Ilbo,
2007). The elementary understanding of manufacturing car phones became elevated by licensing
Toshiba technology in 1984. Yet market performance was unsatisfactory and Samsung shifted to
research on Motorola's products. The first analogue wireless handset, an imitation of Motorola,
was mass-produced in 1988 and its export began in 1993. Other firms, such as Telson, acquired
production skills from subcontracting (OEM) with Motorola. The CDMA success by the Korean
firms was supported by production skills accumulated from the previous experiences in
manufacturing other types of wireless phone, assisted by U.S. firms rather than the Japanese firms.
Accordingly, the Japanese machinery was less dominant in the wireless handset industry of Korea.
Nevertheless, technology selection is not the only factor that explains the weaker effects
of technological learning from the Japanese capital goods in the wireless handset industry, since
the Taiwanese firms entered the wireless handset industry as a form of subcontractor for the
Japanese electronics firms (the Taiwanese firms also supplied to the European and American
wireless brands). The machinery for wireless handset manufacturing has been less specialized
than the machinery for TFT-LCD manufacturing.38 Accordingly, the role of the machinery
vendors in the wireless handset industry was more limited than that in the TFT-LCD industry.
Latecomers acquired quality-control management (QCM), a production technique, but the
instructors were not their equipment vendors but the contractors or joint venture partners.
Although latecomers in the wireless handset industry were influenced by the Japanese firms,
geographic proximity was less critical in fast acquisition of knowledge through capital goods.
The reasons are: first, the Korean firms adopted the U.S.-leading technology (CDMA).
Qualcomm, a U.S. firm, had developed the technology and, accordingly, capital goods were
imported from equipment vendors networked with Qualcomm. Therefore, Japan was not the
primary equipment market for CDMA. Second, while TFT-LCD has a cyclic pattern which has
encouraged latecomers to acquire production skills before the next coming upturn, wireless
handset production did not. Latecomers therefore accessed production technology by
subcontracting. Third, wireless handset manufacturing does not require the fab setting as in
semiconductor or flat panel display manufacturing. The fab setting mandates state-of-the-art
production and process skills: fab construction and the process skills are the core technologies in
TFT-LCD. Due to the different nature of the technology, the role of capital goods and the
requirement for time-sensitive learning were limited in the wireless handset business.
Accordingly, the location advantage of latecomers being next to Japan was not outstanding in
their early stage. Yet later, as industry increasingly matured, the local firms in latecomers'
countries also began to replace the imported equipment (capital goods) technologies and a
majority of the local equipment manufacturers learned from the Japanese vendors.
38 Piore and Sabel (1984) have asserted that skills and knowledge are embedded in special-purpose
machinery rather than generic-purpose machinery.
4.4. Direction of Knowledge Flows: Vertical and Horizontal Relationships 39
In addition to the capital goods, the upstream firms from the advanced economies have also been
sources of technological knowledge. In this section 4.4.3, using the concept of global supply
chain, we approach the question of that how latecomers accessed production technology and
whether the access mode had a relationship with entry speed. Many latecomers first began OEM-
type manufacturing before they produced their own brands.
The Korean firms, for example, Samsung and LG, acquired production technology from
facilities vendors and professional engineers, as discussed in the previous section. LG
independently entered with the Gen 2 technology in 1995 but signed onto ajoint venture
partnership with Philips from Gen 4 for ramping up in the market. In Taiwan, the overwhelming
technology source has been the Japanese firms, which came to Taiwan to curb the growth of the
Korean firms.
4.4.1. The TFT-LCD Industry
As Table 4.7 suggests, advanced production skills from the leading Japanese TFT-LCD
manufacturers were available to latecomers in the TFT-LCD business. The extent and type of
access varied, depending on latecomers' entry timing. For example, the Korean firms relied more
on the equipment vendors due to a rivalry relationship with the Japanese firms, but the Taiwanese
firms benefited substantially from the Japanese manufacturers. It is notable that the relations
between the Taiwanese TFT-LCD manufacturers and the Japanese TFT-LCD producers were
vertical: the Taiwanese firms supplied to the Japanese firms low-priced panels to be used in the
electronics products.
39 The boundary of "vertical" FDI and global production outsourcing is very indistinct. Both modes mean
supplier relationship and the only difference is that vertical FDI concerns ownership while global
outsourcing does not. In the past, FDI was a common mode for firms to produce overseas, as the leading
Western firms in electronics did. Yet, the advancement of IT has made them shift to outsourcing, as they
now can control and monitor the entire logistics with an electronic manufacturing system (EMS). To
latecomers (and their supplier firms in developing countries), vertical FDI and outsourcing do not differ
much. However, the difference between "horizontal" FDI and outsourcing is significant (to latecomers).
Theories predict that FDI is favored over global outsourcing if a significant risk of losing control over
proprietary assets and processes exists, or if the domestic market is large and there is a need for easy access
to it (Ohmae, 1990).
In contrast, firms are likely to outsource if technologies are in short or low-volume runs, or are
subject to very rapid change and modification (Chen, 2002). Outsourcing is also preferred when product
technology is generic or administrative/monitoring costs are relatively low. Alguire et al. (1994) confirmed
that products manufactured through global sourcing were usually of unsophisticated technology and for
generic use. Their research included 426 advanced economy and 418 developing country firms. Putting
theories together implies that, for the peer-level latecomers (OBM), it is hard to acquire knowledge directly
from FDI. In the next chapter, we will examine in detail what type of technological knowledge is obtained
from which source.



































Notes. 1 ADT previously formed a JV with Japan IBM and later merged with Unipac, changing name to
AUO; 2 JV and OEM refer tojoint venture and original equipment manufacturing, respectively.
The Korean firms acquired production skills primarily from the equipment vendors.
Samsung later formed a joint venture with NEC but it was for application of the TFT-LCD
technology to the mobile phones. A joint venture with Sony resulted from strategic intentions
agreed by the two firms in order to make standard their panel size. LG's TFT-LCD manufacturing
is now LG-Philips, apparently a joint venture with Philips, but division of labor in LG-Philips is
very clear-cut: Philips provides distribution channels in the European market and LG is
responsible for manufacturing the R&D technology. LG's basis for TFT-LCD manufacturing
skills was the experience of LG Semiconductor and the Japanese equipment vendors, as we
examined in the previous section.
The "big three" TFT-LCD panel makers in Taiwan are AU Optoelectronics (AUO: Acer
Group subsidiary); Chung-Hua Picture Tube (CPT: Tatung Group subsidiary), and Chi-Mei
Optoelectronics (CMO: Chi-Mei Group subsidiary). AUO was formed in 2001 by Acer and
Unipac merging. Unipac, the earliest TFT-LCD firm in Taiwan, was a long-term partner with
ERSO, a research affiliate of ITRI, the central technology research institute established by the
Taiwan government. Unipac's production capabilities in TFT-LCD manufacturing were built






















JV for mobile display production2
JV for Si-LCD production
JV for LCD production
Production technology transferred from ITRI
Licensing and OEM
Production technology transferred from ITRI
OEM
Licensing and OEM
Licensing and OEM (28% of total production)
Licensing and OEM
Licensing and then JV for LCD production and OEM
Licensing (process/device tech) and OEM (36% of total
production)
ITRI spin off
BOE acquired Hydis, a Korean firm
JV for LCD production (upon NEC's exit)
JV for LCD production
Facility construction
Taiwan electronics industry. Through Tatung's cooperation network, CPT obtained production
technology from Mitsubishi when Mitsubishi came to Taiwan for less costly production of the
TFT-LCD panels. Finally, CMO initially relied on the national technology transferred from
ERSO but later turned to working on the Fujitsu technology.
The Taiwanese firms jumped onto the TFT-LCD technology trajectory during the third
cycle, but there were some firms which entered later (the fourth cyclic period). Most importantly,
ERSO established a spin-off firm. Toppoly entered with support of ERSO, and ramped up quickly.
Although ERSO owned an excellent technology, most Taiwanese TFT-LCD manufacturers
instead benefited from the Japanese firms (see Table 4.7). Quanta, the largest Taiwan computer
manufacturing giant, also plunged into the TFT-LCD business, allying with Sharp, which then
wanted to streamline its production by outsourcing production of middle-size panels.
Table 4.7 makes clear the direction of knowledge flow: in the previous section that
discussed upscaling and learning, we showed that latecomers crowded out the leading firms by
price cutting. Because of the pricing strategy based on mass production, the emergence of one
latecomer has affected the technology strategies of other latecomers. Both Korean and Taiwanese
firms in TFT-LCD benefited from the Japanese technology, but the knowledge did not flow
horizontally but vertically. Later entrants had to take account of market saturation, as shown in
the Chinese case. The Chinese firms could only acquire existing TFT-LCD manufacturers which
were driven to exit.
As Table 4.7 shows, the Taiwanese firms connected with the Japanese firms through
membership in the Japanese production networks. The membership requirement always included
OEM contracts, which guaranteed a certain level of sales and thus growth for the Taiwanese firms.
Finally, some latecomers which entered very late tended to obtain production technology by
purchasing it, as indicated by the Chinese cases. When the Chinese firms diversified from
electronics from 2000, the leading firms in advanced economies were exiting from the business or
leaving their home countries and selling their know-how. A similar pattern was also found in the
cell phone industry, as Table 4.8 in the next section shows.
In summary, no source or mode is found to have been dominant as a way for latecomers
to acquire production technology, although latecomers commonly learned from the foreign firms.
This finding suggests that speed of entry by latecomers has depended on their endogenous efforts.
4.4.2. The Wireless Handset Industry
We also examine the wireless handset industry, exploring that how latecomers have utilized
technological knowledge from foreign firms as well as whether foreign technology has been
essential for latecomers in executing speedy entry. At the pre-CDMA stage, the Korean firms
(Samsung, LG, Hyundai, or Macson40) were manufacturing analogue-type wireless handsets via
OEM and in semi-knock-down (SKD) modes. The localization rate for the Korean analogue
wireless handsets was less than 20 percent (ETRI, 1999). With some level of production skills,
they worked on production technologies of the CDMA, a new type of wireless handset, assisted
by the Korean government, especially ETRI, which provided product designs and components
technologies.
The sources of production knowledge for the Korean firms varied (see Table 4.8):
Samsung relied primarily on in-house learning, Pantech and Macson were local OEM suppliers,
and Macson was an ETRI spin-off. Although their technological learning was generated by
different routes, they blended existing learning with new learning (with governmental support),
quickly mass-producing the CDMA device. Wireless handset manufacturing in China has a
longer history than in Taiwan, starting in the early 1990s. The early firms were former SOEs or
state labs that specialized in developing and manufacturing mobile equipment.41 They gained
experience from manufacturing the beeper, car phone and cordless phone, as well as an
elementary level of mobile handsets, but were quite slow in producing their own brands.
As the table indicates, all latecomers acquired production skills from foreign sources, but
the level of endogenous efforts to further develop the skills varied. Particularly in Taiwan,
learning from foreign sources has taken place through the global production chain, a vertical
network between latecomers and the leading big brands. In contrast, the foreign knowledge in the
wireless handset industry flowed into the Chinese firms in a horizontal way. The horizontal
knowledge flow was pushed by Chinese government policy as well as by the market-seeking
strategy of the leading foreign brands.
Latecomers which entered the wireless handset market while it was less mature usually
joined the production chain of the leading foreign brands; other latecomers which entered tried to
obtain production technologies by acquiring existing firms. However, it is noteworthy that
ownership did not guarantee knowledge. Many latecomers who entered last adopted an
acquisition strategy, but the acquisitions did not always bring satisfactory results.
40 Established by ETRI, Macson in the 1990s had built a powerful brand in the car phone market. Because
of its reputation, it entered the CDMA handset manufacturing. Before CDMA participation, Macson was
one of the major suppliers (OEM) for Motorola. The firm failed in timely adaptation to drastically falling
rrofit margins due to the Chinese entry, and went bankrupt. LG acquired Macson.For example, Sangfei, Eastcom, Capitel, and Bird entered in the early- or mid-1990s as production
partners for Philips, Motorola, Nokia, and Sagem, respectively.



































Source: Author and Digitimes (various issues).
Notes. 'After the first ODM model, the alliance was annulled. LG proceeded to OBM; 2 the acquisition
ended in bankruptcy, in 2006; 3a Hong Kong-based handset manufacturer; 4 Bird provides distribution
channels for the products Sagem manufacturs.
For example, BenQ Mobile, which acquired Siemens, ended up in bankruptcy due to the
accumulated losses; Sagem and Bird broke up; TCL gave up Alcatel's mobile business; and
Panda liquidated Ericsson China's mobile division. Firms ramped up through an OEM strategy
also faced challenges: for example, Motorola terminated handset OEM contracts with BenQ and
Compal, as BenQ and Compal shifted to being OBM. Because of their insufficient knowledge-
based assets, the new OBM firms slumped in sales after becoming independent.
So far, latecomers' strategies for acquisition of production know-how have illustrated that
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JV for digital media production
Acquisition (mobile manufacturing subsidiary) 2
OEM and then ODM (from 2002)
ODM for camera phone begins
JV for cell phone manufacturing
OEM
JV for cell phone production
JV for GSM phone production
Acquisition (mobile manufacturing division)
JV for transferring 3G phone technology
OEM for CDMA phone components
Exclusive procurement for Ericsson's CDMA solutions
JV for cell phone production
JV for cell phone production and OEM
JV for cell phone production
JV for CDMA phone production
JV for transferring some cell phone technology
Acquisition of Xoceco
JV for cell phone production
JV for cell phone production
Licensing for wireless telephone production
JV for cell phone production
JV for cell phone distribution4
the global production chain, organized by the leading firms in advanced economies. As
technology has been diffused by international outsourcing and foreign direct investment, the
wireless handset technology has become extremely mature and its market has been saturated
since 2000. Over time, the wireless handset market has become segmented by region, price (high,
medium, or low), and product type. At this stage, latecomers who integrate with their OEM and
ODM suppliers and properly use buy-or-make strategy have been faster in entry execution.
Due to market saturation, the big brands have been outsourcing a considerable percentage
of their production to OEM4 2 and ODM in order to meet profit goals4 3 (see Table 4.10). The big
brands have instead concentrated on design and development of material and core parts. Because
even design is purchasable at independent design houses, the big brands have increased
OEM/ODM and focused on high value-added products only. The big brands have outsourced to
latecomers but relied more on the firms which are specializing only in outsourcing, like
Flextronics or Foxconn.
Accordingly, the more delayed the entries of latecomers, the more likely it is that they are
not actually involved in production, simply for the reason that getting technologies is easy, but
outperforming others within a short time - given that market is growing more saturated over time
- is hard. Those latecomers' ramp-up strategies are not based on endogenous learning through
production; they even outsource the entire R&D and manufacturing processes and only integrate
the outsourced tasks with other corporate functions, e.g., marketing, procurement, or planning.
Because they are "late" and it takes time to master production technology (apart from availability
of technological sources), they have relied on external and independent suppliers. For example,
TCL purchased finished handsets from the Taiwanese firms and attached its label to the products
(see Table 4.9).
The share of endogenous efforts in building technological capabilities has varied,
depending on the latecomers. As Table 4.10 suggests, the Korean firms and the Taiwanese firms
have placed more weight on in-house jobs through their domestic and overseas subsidiaries'
manufacturing. These groups have also contracted with OEM suppliers and purchased designs
(for low-end products) from design houses. Yet the percentage of outsourcing has been relatively
low. Therefore, depending on the level of endogenous efforts, particularly in promotion of
production skills, types of integration have been different.
42 In 2002, OEM outsourcing ratios for Nokia, Motorola, Siemens, and Sony-Ericsson were 20%, 52%,
25%, and 100%, respectively. In 2003, the ratios increased to 23%, 56%, 28%, and 100%. Outsourcing
ratios were measured by value of production, calculated in USD (Goldman Sachs, 2004).
43 Based on author's fieldwork.
Table 4.9. Global wireless handset outsourcing: Brand marketers and their suppliers, 2005
Firm Major OEM/EMS suppliers Major ODM supplier OEM units By EMS By ODM(mil) (%) (%)
Nokia Elcoteq (FL), Foxconn (TW) Celestica (US), Solectron (US), Telson (KR), Honhai (TW) 165 15 0
Motorola Flextronics (SG), BenQ (TW)*, Pantech Compal (TW)', Telson (KR), Solectron (US), Celestica (US),(KR) Foxconn (TW) 65 10 50
Sony-Ericsson Flextronics (SG), Foxconn (TW) Arima (TW), GVC-Lite-on (TW), Elcoteq (FL) 30 40 60
Siemens Flextronics (SG), Sanmina-SCI (US) Quanta (TW) 1 28 30 30
Panasonic n.a. Celestica (US) 16 5 20
NEC n.a. Celestica (US), BenQ (TW), Arima (TW) 14 5 15
Mitsubishi n.a. Solectron (US) 11 10 0
Kyocera Solectron (US) n.a. 10 30 0
Samsung n.a. In-house 65 0 0
LG Tubotech (KR) In-house, Arima (TW)2  _ 25 0 0
Huawei n.a. 5.7 100 0
TCL Alcatel3, LG (KR), Pantech (KR) GVC-Lite-on (TW), Compal (TW), Foxconn (TW) 4 40 60
ZTE SK telecom (KR) Qi ii (TW) 1.4 20 n.a.
Arima In-house In-house n.a. 0 0
BenQ In-house In-house, Siemens n.a. 0 0
Compal In-house In-house n.a. 0 0
Source: Author, Credit Suisse (2007), Weaver (2007), KISDI (2005), and Digitimes (various issues).
Notes. 'The OEM with indicated firms stopped as they became OBM; 2 low-end phones only; 3 relationship discontinued from 2005
FL - Finland, US - America, KR - Korea, TW - Taiwan, FR - France, SG - Singapore
Table 4.10. Outsourcing for ODM/OEM: Wireless handsets, 2006
Country Firm ODM supplier
China UTStarcomm Foxconn (TW)
Amoi Arima (TW), Bellwave (KR)
Capitel Chi-Mei (TW), DBTel (TW), Sewon (KR), Intercube (PO)
China Bridge LG (KR)
CEC BenQ (TW), Pantech (KR), Telson (KR), Arima (TW), Chi-Mei (TW)
Datang Compal (TW), Sharp (JP)
Eastcom Lite-on (TW), Compal (TW), Pantech (KR), Telson (KR)
Haier BenQ (TW), Compal (TW), Lite-on (TW), Sewon (KR), Asus (TW)
Hisense Telcom, Panasonic (JP), Telson (KR),
Kejian EZZE (KR)
Konka BenQ (TW), Telson (KR), Quanta (TW), Pantech (KR), Telson (KR)
Langchao LG (KR)
Lenovo BenQ (TW), Arima (TW), Pantech (KR), Sewon (KR),
Bird BenQ (TW), Quanta (TW), Pantech (KR), Sewon (KR), Telson (KR)
Panda Foxconn (TW), Sewon (KR), Bellwave (KR), Panda (TW)
Putian BenQ (TW), Compal (TW), Sewon (KR), Pantech (KR), Telson (KR)
Sangfei Okwap (TW)
Southtec Pantech (KR), Toplux (TW), Samsung (KR)
TCL Compal (TW), Foxconn (TW), LG (KR), Pantech (KR)
ZTE Qi Ji (TW), SK telecom (KR)
Korea Samsung Asus (TW)
LG Arima (TW), Turbotech (KR)
Taiwan Arima None






For the Chinese firms, speedy entry required inter-firm contracts: acquiring a
manufacturing company (e.g., Konka as a sales firm, or BenQ as an ODM), or efficiently
networking (paying less for the more trendy models) with ODM or OEM firms. This type of
integration was distinct from the Korean-style integration, which was mainly application of one's
existing knowledge to the new business, or combining within-firm knowledge with external
knowledge. For Konka-branded products, Konka only assembles sockets with the GSM phones
manufactured by BenQ and the CDMA phones by Telson.4 The only difference between the
outside suppliers and this group of latecomers is that latecomers (of the last entry) possess
knowledge-based assets, at least enough to sell their own brands.
44 Based on author's fieldwork.
4.5. Product Designs and the Role of Government as a Technology Incubator
In the previous sections, we have found that latecomers acquired necessary knowledge from
multiple sources, including government. In addition, some latecomers spun off from the national
labs. Since government is one of the important sources that supply latecomers with critical
technical knowledge, we first need to investigate how latecomers (specifically the first
latecomers) have been connected to government in order to facilitate their entries.
The role of governments in developing countries has been debated: in one stream, the
governmental expenditure in science and technology and spin-offs from the government labs
foster technological capabilities at the national level (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). In another
stream, the governmental spending on technology also creates potential for (inflation-enhancing)
excess investment locally (Huang, 1996), for other domestic institutions to exert a negative
externality on competing investments (Ring, Bigley, D'Aunno, and Khanna, 2005), or for other
non-recipient industries to relatively lag behind (Ring et al., 2005). In addition, spin-offs from
governmental labs possibly repress private entrepreneurship and individual incentives to innovate
(Shleifer, 1998). In addition to these perspectives that contrast on the question of whether
government should participate in innovation activities, the scholarly interpretations of the same
facts are also sharply different. The role of the Taiwan government in the TFT-LCD is a good
example. For example, two books on Taiwan's TFT-LCD industry present conflicting arguments.
Berger and Lester (2003) are skeptical about the government, while Amsden and Chu (2003) take
a positive stance.
Latecomers benefited from their group structures for managerial forces and acquired
production skills from their previous businesses or from foreign firms. In addition, latecomers
have been assisted by institutions in raising their speeds of innovation. The roles of governments
are distinguished specifically in making national labs transfer R&D knowledge in product designs
to their national firms, as well as in networking their local firms.45 In the early 1990s, there were
sequential efforts in which the Korean government played a role in leading and coordinating
investment by the Korean firms. In 1990, led by the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy
(MOTIE), an industry R&D consortium association - the Electronic Display Industry Research
Association of Korea (EDIRAK) - was organized. In 1991, MOTIE launched a program to
support R&D of middle-sized panels and the EDIRAK successfully developed a pilot module for
the 10-inch TFT-LCD product. Benchmarking Japan, the Korean government initiated the "G7
45 Externalities, generated by interfirm networking have also been the determinants for quick adaptation to
the changing environment, as shown by the Silicon Valley experience (Saxenian, 1994). Without embedded
relational assets, regional networking for innovation, however, was promoted by government in late-
industrializing countries (Okada 2004; Mathews, 1997; Alcorta and Peres, 1998)
project," which sponsored projects on product development and other supporting technologies
(see Table 4.11).
The Korean government promoted TFT-LCD product technologies, but given that the
Korean government is experienced and successful in public R&D projects, the governmental
efforts in TFT-LCD do not particularly stand out from other projects. Indeed, some Korean
researchers have commented that the role of government was mediocre or unimpressive (Park and
Choung, 2006).
Table 4.11. Role of the Korean government as a TFT-LCD-LCD technology incubator
Funding t
Name Period Government Private
Development project for industrial founding technologies 1990-1997 4,935 6,339
Development project for LCD founding technology 1994-1999 32,884 36,441
Development project for LCD-use liquid display 1996-1999 494 314
G7 project 1995-2001 81,008 98,874
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology, Korea
Note: t indicates million Korean won.
The project was led by the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
(ETRI), a governmental research institute established and administered by the Ministry of
Science and Technology. Scientists and engineers from Samsung, LG, and Hyundai also
participated in the R&D project. The government developed the product technology and the firms
worked on production technology. Because two R&D projects proceeded concurrently, the
Korean firms soon managed to mass-produce independently.4 6
The Korean government intervened very selectively. Its primary role has been technology
incubation at the pre-entry stage. After the Korean firms entered, the R&D projects at ETRI
turned to incubation of the supply technology. The government did not get involved in all stages,
but mainly in pre-entry R&D spillover and inter-firm networking for product design. The
government-led networking in Korea, an imitation of the Japanese industrial policy, has been
deep-rooted in Korea even before the semiconductor industry (Mathews and Cho, 2000).
However, compared to Taiwan, the Korean government was not active in leading interfirm
46 In addition to the government-level R&D for development of TFT-LCD products, EDIRAK has tried to
reduce the Korean firms' dependence on Japanese equipment and components. In 1996, in spite of
skepticism from the Korean firms, EDIRAK agreed with the US Department of Commerce that Korea
would offer the US firms market access and US firms would collaborate on stepper technology and laser
glass cutting (Mathews, 2003).
networking. In contrast to the Taiwan experience, interfirm networking in Korea was
substantiated via vertical integration driven by the business groups and their suppliers.
In Taiwan, the Electronics Research and Service Organization (ERSO) first conducted
R&D on the color TFT-LCD technologies in 1988. ERSO, an affiliate lab of Industrial
Technology Research Institute, is the largest electronics research institute in Taiwan, where 1,000
R&D personnel are involved with an annual investment of 7 million USD every year. An early
R&D collaborative alliance was coordinated by ERSO, in 1994, to produce a small screen TFT-
LCD, resulting in technology that was passed across to the firm Prime View International, an
early leader in the Taiwan industry. Next to Prime View International, Unipac also succeeded in
commercializing the ERSO technology. ERSO actively sought to transfer its technologies, but the
early Taiwanese firms were very ambitious for the TFT-LCD industry and the competition among
them was very fierce. Due to the politics among firms (Berger and Lester, 2003), the Taiwanese
firms were not keen to see ITRI/ERSO efforts to produce a competitor succeed. Acer had
fabrication experience in addition to its long-term Japan connection. Other Taiwanese TFT-LCD
entrants initially worked with ERSO but nevertheless turned to the private technologies because
they did not want to share technology (Berger and Lester, 2003).
Another reason why the Taiwan government was less powerful than the Korean
government is the fast rate of change in the TFT-LCD cycles. When a third downturn in the
"crystal cycle" came, a majority of the Taiwanese firms were notebook manufacturers, and thus
did not have the Korean-style fab-experience. In addition, when the Taiwanese firms entered the
TFT-LCD business two years after the Korean firms, the Korean firms were taking over the
Japanese market share. Perceiving the emergence of the Korean firms as an evident threat, the
Japanese firms eagerly provided their production know-how to the Taiwan firms who were ready
to enter, in order to curb the growth of the Korean rivals. Furthermore, while only a short period
was left for the Taiwanese firms until the next upturn began, the Taiwan government did not
promptly coordinate investment strategies among the firms.
Consequently, the Taiwanese firms turned to the Japanese technology. The Japanese
firms also built supply networks in Taiwan and procured low-end or generic-use panels.
Therefore, in contrast to Korea, the Japanese OEM was the main source for production know-how
in Taiwan, which leads one to conclude that the assistance from the Taiwan government is
diminished or insubstantial, at least at the firm level. The transition in industrial dynamics and the
Taiwanese firms' shift to the Japanese firms from the governmental technologies is the focus that
scholars integrate differently.
Nonetheless, a closer examination of ERSO's projects after the Japanese arrival in
Taiwan indicates that the powerful supports from the Taiwanese government never faded away.
First, the Taiwan government promoted inter-firm networking among the national firms. In
particular, the Taiwanese government constructed TFT-LCD specialized clusters in four locations
in Taiwan, where TFT-LCD manufacturers were connected with other panel manufacturers,
components suppliers, and equipment suppliers. In the clusters, products were manufactured with
one-stop shopping. Also, permission to reside in Hsinchu Science Park was offered upon
satisfaction of certain performance criteria." Second, in addition to the networking efforts, the
governmental technology was used as leverage. Some Taiwanese companies licensed the
advanced ERSO technology - or else used it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the
Japanese firms. ERSO also went on to develop expertise in this emerging technological niche.
Finally, ERSO continued its original mission, development of new TFT-LCD products.
ERSO developed manufacturable low temperature poly-silicon (LTPS), an advanced type of
TFT-LCD product, and started a new pilot line in 1998. It was ERSO's third attempt at providing
LCD technology in Taiwan. This was a good choice, for at the same time the Japanese firms were
electing to transfer Gen 3 technology - then a current (in other words, mature) technology - but
not the emerging technologies like LTPS.48
Perhaps the most successful governmental intervention in technology projects conducted
in developing countries has been the Korean CDMA case. The Korean government's patronage
for incubating the product technology occurred early and was perhaps stronger in the cell phone
industry than in the TFT-LCD industry. In 1989, when GSM and TDMA technology were the
primary communication technologies in Europe and U.S. respectively, the Korean government
initiated projects for CDMA technology commercialization jointly with the Korean firms (see
Table 4.12). The intention was to develop an alternative technology to GSM and to reduce the
tremendous royalty fees being paid.
From 1989 till 1996, a total of 150 million dollars was invested in the R&D project, of
which 80 million dollars was provided by the government. More than 1,000 scientists and
engineers participated in the project (SERI, 2001).
47 In contrast to Taiwan, government-led networking with suppliers was not a major concern for the Korean
government. Because suppliers and equipment vendors in Korea have been verticalized, firms were
clustered around their focal firms. LG and the firms are clustered in Paju and Kumi; Samsung and its firms
produce in Tang-jung and Ki-heung.As we suggested in the previous section, Toppoly was launched based on ERSO's pilot line. Toppoly is a
spin-off firm from ERSO, which provided both its core technologies as well as key technical staff.
Toppoly's first president and CEO was the former deputy head of ERSO, Dr. I-wei Wu.
Table 4.12. Governmental R&D contents for the mobile communication system, 1989-1996
Staff Funding
Year Research contents
1989 - Conceptualization of mobile communication
- Standardization of mobile communication service
1990 - Research on mobile communication network structure
- Research on technology by the mobile communication type
1991 - Implementation of CDMA co-development
- Research on mobile communication switching system and its
standardization
1992 - Experimentation and analysis of RTS in CDMA mode
- Design of CDMA base station and handset machines
-Development of central office and home-location-register
1993 -Development of the CDMA handset phones, base station, and control
office prototypes
-Research on personal communication system (PCS) technology
1994 -Experimentation of system connection and supplementation
-Development of commercialization prototypes and experimentation
1995 -Support for commercialization prototypes for manufacturing
-Supplementation of system functions
- Providing additional services and data services
1996 - Support for system operation












LG, Samsung, Hyundai, Macson, and other Korean telecommunication equipment firms worked
jointly, led by ETRI. Having been initiated in 1989, the CDMA project was scrupulously
advanced over seven years, from the stage of elementary understanding of mobile communication
technologies to initiation of system and handsets manufacturing in addition to providing extra
mobile telecommunication services.
The initial and basic technology was purchased from Qualcomm. Qualcomm was a small
venture firm, and the Korean government preferred a small counterpart for the more
advantageous position when they negotiated royalties. Contact and negotiation with Qualcomm
proceeded quickly. The roles in CDMA development were designated such that the Korean side
would develop and manufacture handset machines, switching offices, and machinery equipment,
including maintaining them, and Qualcomm would be responsible for development and
manufacturing of RTS and base stations, along with joint problem-solving and supporting ETRI
(see Table 4.13). Thus, mass production of the wireless handset with Qualcomm technology was
the mission of Korea.
Yet the R&D team also worked independently in addition to collaboration with
Qualcomm. First, Qualcomm was not involved in production equipment. Moreover, projects
conducted separately by the Korean side and Qualcomm often did not end precisely on time.
Therefore, the Korean side began additional R&D apart from Qualcomm. The telecommunication
case was a good example of a successful tie between government and the private sector. When
the Korean government later organized a task force for the TFT-LCD projects, the
telecommunication experience was very helpful for ETRI and the participating firms.
Table 4.13. Division of labor in development of the CDMA project: ETRI and Qualcomm
ETRI Qualcomm
Design and development of handset machines and Design and development of base station
mobile telephone switching office (MTSO) technologies
Initialization and setup for roving test system Development and manufacturing for RTS
(RTS)
Operation and maintenance for MTSO network Initialization and setup support for RTS
Production of equipment prototypes Support for ETRI for trial performances,
experimentation, and interpretation and analysis of
experimental data
Selection of handset phone manufacturers and Support for ETRI for development of CDMA
support for them
Selection of handset phone manufacturers and
support for them
Source: ETRI (1996)
The Taiwanese firms entered later than the Korean firms, but by 2000 there were more
Taiwanese firms (GVC, API, DBTel for OEM only; and Arima, Compal, FIC, Inventec, and
Quanta) producing cell phones than Korean ones (Amsden and Chu, 2003). The government
support was channeled by ITRI and ERSO and focused on development of important parts and
components rather than development of product technology because the Taiwanese latecomers
were OEM suppliers (Asakawa, 2007; Akabane, 2004).
The Chinese entrants were state-owned enterprises (SOEs) when they began to produce
cell phones in the early 1990s. Firms that were spin-offs from the government labs, for example,
Bird, ZTE, or Eastcom, began OEM early, and then embarked on OBM. Years later, firms such as
Konka, Haier, or Lenovo, which also originated from the state lab, diversified beyond the
electronics industry. From the early period on, the Chinese government actively organized
technology consortia to augment insufficient R&D resources. Regarding technology
standardization and relevant government policies, the Chinese firms were better informed than
the foreign firms.
In addition to incubating firms in the telecommunication industry that previously were
state labs, the Chinese government also performed a unique role in promoting its national firms:
first, the government, imitating Korea, developed an offspring technology from CDMA. Called
"TCDMA," the technology has been China-exclusive and has contributed to market protection
from the foreign brands. China has approved three types of wireless telecommunication
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technology: GSM, CDMA, and TCDMA. Although TCDMA has been criticized for making the
Chinese local firms seek to anchor in the domestic market, the TCDMA technology has
undeniably fostered the growth of the Chinese local firms in the sector.
In summary, governments in late-industrialization enhanced the integration capability of
latecomers by promoting a knowledge-creating network. The government-led networking was
benchmarked from the Japanese government. In the network that the government built, the
government selectively intervened as a technology incubator in product knowledge, or as a cluster
promoter. Latecomers speeded up their entries through government-led networking. However, the
Korean government concentrated on technology incubation, while the Taiwanese government
was involved in both technology incubation and cluster promotion.
4.6. CONCLUSION
We examined latecomers' dynamics in implementing entry projects. Latecomers successfully
penetrated into an emerging industrial sector and acquired critical knowledge for entry,
assimilating and using it in different ways. Yet latecomers generally experiences the following
steps, and their speed of innovation depended on how efficiently each step proceeded and how
seamlessly steps were integrated:
* Selection of a suitable target
* Mobilizing the technology
* Mobilizing the capital
* Breaking in at one point in the value chain
0 Mastering the production process
These steps are similar to the frameworks of Mathews (2003) and Westphal, Kim, and
Dahlman (1985). This chapter has illustrated how latecomers made efforts to shorten the process
and become faster than the leading firms. First, latecomers deliberately selected the TFT-LCD
and wireless handset industry. The target industry selection was made by the owners of
latecomers, based on benchmarking for the leading firms - most likely, the Japanese firms.
In this regard, the owners of latecomers were entrepreneurial because they did not rest on their
success in the mid-tech industries but tried at all costs to upgrade the technological capabilities
into the high-tech industries. The timing of target industry selection also resulted in varied
positions in latecomers' entry strategies. Once identifying the diversification target, the owners of
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latecomers initiated entry vigorously, beginning to acquire technologies required for the entry and
investing aggressively.
Technology acquisition was undertaken in several ways. First, latecomers relocated top
managers from the semiconductor or electronics subsidiaries, so that they fully used expertise
accumulated in the firms. Second, returnees who had advanced degrees and worked at the frontier
firms, although only a few, also provided technological leadership to latecomers. Third,
latecomers' governments played an important role in developing product knowledge and
production skills. Some latecomers favored the foreign firms due to political reasons, and thus the
benefits from the governmental technology to latecomers were varying; but, in general, the
government helped latecomers build technological foundation and ramped up quickly by spinning
off a firm, offering the newest R&D knowledge, or leveraging negotiations between their national
firms and foreign firms.
Latecomers have been very aggressive in making pre-emptive investments. In order to
mobilize capital, they used the business group structure and family ownership. The proactive
investments by the group owners facilitated the progress of projects, eventually leading to shorter
time-to-market; yet, on the other hand, many business groups ran into financial problems. In
addition, government was a good source of research funding. Particularly in the Korean wireless
handset industry, the government was the axis of the Korean firms' entry into the CDMA
technology. The Korean government was a planner, connected the Korean firms with Qualcomm,
invested in product R&D, and negotiated with the U.S. government for market access.
All the projects in R&D, acquisition of production skills, and investments for entry in the
TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries focused on mass production. By mass production plus
lower wages, latecomers could sharply cut product prices. The price competitiveness enabled
latecomers to increase their share in the world market. Accordingly, the most significant concern
for latecomers was to reduce time to mass production and apply intra-firm technologies to the
new industry. While the leading firms entered with substantial product and production knowledge,
latecomers did not follow the sequence prescribed in production management textbooks. They
concurrently implemented all projects and simultaneously learned technologies at different levels,
which eventually made possible fast followership.
Several factors, all of which are related to process (or production) technologies, have
contributed to fast followership of latecomers. Firstly, the project execution capability nurtured
by the business group structure enabled latecomers to quickly integrate learnings from different
locations. Because no single source was dominant in latecomers' acquisition of critical
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knowledge, they were able to quickly absorb and assimilate the knowledge, and to imitate the
leading firms without delay.
Secondly, among the loci of learning, capital goods were perhaps the earliest and most
fundamental source of knowledge. Because technological knowledge via capital goods was
transferred to latecomers when they purchased equipment and constructed facilities, vendors for
capital goods were very useful instructors who taught latecomers production know-how,
sometimes including product knowledge. The equipment vendor relationship was distinctive,
especially in the process-centered technology (TFT-LCD) and for the earlier entrants (the Korean
firms). We have found that technological knowledge is not accessible to earlier entrants in
horizontal relationships with the leading firms, which has made earlier entrants seek technologies
from vendors. In addition, we have noted that geographical proximity enhances efficiency of
learning from vendors.
Thirdly, while earlier entrants in the TFT-LCD industry - the Korean firms - could not
obtain technological knowledge from the peer manufacturers (in horizontal relationship), it was
easier for later entrants, the Taiwanese and Chinese firms, to acquire production know-how from
horizontal relationships (e.g., joint venture or joint production) with other firms which were
motivated to curb the growth of the Korean firms.
Finally, in the case of product-oriented technology (wireless handsets), latecomers were
closely connected with core component suppliers rather than equipment vendors. Because finding
technologically compatible components and integrating them on a PC circuit board is a core
technology in wireless handset manufacturing, latecomers collaborated with core component
suppliers (e.g., Qualcomm) for acquisition of component technology know-how rather than
equipment vendors.
In addition, while TFT-LCD has cycles due to unmatchable demands and supplies in
investments, the technology of wireless handsets has evolved from car phone and analogue
wireless handset, to digital wireless handset - or, more broadly, from calculator to wireless
handset (Amsden and Chu, 2003). For latecomers, production skills were acquired through
international outsourcing (OEM) for top brand firms: before the CDMA success, the Korean
firms accumulated production capability from their manufacturing experience in car phones and
analogue handsets. The Taiwanese firms accessed the advanced production technology via
outsourcing contracts with the Japanese electronics firms.
Because the Korean firms created new trajectories by mass-producing the CDMA phones,
advantages that came from the geographic location close to Japan were not significant (most
Japanese firms produced GSM phones). Yet geographic proximity still mattered: the Korean
103
firms did "parallel project management," working with the American firms, including Qualcomm
and Qualcomm's suppliers. Communication with the U.S. firms was very slow and inefficient, so
that ETRI finished its assigned projects earlier and, while waiting for Qualcomm to finish, began
with other Korean firm participants to work independently on the research that Qualcomm was
conducting. This experience helped Samsung, one of the participants then, to produce, five years
later, wireless telecommunication chips and begin to substitute them for Qualcomm chips.
In this chapter, we constructed three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 addressed the contribution
of business group structure to latecomers' first-to-market position. Hypothesis 2 proposed that
latecomers are speedy in absorbing knowledge from different sources and assimilating them, and;
we call this specific capability "integration capability." Hypothesis 3 particularly examines the
importance of geographical distance from the knowledge sources. We will continue our




WHICH FACTORS ARE RELATED TO SPEED OF
ENTRY BY LATECOMERS?
"We expanded without developing the ability to cope with the industry's
dramatic ups and downs. We should have made our entry based on
capability and integration, not just by financial motivation. This lesson
was very costly."
-- Michael Mou, Former Chairman of DBTel, Taiwan49
5.1. OVERVIEW
In Chapter 5, we test our three hypotheses with a regression model that have been examined by
studying cases in chapter 4. The hypotheses are the same ones that we constructed in the previous
chapters. To briefly recap, our hypotheses are: H1. Speed of entry by latecomers is related to
integration capability; H2. Speed of entry by latecomers is related to business group structure,
and; H3. Speed of entry by latecomers is moderated by the geographic proximity.
We first introduce our empirical setting and then describe our dataset. Our dataset is a
combination of field-collected data and archival data. While we made some introductions of our
49 Cited from Taipei Times (Oct 10, 2005). Michael Mou established DBTel, a Taiwanese handset
manufacturer, in 1979. Having a long-term partnership with Motorola, DBTel promoted its manufacturing
capability and finally decided to expand into the brand business. However, when they shifted to OBM, they
needed a large amount of investment in building "infrastructure" for brand business. Due to a shortage of
funding, Michael Mou got involved in insider trading and consequently had to leave the company.
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data in the earlier chapters, our dataset in chapter 5 is illustrated with more details, including
measurements and variables. Next, we propose our regression model for hypothesis testing. We
use a simple linear regression model. Finally, analysis results and interpretation of the results will
be presented.
5.2. DATA AND METHOD
5.2.1. Empirical Setting and Data
The research setting is two high-tech industries, the TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries. In
chapter 2, we explained the reasons why we selected TFT-LCD and wireless handsets (see
section 2.3.1). The population of our sample is the entire list of TFT-LCD and wireless handset
manufacturers, including OEM, ODM, and OBM. From the population, we draw latecomers who
are OBM. In the wireless handset industry, some OBM latecomers are also ODM or OEM, while
there is no OEM or ODM in the TFT-LCD industry. A definition of latecomers was introduced in
section 1.1 and is also provided in Appendix A.
In Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, we show trajectories of products that latecomers have
manufactured. Some firms have consistently produced all generations of products; others skipped
into the next product technology. For some firms, they started brand business but later turned into
suppliers (ODM). Data sources for these latecomers vary: we have sought data related to
performance and management of latecomers from datasets provided by Moody's, Frost and
Sullivan, Gartner Group, Hoovers online, Euromonitor, and Gale Group. These datasets are
subscribed to by Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They provide information about a firm's
size, establishment year, CEO information, history, subsidiary list, operating industries (at 2-SIC
level), alliance information, and financial statements.
In addition, we have surveyed our sample firms. We had two rounds of field trips to East
Asia to interview our latecomers; the first travel was from May to July in 2003 and the second
field research was from September, 2004 to August, 2005. Field research locations include Seoul,
Suwon, Taipei, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Ningbo. In October, 2007 and in February, 2008,
we also met the R&D managers and marketing directors of our sample firms, who came to recruit
students at the Korean Career Fair, Taiwan Career Fair, and China Job Fair hosted by MIT and
Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Each time we interviewed different people but
their affiliation was either marketing or R&D division.
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Table 5.1. Mass production and latecomer entry in TFT-LCD
Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4 Gen 5 Gen 6
Samsung Samsung Samsung Samsung Samsung
LGE LG-Philips LG-Philips LG-Philips LG-Philips
Hydis
CMO CMO CMO CMO
Unipac AUO AUO AUO
Hannstar Hannstar Hannstar Hannstar
Quanta Quanta Quanta Quanta
CPT CPT CPT CPT




Table 5.2. Mass production and latecomer entry in wireless handsets
Gen 1 (1985 - 1992) Gen 2 (1993 - 2001) Gen 3 (since 2002)
Samsung Electronics Samsung Electronics Samsung Electronics
LG Electronics LG Electronics LG Electronics
Hyundai Hyundai Hyundai, Bellwave
Pantech Pantech and Curitel Pantech and Curitel
Macson Macson, Sewon SK Teletech
Telson Telson Haier, Chabridge, Putian
Eastcom Eastcom Eastcom (became ODM)
TCL TCL, ZTE, Hisense
Panda Panda (became ODM)









We have two dependent variables, seven independent variables, and three control variables. First,
we have the first latecomer and the first-to-market as indicators for speed of entry. Among seven
independent variables, three variables - prior experience, diversification, and family control - are
related to business groups (HI).
Two additional variables are related to internal integration (including managerial and
technological integration) and external integration (also including managerial and technological
integration) (H2).
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We also add two interaction variables, geographic distance from the learning source as
well as joint venture, in order to measure location effects regarding external integration (H3).
Finally, we use size, age, and industry variables to control for extraneous variations. In the next
section, we show how we have measured each variable. A summary of variable descriptions is
presented at the end of the section.
A. Dependent Variables
* First latecomer (FLC): We have defined "first latecomer" as the first entrant from late-
industrializing countries in the TFT-LCD and wireless handset industries. Given entry has been
variously defined (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996), we also have
conceptualized our definition of entry as start of mass production. Hence, we measure "first
latecomer" as a binary variable. A value of 1 is given if a latecomer is the first entrant; otherwise
0.
* First-to-market (FTM): As an extension to first latecomer, we have added "first-to-
market" as another dependent variable in order to examine whether the proposed hypothetical
relationship is supported by the subsequent product entries in a given trajectory. We have
identified firms which first mass-produced, following a chronological order of product innovation.
More specifically, we have the "first-to-market" observations, each from (i) first generation
(analogue wireless handsets), (ii) second generation (digital wireless handsets), and (iii) third
generation (moving-image wireless handsets). 5o For TFT-LCD technologies, the up-to-date




Business groups have several outstanding characteristics that make them distinctive from other
forms of firms. They include social and cultural ties(Leff, 1978), inter-subsidiary
connections(Keister, 1994), diversification (Chang and Choi, 1988; Amsden, 1984, Granovetter,
1994), family ownership (Leff, 1978), or some relationship with government (Kim, 1997;
Granovetter, 1994). Among them, we have selected some variables relevant to our hypotheses:
* Prior experience (PRIOR): Given the importance of skill continuity or likeness in leading
to fast entry, we examine if a firm executes an entry project faster than others with manufacturing
50 The fourth generation - wireless handsets integrated with any electronics - has yet to appear.
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experience in an industry which required similar process and production skills. Prior experience
hypothesizes that related diversification enables latecomers to quickly imitate past activities and
reduce the time required for new entry.
For operationalization of this variable, we had an expert opinion that manufacturing
semiconductors has similar technological traits with manufacturing TFT-LCD. For the wireless
handset industry, we have comprehensively defined "relevant industry" as analogue
telecommunication devices before the PCS age, including cordless phones, analogue wireless
handsets, car phones, intercoms, or beepers. We use a binary variable: for TFT-LCD, value 1 is
assigned if a firm diversified from the semiconductor industry; otherwise 0. Similarly, for the
wireless handsets, value 1 is given if a latecomer diversified from analogue phone businesses;
otherwise 0.
* Diversification (DIV): Not only have our cases identified a link between diversification
and learning, but scholars, particularly in the field of late-industrialization, have also claimed a
causal relationship (Barbero, 2000; Chagar and Vissa, 2005). Therefore, we have selected
diversification and examined whether diversification has indeed induced latecomers into quick
entry. While management research usually uses indices developed by Palepu (1985) or Jacquemin
and Berry (1979), in many cases of latecomers, consolidated financial statements are not
available or sales data at product level do not exist. Given this problem, we adopt the number of
businesses (at two-SIC level) that a firm has entered as an indicator of diversification. Although
this is not the best approach, this measurement has been adopted, especially by researchers who
study the countries that do not follow the Western-style financial system (Li and Wong, 2003).
* Managerial control (CEO): Another well-known characteristic of the business groups in
late industrialization is family ownership. Our case studies presented in chapter 4 have also
confirmed the significance of leadership in executing fast entries. Because entry into a new
business is a major decision accompanied by risks, capital investments, changes in strategy, or
resource re-allocation, we expect strong leadership to drive a firm more quickly into a new
business. However, our measurement is family leadership (managerial control by the founding
family), not family ownership (stock share owned by the founding family). Therefore, we assign
1 if a family controls management of a firm; otherwise 0.
B2. Integration capability
Next, we introduce another set of independent variables, integration capability. We use the ideal
profile index method, following the approach that prior works have used (e.g., Van de Ven and
Drazin, 1985; Venkattraman, 1987; Fujimoto, 1999; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Iansiti and Clark,
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1994). Existing theories have identified several distinctive characteristics of the most effective
organization, particularly in structure, routine, and individual behavior (Clark and Fujimoto,
1991; lansiti, 1992; Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). We aggregate
the organizational variables suggested by these theories and construct "profile" indices.
Subsequently, we measure integration capability by adding up applied cases for the indicators and
construct estimates as an index percentage. 51
We have divided integration capability into internal integration and external integration,
choosing the boundary of a firm as a criterion. Treating business groups as one entity, we have
considered that integration proceeding at any locus consists of managerial integration and
technological integration.52 Many indices, specifically those related to internal integration, have
been borrowed from lansiti (1992), which is based on Clark and Fujimoto (1991). The indices
that the proceeding studies developed have been modified and complemented, for the context of
entry execution.
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed description and
motivation for each of the indicators, it is meaningful to discuss the outline and key dimensions
of our indices. Integration occurs at two loci. First, the internal integration index is concerned
with the organization's technology integration activities as well as managerial interactions.
Internal technological integration explores whether intra-organizational technical learning is
effectively realized, and whether R&D knowledge and production skills are being systematically
developed together. Internal managerial integration examines whether the role of integrator is
singled out and emphasized by the organization, as well as whether managerial expertise for entry
execution is shared among different functional specialties.
External technological integration explores inter-organizational learning processes,
examining whether knowledge generated by interactions among new technological capabilities,
on the basis of the existing competence, is retained within an organization. It is also related to
communication between a learner organization and a source organization, and problem-solving
practices between them.53 External managerial integration investigates higher-level integration
processes between a learner and a source, such as task coordination among different functional
specialties or inter-organizational routines which diffuse newly acquired learning into a recipient
organization.
51 Iansiti (1994) used the same method when he measured integration. For further information, see lansiti
(1994).
52 Iansiti (1994) constructed integration with technology integration, customer integration, and internal
integration.
53 Von Hippel (1994) has argued that the essence of learning is problem-solving practice.
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* Internal Integration (INTERNAL): Based on the interview and survey data, we have
counted how many cases are applicable per each firm and estimated index percentage, regarding
it as a level of internal integration. We have considered integration of managerial knowledge and
technical knowledge when composing an ideal index.
* External Integration (EXTERNAL): We have repeated the same process that we did with
internal integration. We have used calculated index percentage for external integration as a level
of external integration. As with internal integration, we have constructed external integration
based on the two dimensions of managerial knowledge and technical knowledge.
In Table 5.3 presented in the next page, we provide two complete indices for measuring
internal integration and external integration. Each consists of managerial and technological
aspects. Internal integration has 28 items and external integration has 25 items.
B3. Location
The location variables test whether there is an advantage for learning when an entrant is located
in the neighborhood of its knowledge sources. We examine the location effects by including
variables representing distance between a learning source and a recipient. We expect these
variables to affect the speed of entry, by interacting with external integration, based on the
literature arguing that external integration is primarily concerned with efficiency of inter-
organizational learning (Pfeffer and Salanik, 1978; Gupta and Govindarajan).
In order to measure distances, we select two variables: geographic distance and joint
venture. There are several indicators for measuring distances, for example, cultural distance
(Hofstede, 1980; Kogut and Singh, 1988), institutional distance (Kostova, 1999), or geographic
distance (Harzing and Noorderhaven, 2006). Because all sample firms are located in Asia, we
assume that their culture distances or institutional distances do not show significant variations.
We consider joint venture as another location variable because joint venture assumes a
zero distance between firms (a source organization and a learner organization). If a firm forms a
joint venture with another firm, the inter-organizational learning is formalized and thus
supposedly stronger in the joint venture than in a non-joint venture (Hagedoorn, 1993). The
positive effect on knowledge acquisition has been particularly noticeable in developing countries,
where advanced technical knowledge has been insufficient (Child and Markoczy, 1993).
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Table 5.3. Internal and external integration indices
Internal integration: (A) Managerial integration
Project manager exists
Project manager responsible for entry execution
Project manager performs entry planning
Project manager influences engineering
Project manager has direct contact with engineers
Project manager has direct contact with affiliates'
managers
Liaisons have strong influence over affiliates' engineers
Early manufacturing information
Overlapping product and process engineering
Project team involve process engineers
Concept creators influence marketing
Project manager interacts with marketing
Entry taskforce dedicated
Project group shares resources with affiliates
Internal integration: (B) Technological integration
1 Integration group exists
Integration team dedicated
R&D knowledge shared at group level
R&D staffs relocated at group level
Integration group fixes production problems
Integration group chooses production volume equipment
Interact with component group
8 Technical expert exists
9 Continuous cycle (firm)
A person is responsible for the development activities
The project manager has wide responsibilities, encompassing entry execution
The project manager is actively involved in entry planning activities
The project manager exerts strong direct influence on R&D project
The project manager has regular direct, face-to-face contact with scientists and engineers
The project manager has regular direct, face-to-face contact with managers at other affiliates
Project manager liaisons have regular direct, face-to-face contact with R&D at affiliates
Early communications from manufacturing about the manufacturability of the design influence
the development process
The design of product and process are performed with a high degree of simultaneity
Engineers who perform detailed process design are part of the core development team
Concept creators have strong influence over marketing decisions
The project manager interacts with marketing division and ideas are merged
A taskforce is dedicated to entry execution
The project group access tangible and intangible resources owned by affiliates
Responsibility for integration is localized in a single organizational unit, defined to be the
integration group
A core scientist/engineer team is dedicated to integration and development activities
R&D knowledge developed by affiliates are shared with the firm which plans entry
R&D staffs are relocated among affiliates
Integration group is responsible for major production problems on ongoing product lines
Integration group drives equipment choices
Integration group interacts directly with units or persons responsible for component
management
Individual with great depth and breadth of knowledge is in the integration group
The firm markets a continuous stream of technically related products
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Continuous cycle (group)
Production group relocated among affiliates
Supplies produced by affiliates
Equipment produced by affiliates
Integration group interacts with affiliates
External integration: (A) Managerial integration
1 Project manager exists
2 Project manager responsible for wide learning
3 Project manager has direct contact with R&D at source
firms
4 Project manager has direct contact with managers at
source firms
5 Project manager interacts with other R&D groups at
source firms
6 Liaisons have strong influence over R&D both
organizations
7 Liaisons have strong influence over project managers at
both organizations
8 Liaisons have strong influence over process engineers at
both organizations
9 Regular interact between managers at both organizations
The integration group works on a consistent stream of products, with continuity in members
Technical staffs at plants are relocated among affiliates
Affiliates participate in supply production
Affiliates participate in equipment production
Integration group interacts directly with project managers and external integration group
A person is responsible for the development activities
The project manager has wide responsibilities, encompassing learning from other sources
The project manager has regular direct, face-to-face contact with R&D at source firms
The project manager has regular direct, face-to-face contact with managers at source firms
The project manager interacts directly with R&D groups other than ongoing project R&D
groups at source firms
Project manager liaisons have regular direct, face-to-face contact with R&D staffs between a
recipient and a source firm
Project manager liaisons have regular direct, face-to-face contact with managers between a
recipient and a source firm
Project manager liaisons have regular direct, face-to-face contact with process engineers
between a recipient and a source firm
managers at a recipient and a source organization interact regularly
10 Technology and system architecture choice simultaneously Simultaneous technical choice and specification of an entering industry
11 Cross-functional concepts Concepts are created through cross-functional discussion under the leadership of concept
creators
12 Capability for coordination The organization has the opportunity for coordinating projects of different progresses
External integration: (B) Technological integration
1 External integration group exists
2 External integration team dedicated
Responsibility for communication and joint work is localized between two organizations,
defined to be external integration group
A core scientist/engineer team is dedicated to communication and joint work with a source
firm
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3 Day-to-day contact between external source and plant
4 Fix production problems
5 Manufacturing engineering group not on critical path
6 Technical consultancy exists
Interacts with internal integration group
Interacts with component group
Interacts with R&D group
Interacts with R&D group at affiliates
Interacts with equipment group
Regular interact between engineers at both organizations
Capability for quick facility building
External integration team makes available of ongoing day-to-day contact between a source and
manufacturing plant
External integration team makes available of ongoing problem-solving tasks between a source
and manufacturing plant
The core of development of the production process is performed by the external integration
group
External integration group makes available of ongoing technical consultancy from a source
firm
External integration group interacts directly with internal integration group at a recipient firm
External integration group interacts directly with component group at a recipient
External integration group interacts directly with R&D staffs at a recipient
External integration group interacts directly with R&D staffs at a recipient's affiliates
External integration group interacts directly with equipment group at a recipient
Engineers at a recipient and a source organization interact regularly
Facility building lead times are short, and not a significant bottleneck in the design process
Note: Complemented by Iansiti (1992), lansiti and Clark (1994), Allen, Lee, Tushman (1980), Amsden and Hikino (1994), Clark and Fujimoto (1991), Cohen
and Levinthal (1990), Fujimoto (1999), Fujimoto, lansiti, and Clark (1991), Gupta and Govindarajan (2000), Hamel (1991), Henderson (1994), Katz and Allen
(1982; 1985), Kogut and Zander (1992), Larson et al. (1998); Nagarajan and Mitchell (1998), Nelson and Winter (1982), Teece and Pisano (1998), Teece, Pisano,
and Shuen (1997), Von Hippel (1987; 1994), and Zander and Kogut (1995).
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Contrarily, other scholars argue that joint ventures may fall into resource dependency,
bottlenecking progress of a dependent partner (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Furthermore,
unbalanced levels of knowledge stock between two firms lead to different bargaining powers,
which subsequently make joint ventures very unstable and perhaps ineffective in goal
achievement (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997).
During our pilot study conducted in 2003, we asked our sample firms to identify the most
important knowledge required for entry into their business. According to our respondents,
acquisition of production techniques was the most critical factor for entry. Based on the result, we
asked the same firms in 2004 how they acquired such skills and who primarily provided the
knowledge. We have reconstructed answers from them and codified them as a numeric value.
* Geographic distance (GEO): Geographic distance may be expected to first and foremost
have an impact on the physical and knowledge flows between a knowledge source and its
recipient (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988; Feldman, 2000). As other researchers (Harzing and
Noorderhaven, 2006) have done, we treat geographic distance as the flight distance (in miles)
between the airports where a source headquarters and a student headquarters are located.
* Joint Venture (V): We have a binary value for learning through a joint-venture mode. A
value of 1 is given for learning by forming a joint venture; otherwise 0.
C. Control Variables
In addition to explanatory variables, we have included some control variables. These variables
are related to firm performance and thus typically used to control such effects on our dependent
variables from non-hypothesized variables.
* Age (AGE): Because latecomers have grown through diversification (Chandler, Hikino,
and Amatori, 1997; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Khanna, 1997), age represents project
execution capability to some extent. We control for the age effect by considering years of
operation (since group establishment) in the model.
* Size (SIZE): There are studies arguing that large organizations are sluggish and
inefficient in adapting to changing environments (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Possibly, a low internal
integration is driven simply by the larger size of a firm. Accordingly, we control organizational
size by using a logarithm of the number of employees.
* Industry (IND): 1 for TFT-LCD and 0 for the wireless handsets. We have included this
industry dummy variable in order to control for variations from different technological traits.
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5.2.3. Regression Models
The basic idea for our model is that speed of entry (dependent variables) depends on business
groups, integration capabilities, and geographic proximity (independent variables). Models are
simple linear models, and we test our hypotheses with two dependent variables, first latecomer
and first-to-market. The idea can be statistically expressed as follows:
Y =a +fiX + yZ + E
where Y is a dependent variable, X is a vector of independent variables, Z is a vector of control
variables, and e is a disturbance term. Accordingly, a is a constant, f is a matrix of coefficients
on the independent variables, and y is a matrix of coefficients on the control variables. We also
assume that the basic properties of OLS apply.
We provide sample characteristics in Table 5.4. It suggests that latecomers are heavily
diversified and that more than half of our sample firms are managerially controlled by the
founding family. Sample firms consist of the incumbent latecomers.
Table 5.4. Descriptive statistics













Total observations are 50 firms; 16 firms in TFT-LCD and 34 firms in wireless handsets
5.3. RESULTS
We begin by examining which factors have enabled firms to become the first latecomer (see
Table 5.5). Model 1 examines our first hypothesis (H1). Variables such as PRIOR and CEO are
statistically significant and the coefficients are positive. This means that diversification from the
industries which used similar production skills (PRIOR) contributed to fast entry for latecomers.
However, diversification (DIV) in itself was not related to becoming the first latecomer.
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CEO, which represents managerial control by family, is also positively correlated with
the first latecomer status. It supports the leadership effect of the owner family on the speedy entry,
as observed in case studies. The result implies that managerial leadership by an owner makes
decision-making proceed more efficiently than non-owner leadership, given that any entry
requires immense investments and resource leverage at the group affiliate-level.
Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4 examine the effects of integration capability on the first
latecomer position (H2). In Model 2, we have found that external integration (EXTERNAL) is
significantly associated with becoming the first latecomer in the TFT-LCD and wireless handset
industries. This makes sense because, in order to become the first latecomer, a firm is essentially
required to learn quickly and assimilate (or imitate) its product up to the standards of a learning
source (mainly, the leading firm in advanced countries) as fast as possible. Although we do not
present it in Table 5.5, we have also found a high correlation between PRIOR and INTERNAL
(r=0.63), implying that a subset of our internal integration index is perhaps positively associated
with becoming the first latecomer.
Table 5.5. Regression results: First latecomer
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.0306 -0.8957 t  -0.7255 -0.8040







EXTERNAL 2.2229* 1.8689* 2.1850t
(0.8335) (0.8124) (0.8242)






AGE 0.00141t  0.0012 tt  0.0011 0.0011*1
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006)
SIZE -0.0072 -0.0281 -0.0206 -0.0394(0.0303) (0.0263) (0.0254) (0.0272)
IND -0.1091 -0.2343* -0.2557 t  -0.1626
(0.0979) (0.0961) (0.0923) (0.1079)
R square 0.4143 0.4788 0.5363 0.5037
F statistics 0.0013 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
tsignificant at 0.01; *significant at 0.05; T significant at 0.1
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We have further hypothesized the positive role of geographic distance in the international
learning projects (GEO*EXTERNAL) in Model 3, and the results support our hypothesis (H3).
The "first latecomer" inherently assumes a pivotal role in international learning because no
latecomer possessed world-frontier technology when it entered. Our analysis suggests that, as a
latecomer stays closer to its primary learning source, its external integration is more likely to be
enhanced. The firm is then more likely to become the first latecomer, since the first latecomer
project is time-critical.
In contrast, we did not find a significance of joint ventures in promotion of external
integration (JV*EXTERNAL). We conjecture that a joint venture does not always facilitate swift
interfirm learning. This does not mean that a joint venture is useless for interfirm learning; our
argument is that joint venture may be an effective channel, but is not a fast mode for becoming the
first latecomer. We interpret the insignificant coefficient on JV*EXTERNAL, as attributable to
set-up time, managerial negotiation time, and production coordination time.
A particular note is the insignificant coefficients on internal integration. Even though the
validity of internal integration for the first latecomer is asserted by various anecdotes, it was not
statistically supported. In fact, we have found that some Taiwanese firms, which moved from
home electronics, to notebooks, and finally to the wireless handset industry, had their internal
organizations surprisingly well-integrated but, as they expanded, the internal organizations
became very sluggish and unaware of the changing environment.
Next, we have also examined our variables regarding the first-to-market (see Table 5.6).
While both the prior experience (PRIOR) as well as managerial leadership by founding family
(CEO) are significant in Model 1, only PRIOR is significant in Model 5. We interpret that the
leadership factor (CEO) is involved more strongly in the speed of initial entry but becomes weak
in the subsequent product entries, once a latecomer has entered. Diversification itself is not
related to speed of entry (FLC and FTM), although the results hint that a subset of diversification
(for example, prior experience using similar production skills) advances entry. We interpret that
diversification brings economies of knowledge but, as the firm expands, such benefits become
offset by the increasing bureaucratic costs.
In contrast to the first latecomer, not external integration (EXTERNAL) but internal
integration (INTERNAL) contributes to becoming the first-to-market, as Model 6 shows. External
integration is not statistically significant for becoming the first-to-market. It seems that, although
speedy entry depends on external learning, becoming the first-to-market (subsequent entries) in
the given product trajectory requires product upgrading. Thus the speed of product upgrading
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rests more on internal integration, namely, improving on acquired knowledge and deepening of
internalized knowledge, than on external learning.
Table 5.6. Regression results: First-to-market
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8







EXTERNAL 0.0938 0.0529 0.0692
(0.7005) (0.6904) (0.7068)






AGE -0.0013 -0.0013t -0.0015s -0.0013'
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
SIZE 0.0658$  0.0366 0.037911tt 0.0327
(0.0283) (0.0220) (0.0217) (0.0231)
IND -0.0123tt -0.0086 -0.0252 0.0187
(0.0935) (0.0797) (0.0792) (0.0921)
R square 0.4951 0.6494 0.6678 0.6525
F statistics <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
T significant at 0.01; significant at 0.05; TTsignificant at 0.1
The coefficients on INTERNAL show positive signs with three models (Model 6, Model
7, and Model 8). They are all significant, while no sign on EXTERNAL is significant in the same
model. Therefore, it is highly likely that internal integration is more important than external
integration for the speed of subsequent entries.
This finding is consistent with existing literature (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Katz and
Allen, 1982; Sobrero and Roberts, 2001). These studies highlight the role of internal integration
mechanisms for better understanding of acquired knowledge. They also argue that a firm should
invest in its capability to "absorb" external learning in a manner to widen communication
channels among organization members (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and that such internal efforts
make a difference in a firm's long-term capability (Sobrero and Roberts, 2001).
We have also found that neither geographic distance nor being ajoint venture is a
significant factor for becoming the first-to-market, which again stresses the importance of internal
integration. Indeed, we have observed that, once latecomers have entered, they tend to gradually
lessen reliance on the learning source. Further, latecomers begin to replace the imported learning
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with local knowledge, by inviting the local equipment vendors and suppliers to their production
activities, since knowledge localization eventually lowers production costs. Therefore, we claim
that the locus of knowledge management shifts from an interfirm relationship to an internal
process, once latecomers enter the industry.
5.4. CONCLUSIONS
We have set up a simple regression model and quantitatively examined our hypotheses. Data has
been collected from several sources, including fieldwork interviews. We have constructed linear
models and used ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. We have found that, first, some
business group-related variables are positively related to becoming the first latecomer and the
first-to-market. Prior experience using similar production skills definitely helps latecomers
become the first latecomer and the first-to-market, while managerial control by a founding family
is only positively associated with becoming the first latecomer.
Second, we have confirmed the positive roles of both external integration and internal
integration for speed of entry by latecomers. More specifically, external integration is positively
correlated with becoming the first latecomer, and internal integration is associated with becoming
the first-to-market (speed in the subsequent product entries).
Third, we have found that, as the geographic distance between a latecomer and its
learning source becomes smaller, the level of external integration by a latecomer becomes
boosted up, raising the probability of becoming the first latecomer. However, we did not obtain a
convincing result that the same mechanism is applicable to becoming the first-to-market. We
presume that the reason is the relatively decreasing role of external integration in becoming the
first to market. In addition, it turns out that ajoint venture in itself is not related to speed of entry




"Since we entered the TFT-LCD industry, production management has shifted its
focus to internal efficiency from external learning. LG-Philips conceptualizes a
product, and asks LG Chemical to conduct research, borrowing its patented
knowledge. Usually the research does not take long because LG Chemical has
worked with us and thus understands our projects very well. Once LG Chemical
completes R of R&D, LG Electronics promptly begins D stage, which is product-
design engineering. Upon a prototype being done, we ask LG-Philips' verticalized
suppliers to manufacture it. Our experiences have confirmed that this is the shortest
cut to minimize lead time, although it does not necessarily guarantee the lowest
production costs."
- A project manager at LG-Philips R&D division54
"It took 16 months for us to complete a course of product design, assembly, testing,
and shipment to retailers. When we purchased design and manufactured in-house,
the lead time was reduced to 8 months. For the same product, it took only 2 months
when our ODM firm took care of the entire process."
- A manager at Eastcom procurement unit55
6.1 WHY WERE SOME FAST WHILE OTHERS NOT?
This study has examined speed of entry by latecomers in high-tech industries, and discussed
contributions of speed to competitiveness building in the context of latecomers. Speed of entry, in
the context of late-industrialization, is often conceptualized as becoming the first latecomer or the
54 Author interviewed at company presentation hosted by MIT Korean Career Fair.
55 Based on author's interview in China.
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first-to-market. The research question which has consistently run through this study is how some
latecomers have been faster than others, eventually becoming the first latecomer in their industry.
In this study, we have presented answers based on latecomers' pre-entry experiences and their
entry dynamics for two high-tech industries (TFT-LCD and wireless handsets). We have also
reviewed and quantitatively examined whether the determinants for becoming the first latecomer
were further involved in making subsequent entries speedy (first-to-market).
Drawn from theories in economics, management, and policy, three hypotheses related to
our research question have been proposed: (1) speed of entry by latecomers is related to business
group structure; (2) speed of entry by latecomers is related to integration capability; and, (3)
speed of entry by latecomers is moderated by the geographic proximity to a knowledge source.
For hypothesis testing, we have collected interview and archival data, and conducted both
statistical analysis and case studies.
From the case studies, we have identified several factors critical to becoming the first
latecomer and the first-to-market. While some factors are not statistically significant, failing to be
generalizable, others are found to be significant: first, we have observed cases where the prior
experience with skill similarity to the entered industry facilitated entry execution, and the
observations are statistically supported for both the first latecomer and first-to-market
performances. We have also found that managerial control by the owner family helps a latecomer
quickly invest in the skill formation required for a new entry. Yet statistical results indicate that
the managerial control by the owner family is positively related to becoming the first latecomer
but not to becoming the first-to-market. Finally, based on the existing case studies about a leading
group of latecomers which have benefited from diversification in acquisition of managerial
resources and production skills, we have expected a positive effect from diversification on speed
of entry. However, we do not have a statistically convincing result. The supposed economies of
knowledge integration from diversification become offset by the bureaucratic costs from
organization management, once diversification increases beyond a threshold level. Thefirst
hypothesis is thus partially supported.
We have further investigated firm-specific competences that enable a firm to quickly
sense new business opportunities, swiftly mobilize resources for entry, promptly acquire and
assimilate technical knowledge, and rapidly apply the knowledge to the target industry. After
reviewing relevant literature that discusses technology management at the organizational level,
we have conceptualized this specific capability as integration capability. Case studies have
suggested that latecomers, using their organizational structure, have shared and circulated
resources within the group, as well as being connected with people responsible for relevant or
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specialty functions at the subsidiaries. Case studies have also shown that latecomers have closely
collaborated with firms which provide good technical knowledge (e.g., equipment vendors,
governmental research institutes, or suppliers), and that they have been specifically proficient at
making knowledge possessed by the others diffuse into their firms through vertical and horizontal
networks.
Our statistical findings support capability of external integration for becoming the first
latecomer and capability of internal integration for becoming the first-to-market in the subsequent
product entries. Based on the regression analysis, we conjecture that becoming the first latecomer
is driven by quick assimilation of the acquired knowledge, and becoming the first-to-market
depends on internal efficiency in production engineering, e.g., fast improvement on the existing
design, quick technical upgrading based on the current product technologies, to name a few.
Accordingly, our second hypothesis is supported.
We have also proposed geographic proximity as a core hypothetical variable and
examined its effects on inter-organizational learning required for speedy entry. We have found
that geographical distance renders a recipient (a learner) organization less externally integrated,
holding back efficient transfer of technical knowledge and best practices. However, forming a
joint venture (which is the ideal case where geographic distance in inter-organizational learning
should be zero) is not statistically significantly associated with integration. Whereas latecomers
have favored international joint ventures as a vehicle of knowledge transfer, international joint
ventures, paradoxically, tend to increase lead time taken to process decision-making, as well as
tend to be less effective in accessing the core knowledge possessed by the engineers and scientists
who stay at the headquarters of the foreign partner firm. Therefore, our third hypothesis is
partially supported.
This study emphasizes that speed of entry by latecomers has been very distinctive from
speed of entry by firms in advanced economies, which makes our study particularly interesting.
First, latecomers in our study were very entrepreneurial. Beginning from the low or mid-tech
industries, latecomers, specifically the first latecomer, were well aware of the changing business
environments, including technological paradigm shifts, emerging technologies, or falling profits
in the existing industries. Given the situation, they continued to identify the targets (maturing but
technically more upgraded than their current ones), quickly mobilized resources, and promptly
acquired essential knowledge for pushing entry projects. This type of entrepreneurship is different
from Western-oriented entrepreneurship in that it originates from application of acquired
knowledge and adaptation to the changing environment rather than from creation of
fundamentally new products.
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Second, while firms in advanced economies tend to first possess product knowledge
(R&D success) and then begin production, latecomers have prioritized mass production over
R&D performance (acquisition of product knowledge). The first latecomer's entry was executed
without any product patent: the first latecomer concentrated its R&D on development of mass-
production technology, but not on new product development. After having entered, the first
latecomer finally began to develop its own product technology. Therefore, latecomers undertook
entry in reverse sequencing, i.e., getting skillsfirst. Simply put, they began mass production and
later developed proprietary product knowledge (R&D).
Finally, our study has shown that, when the first latecomer had entered, getting
technological and managerial knowledge was extremely difficult and it had to make enormous
efforts to acquire knowledge, which is far from just "somehow" receptively obtaining the
knowledge. Due to difficulties in accessing core knowledge and thus efforts to acquire it from all
directions, no channel or source was predominant in fast entry execution. The same pattern was
observed for the first-to-market case.
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Appendix. Glossary and Definitions
Following are expressions that we call firms like Nokia, Sharp, or Motorola vis-A-vis national
firms in emerging markets The six terms presented below have almost identical meaning, in spite
of some technical variations and nuances allowed.
Leading firms (equivalently, forerunners)
Firms which lead markets. "Leading firms" do not distinguish entry timing. We usually
use this expression for product manufacturers.
Firms in advanced economies
General expression for firms located in environments where frontier technologies,
capital goods, and high skilled workers and R&D personnel are easily accessible.
First movers (similarly, early movers)
Same meaning as leading firms. Only difference from leading firms is that first (or early)
movers are indicated by entry timing.
Foreign firms (equivalently, foreign-owned enterprises or FDI firms)
In general "foreign" indicates non-national ownership. Because our research context is
emerging markets, "foreign firms" is confined to FDI firms from advanced economies or
multinational enterprises. Any outward FDI from a developing country will be
specifically mentioned as "country X's outward FDI."
Multinational enterprises (equivalently, multinationals)
Multinational enterprises access emerging markets via either foreign direct
investment or outsourcing. Like foreign firms, we use multinational enterprises
exclusively for firms originated from advanced countries.
Top brand firms (equivalently, top branded assemblers or top branded upstream firms)
The firms addressed by the above five definitions have their branded products.
Therefore, specialized downstream contractors like Jabil, FIH, or Flextronics are not
included in "top brand firms." They, however, belong to the categories like "firms in
advanced economies," "foreign firms," or "multinational enterprises." Brand, unless
specified, is related to products for final consumer.
In order to make our sample firms distinguished from the "leading firms," I use expressions as
follows:
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Nationalfirms in emerging markets
Private-owned (except the Chinese firms) firms which produce branded products in mid-
income countries. The term "national" is used to make a contrast to "foreign firms." In
fact, many of these "national firms" do public offerings and thus have foreign investors.
Emerging markets indicate of middle-income countries, a group of developing countries
relatively better off and grow faster than other developing countries. Some firms in this
category do ODM or OEM contracts, but we exclude specialized subcontractors, like
Flextronics, from this category.
Latecomers (equivalently, firms in late-industrializing countries)
Initially used by Gerschenkron (1962), the term "latecomers" originally means countries
backwarded in industrialization. When first used, "latecomers" included the least
developing countries (lowest-income countries), but later became re-defined by other
scholars as middle-income countries which started off their economic development based
on manufacturing industries later than the high-income countries did, but showed high
growth rates. In this study, "latecomers" are identical with "national firms in emerging
markets."
While overlapping in many characteristics, we use the following expression for differentiation
from "national firms in emerging markets" and "latecomers".
Local suppliers in emerging markets (equivalently, local subcontractors, or local outsourcees, in
emerging markets)
Our sample firms in this study are branded firms but many of them are also
subcontractors of top brand firms (multinational enterprises). "Local" indicates of
national ownership. Thus, "local suppliers in emerging markets" exclude multinational
enterprises located in emerging markets. "Local suppliers in emerging markets" and the
equivalent expressions are a subset of "national firms in emerging markets" or
"latecomers," for "local suppliers" usually exclude final consumer-branded firms.
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